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THE UNILATERAL ELEMENTS IN MAGIC
THEORY AND PERFORMANCE

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AS CLARK WISSLER has indicated,¹ there is urgent need to take the data of space-time relationships in the field of archaeology and culture history and give to them a psychological analysis and interpretation. This will lift them from the level of earth science and history to social science. Although cultural anthropology claims status as a social science, it continues to do so mainly on the level of archaeology and culture history. I recall the somewhat aggrieved statement of an anthropologist, made some twenty years ago, that anthropology should have occupied the position as human science now held by sociology. He was correct in his general assumption that it had failed to deal with human affairs of contemporaneous interest but he stated no theory as to its failure to adopt those means of human interpretation, the psycho-social, that are most significant in the social sciences. In the brief limits of this paper I should like to offer a few suggestions with regard to the methodology of this newer approach.

Primitive man, like modern man, we may suppose, observed phenomena and theorized with regard to their meaning. If he came to less acceptable conclusions, it was because his facts were less numerous and less dependable and his logic for handling the facts was less refined and trustworthy. Otherwise, his general method was the same and he had the same objective. He was endeavoring more or less consciously to project some method or system of behavior which would give him a better adjustment to nature and to man. He was striving to live more effectively in his environment. In other words, he was trying to control his world, then as now.

This search for a method of control of his adjustment to his world presents, as we see it in analytical retrospect, two major problems. First, the problem of the seat of control or power and, second, the problem of the

¹ See E. C. Hayes (Ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, 50-96, New York, 1927.

nature of the process of the use of this power for purposes of control. The former problem was solved tentatively by the location of the seat of control in certain Objects with Power. Man was manifestly an object with power. It was a matter of frequent experience that he achieved the objects of his desires but he was not endowed with unlimited power, for sometimes he failed. So often in fact did he fail,—and often in very crucial situations involving life and death, and other matters that were consciously of great moment to him,—that primitive men were not only conscious of their power to make things happen, but they were equally, perhaps even more strongly, conscious of the limitations upon their powers. This strong consciousness of limitations to their powers necessarily resulted in an urgent desire to overcome this inadequacy and ultimately led to the development and employment of magic as a means to that end. Among modern peoples it has led to the development and instrumentalization of science and scientific technology, which are in the process of replacing magic as the means to an adequate control of environment and of an effective adjustment of man to that environment. The power that primitive man attributed in some measure to himself, and of which he sought a larger measure, was not the power of scientific technology, but of magic.

Certain other objects, which were not human (although early man did not draw as close distinctions in this respect as we do), were also judged to be objects possessed of this magic power to cause events to happen. These were other animals than men; plants; various inanimate objects, as we call them, although primitive man did not make this distinction; certain natural phenomena, like warmth, sunlight, darkness, succession of day and night and of seasons; and many more, all of which were fairly easily perceivable. Magic power was attributed to all of these objects on the basis of two assumptions. Either events were perceived to occur in time and space juxtaposition of these objects and things, the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* or contiguity associative assumption, or there was observed or assumed to be some real or fancied resemblance or other effective association between an assumed causal object with power (human or otherwise) and the object operated upon or manipulated or the effect produced by such operation. This second hypothesis may be termed the *analogical* assumption.

There appears to be good evidence from the data of primitive life and thought that the location or assumption of a magic power capable of producing desired adjustment behavior antedates in some degree an explanation of the nature of that power. The former process, the attribution of power to an object, is much closer to direct sensory experience and simple perception of cause and effect and utilizes in its early stages of development at least, simple perceptions of time and space relationships. Necessary logical inference in the case is slight and the assumed technique of its operation is simple and relatively direct. A completer and more analytical ex-

planation of the nature of the magical power that causes the desired adjustment response, or prevents it, must, however, await the development of at least the simplest mechanisms of introspection and verbal explanation. In other words, there can be no such explanation until there is a sufficient development of language to enable the primitive thinker or philosopher to make verbal comparisons and explanations.

When early man began to seek an explanation of the nature of this mysterious power which he and other objects manifestly possessed in greater or less degree, he apparently arrived at a conception somewhat analogous to our notion of will power. He seems to have come to this interpretation by an elementary process of self-analysis which associated certain subjective or emotional tensions, that collectively we call will, with overt action in self or other objects. By inference, he transferred the observation of this experience in himself to other men and animals, and even to plants and other objects assumed to have power. Either because he saw these objects with imputed power behaving in a manner similar to his own behavior when willing, or because he associated such objects with imputed power in time or space, or by analogy, with overt action and movement in the objects supposed to be controlled by them, he inferred that they were also acting under the same sort of emotional stress, which we call desire or aversion, affection or dislike, and which he necessarily attributed to some active and efficient detachable inner power (*mana*). Thus, early man not only located the source of this power in objects, as a mysterious or magical "*mana*," but he came in time to develop a crude theory of the nature of this power, or "*mana*," as analogous to that thing that we have been accustomed to call will.

To him this will power, or "*mana*," was an entity, a detached thing, because in its exercise he experienced sensations, mainly visceral to be sure, but nevertheless sensations; and where there were sensations, he, like ourselves, naturally inferred that there was a causative object or external "thing." Being detached from the object in which it resided, this power was looked upon as a mystical force, as "*mana*." Later, this thing, or "*mana*," became a "spirit" to him and it has persisted in a quasi sense as such almost to our own time under the assumption of a guiding spirit which produces results by "act of will." Only now are we learning to analyze this "act of will" naturalistically into emotional conflict tensions and urges that arise in the process of adjustment behavior and to get rid of the concept of a detachable power (*mana* or spirit) which makes things and events happen magically.

We must not lose sight of the fact that early man lacked those scientific data which would have enabled him either to explain will, which is much more easily perceived symptomatically than explained scientifically, or to recognize the fact that plants and inanimate objects or other natural phe-

nomena have no "will," on the human analogy, because they have no sensoriums and can have no emotional urges. To be sure, early man had made many observations of minor causal relationships operating in a purely naturalistic manner without the assumption of a mysterious driving will power, or mana, and such experiences and observations are the basic groundwork out of which and upon which science ultimately is built. But, in the absence of genuine data of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and sociology, his observations and experiences could be interpreted, if and when consciously interpreted, only on the basis of his most immediate emotional experiences accompanying choice and action, or as will causation. He and other putative "objects with power" were, he supposed, able to cause things to happen, according to their wishes or wills. This conception of "will," or "mana," is of course not the modern psychological concept of will as we hold it, but the primitive notion of will, or mana, conceived as a mysterious, detached power residing in the person, animal, or thing, able to cause the desired result. When early man came, somewhat later, to the conception of a god, this god also possessed this same mystical mana or will power and caused things to happen by acts of will or by fiat. This power was retained even in a pantheistical conception of the supernatural and in the metaphysical conception of Natural Law.

This type of assumed causation by will power, or mana, is the essential element in magic.² The essence of magic is assumed power to produce results by means of wish, will, or fiat, but there is a secondary and accessory principle in magic. This is the principle of form. Both will power, or mana, and its overt expression in action must be kept constant if the willed act is to be effective in securing its intended result. This demand for constancy of form in magic undoubtedly grows out of a feeling of anxiety for the result of the action and the patent observation that a change of desire or of procedure easily produces a modification of consequences. This capacity of a change of form in the willing or the exercise of mana by the worker of magic and in its supplementary instrumentalization, to modify the results of willing is easily transferred by inference or observation to changes of form in the behavior of surrounding persons and things, and eventually to all other objects that have time, space, or interest associations with the causal situation. Ultimately this need of stability, this fear of disruptive change in the magic bearing circumstances, may also acquire an ethical significance, requiring all associated persons to conform strictly to an elaborated system of magic as a strict personal or social obligation. Some very queer results may come from this extension of the magical significance of form to embrace all related circumstances, such as the necessity of the African king

² See L. L. Bernard, "Psycho-Sociological Interpretation of Magic," *Publ. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, 22:60-71, (1928).

mentioned by Frazer³ to sleep sitting up in his chair in order to keep the winds blowing; of the Japanese emperor to sit immovable on his throne with his crown in place in order to insure the stability of the empire; of the compulsory meticulous observance of all forms of the ritual, of prayer, of dress in current orthodox magical religious ceremonials; and other like magical requirements in primitive and modern religious and secular life sufficiently numerous to fill an encyclopaedia.

It is not intended here to go into a detailed analysis of the psychology of magic. Something of this sort has been done elsewhere.⁴ It is merely desired to make clear these two major personality elements that inhere in magic. One of them, detached will power, or mana, goes back to the earliest forms of magic, and the other, form, which grows into ritual, is also very primitive, although apparently of somewhat later date of origin and development. The aspect of form in magic grows into great importance as ritual, which, in the character of systems of magic, develops into religious controls of a supernaturalistic character. Thus, ritual, the embodiment of ceremonial form, comes to be as important as will power, perhaps even more important, as magic becomes systematized, for form is the essence of systematization. It is, however, sufficient here to note the fact that both of these aspects of magic, will power, or mana, and form, or ritual, are personality attributes. The purpose of this paper is to trace in skeleton form the unilateral persistence of both of these personality forms throughout the development of supernaturalistic controls. In fact, they antedate anthropomorphic supernaturalism, and they persist after anthropomorphic supernaturalism tends to decline into relative insignificance and neglect in the theory of social control.

First, then, in tracing the unilateral development of personality elements in relation to the supernatural in magic, let us examine briefly the successive types of objects in which this magic power is lodged. If we omit the general object, nature, which is said by some anthropologists and observers of primitive religion to be feared by primitives, we are able to distinguish seven of these types of objects, as follows: fetishes, totems, spirits, heroes, gods, metaphysical principles or essences (finally summated by the metaphysical philosophers as Natural Law), and the social collectivity. Each of these will be considered briefly in its turn. The point to be emphasized is that each of these types of objects endowed with magical power is regarded at the time of its dominance as a control medium or device, as a carrier or embodiment of mana or will power, by means of which it exercises direction over events on the analogy of putative human willing. There is here a complete unilaterality of development, as far as the mystical power is concerned, although the imputed magic will power inherent in the control

³ *The Golden Bough: The Magic Art.*

⁴ See L. L. Bernard, *op. cit.*

mechanism necessarily expresses itself with some degree of variation according to the nature of the concepts of psychical causation that are dominant at the time concerned.

Obviously the fetish and the totem are not to be distinguished primarily by the nature of the objects that serve as the one or the other, but mainly by the person or persons each serves in the practice of magic, and secondarily by the form in which the act of will or the manifestation of power exerts itself in the one or in the other. This latter distinction is in many cases so slight as to be almost negligible. Both fetish and the totem are not only objects with power but they are also interchangeably instruments of power as exercised by another object or person, that is, means whereby the human or animal magician may achieve his own ends through magic. The fetish may perhaps more frequently serve this instrumental function than does the totem, although the totem also very often functions as an instrument of some worker of magic. Both fetish and totem, moreover, have in themselves such mana or power of will, on the analogy of the human will, that they are capable of producing good or evil effects on their own account. Perhaps, here again, the fetish is ordinarily the more passive of the two objects with power. Like the earliest men, the fetishes are not likely to be particularly active in producing their magic results. They are reservoirs of magic energy or of mana to be exploited by the worker of magic or medicine man, rather than actively concerned in working magic for themselves. As early man lacks full self-consciousness regarding his powers and is accustomed usually to take things as they come to him, so the fetish frequently lacks the initiative which is often possessed by the totem. The analogy between early man and the fetish in this respect is clearly observable, and may be attributed to the fact that the putative power of the fetish to work magic or exercise control over events and things is merely a projection of the primitive man's consciousness of his own real or supposed powers by analogy or association into the fetish itself.

Since both the supernaturalistic concepts, fetish and totem, are, as conceived by primitive man, human creations or conceptual generalizations rather than objective facts, they may be properly regarded as having significance only in relation to man's theory of control of adjustment through magic or the direct exercise of will. Early man sought to establish a relationship with fetish and totem in order to secure ends thereby that seemed to him to be possible and desirable. These objects with power were conceived by him to be able to secure for him an adjustment which he valued. In return, he was willing to render the service, in the form of respect, flattery, ceremonial performance, or material aid, that he believed necessary and within the limits of the value of the favor conferred upon him, in order to secure the end desired. Since the fetish is generally of prior origin to the totem, it may be assumed to have less personality, but this is not

necessarily and uniformly the case. While most fetishes are inanimate things rather than living objects, more recent forms of the fetish, especially the mascot and the spirit,⁶ may have more personality than the older forms of the totem. In fact, any object whatever that can be regarded as possessed of will or personality power and is capable of magical manipulation in the service of man may be regarded as either a fetish or a totem by the primitive. Many modern persons who believe in magic also recognize or apply this psychological principle, but with a change of names. The amulet or charm are used in this same manner. Even the "watch charm," which now is regarded merely as an ornament, still usually retains the form of a fetishistic object or scroll or monogram or other symbolic mystery which once was firmly believed to have magical power or mana. Dogs and cats, and other animal pets, or even plants, and human well wishers, are often regarded as possessing a mystical power to bring their possessors good luck, thus continuing the character of the fetish or totem under other names.

It was said above that the distinction between fetish and totem is not to be found primarily in the objects themselves functioning as such, but chiefly in the person or persons with whom they are associated. The essential definition of a fetish is that it is an object of any character whatever that sustains a special magical service relation (frequently more or less passive and manipulated) to some human individual. It may be a curious stone, a bear's claw, a bone taken from a hunted animal or from a human being, a sacred mountain, a heavenly body, an animal or a plant. The essential point is that it must have mystical or personality power or mana, that is, detached will power, which is made available to some human being who has a special magical relationship to it. Although fetishes were most characteristically associated with early primitive men, they still survive in such forms as President Woodrow Wilson's "buckeye" which he carried around with him, the Negro's rabbit foot, the amulet of the superstitious, or the stock-market gambler's favorite pencil. Naturally, the fetish must be something with which the individual may establish a special magical relationship, whose "mana," or "will power," he may control.

On the other hand, the totem is any object, material or immaterial, that is possessed of this magical "mana," or "will power," which has been enlisted in the service of the group, the clan or tribe, as a whole. Some of the objects that have been listed as totemic objects by those familiar with the manners and customs of primitive peoples are natural inanimate objects, such as stones of peculiar shapes or colors or location; prominent objects in the landscape or in the heavens, such as the moon and the sun; occasional

⁶ This shade or other self of the fetish or totem is clearly a projection by analogy upon these objects with power of the notion of primitive man that he himself is possessed of a shade, or spirit, or soul. Thus, personality in the fetish or totem develops *pari passu* and as a result of the idea of personality in the subject.

man-made objects, such as a metal cooking pot, which was a matter of particular pride and value; a great variety of useful plants, including fruits, vegetables, and grass; edible or otherwise important animals, such as the grasshopper, locust, dugong, turtle, fish, chameleon, snake, python, birds, and fowls, crow, hawk, turkey, eagle, bear, fox, wolf, lion, tiger, sheep, ox, and even fabulous animals and spirits. Here we find the totem entering into the realm of imaginary objects and even of abstractions, such as the sunshine or the moonlight, aspects of the seasons, and also mental and moral qualities. I have listed these illustrations of the totem in an ascending order of their evident possession of will power, or mana, on the one hand and of their abstractness of conception on the other hand, because I believe this is approximately the order in which they developed. Only the earlier peoples accepted the less animate and simpler material objects as totems, worshipping such objects as stones, caves, mountains, rivers, and the moon and the sun. But examples of the worship of abstractions and of spirits and mythical personalities comes down much later, even into our own time. Just as primitive peoples ate their totems ceremonially, or found other means of ceremonial identification with them, in order to achieve a closer magical relationship with them, even barbarian and more or less civilized peoples have been known to eat their gods, the lineal descendants of the totem, in fairly recent times. Other more abstract or "spiritual" means of identification with abstract totemic objects are even more common as modern survivals.

It is not possible to enter here into an account of the origin of the conception of, or belief in, spirits. It is familiar to all anthropologists. Suffice it to say that a belief in spirits could not have arisen until the primitive conception of the primal personality element of will power, or mana, had expanded through experience and self-analysis into a more general notion of personality as a whole. The rudimentary concept of will power and of objects with power of will, as described above, or of mana, undoubtedly appeared long before the complex idea of an integral human personality was evident on the intellectual horizon of primitive man. The fetish and the totem were products of this earlier rudimentary concept of will-in-things or mana, just as spirits and heroes and gods were the products of the developing theory of personality in a wider and completer sense. It was of course not possible for earliest man to picture himself as an integrated personality in the modern sense of the term. It may have been many hundreds of thousands of years after he crossed the hypothetical line between the nonhuman animals and man before he even arrived at the crude early notion of will power or mana and objects with power that has been described above. The nearest approach to such a recognition that we see among animals is that they are conditioned to fear some types of animals and to approach and even to show a low type of affection for others.

It must have required many millenia for early man, already possessed of the notion of will power, or mana, in objects, to analyze the behavior of self and of others, with the help of expanding language concepts, until he could perceive the profiles of personality to such an extent that he could conceive of spirits. The early spirits, we know from the study of the most primitive peoples, were like the people themselves, very limited in character and wholly wanting in general idealism. Like the totems and the fetishes, they helped their allies and harmed their enemies. Also, they performed these functions more subtly and efficiently and less mechanically, because they had more personality. That is, the primitive emotions of fear and anger and the lusts were being supplemented by more subtle and benevolent emotions and by brighter gleams of intelligence. As the personalities of man and spirits expanded, they did their work of magic ever better than before. These spirits were only abstracted and stepped-up totems. They were, in fact, at first merely the shades or other selves of the totems.⁶ Many of them were plant and animal spirits and some of them were spirits of places, of stones, of mountains, of heavenly bodies and the like. Such a mythology as that of Greece and Rome offers us almost innumerable examples of this spiritualizing of the old material fetishes and totems into invisible personalities. Even such a writer as Toy, who combats the idea of the transmutation of totems into spirits and gods,⁷ nevertheless presents a succession of data which goes far to disprove his own theory and to substantiate the one set forth here.⁸ Budge has illustrated the same trend in his study of the Egyptian religion.⁹ The evidence on this point seems to the unprejudiced student to be overwhelming.

The appearance of heroes dates both before and after that of spirits. There could be no heroes without an understanding of the major aspects of personality; but with the coming of such an understanding, the totem tends to merge into the hero. The hero represents, in fact, a projective idealization of the benevolent will traits which were already beginning to be realized in the spirits. He is a glorified friend or ally of the tribe, such as the friendly totem could be only as it merged into the hero with his more highly developed personality traits. He is the personification of all or much that the community would like to be or do for itself, reduced to human form and, perhaps usually, but not necessarily, attached to some actual living or deceased personality. As a myth, the hero lives in the ideals of the people

⁶ The Homeric account of the dead contained in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey* is in perfect harmony with this interpretation of the primitive man's conception of ghosts or spirits as passive and incompletely evolved personalities which could be manipulated, like fetishes, by magic workers. The same truth is illustrated by the character of the ghost or spirit of Samuel called up by the Witch of Endor at the request of Saul. See also V. D. Macchiore, *From Orpheus to Paul*, 35, 155.

⁷ C. H. Toy, *Introduction to the History of Religions*, 266-267.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 267-276.

⁹ E. A. Wallis Budge, *From Fetish to God in Ancient Egypt*, Oxford, 1934.

and usually has a human mundane base or stem. Thus, it is the hero that slays the totem, or shall we say, devours him; for the totem is swallowed up by the hero by virtue of the richer personality and the greater benevolence of the latter. It is not that totems do not persist after the coming of heroes, for they do; and to some extent they become rivals of the heroes, for the totems also acquire personalities. They become transformable into men and they have the souls of men in their animal or plant bodies. Even the sacred mountain or the sacred rock or river acquires anthropomorphic spirits. Formerly, mere animals or plants or stones might have more will or magical power, more mana, than men, and such nonhuman objects might be superhuman, although not necessarily supernatural. But when personality grew to be much more than bare will power, or mana, and the concept of spirits arose, the superhuman was merged with the supernatural, or the spirits, and later with the gods. Thus, the fetishes and totems gradually ceased to be superhuman. They did not disappear, but they either took a very subordinate place, like our modern amulets and mascots, or they borrowed importance from men and the spirits by acquiring their forms. Hence, occurs the evolution of magical fetishistic and totemic objects into spirits, usually and increasingly possessed of human forms.

When the human hero first appeared as an exceptional hunter, warrior, artificer, or magician, he still remained human; but with the coming of spirits, it was but a step to transform him into the supernatural and to make him, like the spirits, also superhuman. Thus the hero became a super-spirit, for he was the personification of extraordinary spiritual powers, with an extra allowance of both magical powers and good will. He was a spirit, because only the dead ordinarily could become exalted as heroes of this supernatural type. Not otherwise could sufficient illusions about them easily be created.

This exaltation was accomplished in two ways, perhaps in three. At his death, the ghost or spirit of the hero survived and remained a local power or ghost to conjure with long after. In other cases, tradition or folk embellishment raised great heroes of the past into demigods and gods. Thus, Perseus and Hercules, and the ethical heroes of the later reformistic religions, such as the Prophets, Dionysius, Buddha, Jesus, Paul, came into existence. In a third type of cases, a powerful political or sacerdotal personage might be ritualized into divinity even in his own life time. As in the case of the Pharaohs, for example, his elevation to high office deprived him of ordinary human personality and made of him the chief functioning spiritual personality which personified and represented the sacred institution, which persisted more or less as a folk illusion, and also the hopes and wishes of the people. In large measure, the higher priesthood was subject to this same sort of metamorphosis of the human into the divine by virtue of the ritual that divorced them from ordinary life and gave them to the institu-

tional fellowship of the gods. This last transformation of the hero could occur only in the age of the gods. The essential thing to note here is that the personality of the hero, either as a human being or as a spirit, or later as a god, is not of a different order from that of the fetish, the totem, and the spirit, but is merely a type of magic working person with power who has grown in status and definition with the corresponding growth in power of personality analysis of his type. The saint is, of course, the hero with the highest modern development of personality in the direction of supernatural, as well as superhuman, magic working power of will, or mana. The saint is merely the theological version of the popular folk hero.

The gods first come onto the stage as spirits with even more highly developed personalities. Their power of will, or mana, has been still further refined and increased, especially in the direction of the benevolent emotions and intellectual analysis. In the polytheistic stage, it has also been specialized and departmentalized, as well as increased in power and effectiveness. It is not a different sort of personality or power, but is more highly developed and richer in its attributes. Even with the approach to monotheism, through henotheism, we see merely a perfecting of personality rather than a change in kind. How marvelously personality has grown from the scant anthropomorphic attribute embodied in mana, on the analogy of the human will, that characterized the fetish, in its long development towards the richness of an idealized, projected personality of the monotheistic deity! But magic is still the form of the power that is used at both of these extremes of supernaturalistic personality. The gods, like the fetish or the totem, disdain to employ the principles of physics or of chemistry, or of any other science, to achieve their ends. They use will or fiat, the royal instrument of the gods. Did not the gods say let there be this and that item of creation? And behold! there is was.

With the coming of the gods, or rather of the greater gods, the great supreme gods, the unilateral development of personality ends. We have reached the last stage through which personality passes under the aegis of control through magic. There now begins a transformation in the theory of personality, in which it ceases to be explained in terms of magic will and is reintegrated on the basis of science. Will is no longer regarded as an isolated, detached, causal entity, but becomes a functioning organization of behavior, built up through the conditioning of responses. The telling of the steps taken in this transition from magical postulates to a scientific explanation of will theory is another story and cannot be undertaken in detail here, but it may be said that the transition was made, not in primitive, but in historic times, through a gradual replacement of theology, first by metaphysics, and later by science. The personality attributes of the gods were broken down into metaphysical essences and principles. Metaphysical pantheism replaced theology; then Natural Law supplanted

revelation; finally, experimental methods of science were substituted for the metaphysical postulates of Natural Law. Science ultimately produced social science; and collective will or action, guided by the social sciences, assumed charge of the adjustment behavior of mankind. At least, social science offers its services in this connection.

In all of this grand process, the evolution of the control over behavior so scantily summarized here, in which magic is finally replaced, or is to be replaced, by science, we find a fourfold evolution. 1. A magical concept of will power, or mana, appears to facilitate and standardize the theory of the control of adjustment. 2. The concept of fiatistic will is expanded and instrumentalized by a developing analysis or understanding of personality. 3. Personality analysis develops from the emotional into the intellectual and produces a logic which reduces human behavior to metaphysical principles or essences. 4. Metaphysics gives way to science and the logic of magic and of metaphysics falls before the logic of science. Personality does not disappear with the discrediting of magic, but becomes rational with the development of a science of social psychology, by means of which supposed magical will-causation is explained in terms of the conditioning of responses.

If we turn now specifically to the element of form in the personality sequence on a magical plane, we find that successive developments fall into three fairly distinguishable planes or levels of magical performance. These are the overt behavior level, the literary or symbolic language level, and the integrated logical or philosophical level. We shall take up each of these levels briefly in turn, recognizing that there is a rough correspondence between the personality type, based on the detached will power, or mana, system of causation, and the form of the magic performance. Thus, the overt behavior forms of magic performance seem to have their greatest initiation during the predominance of fetishistic and totemic magic but continue on through the development of succeeding forms of magical performance. Roughly speaking, the literary or symbolic language forms of magic performance are associated at their maximum development with the preponderance of willed control through heroes, spirits and gods, although the beginning is earlier and the persistence is later. The integrated logical or philosophic level begins in earnest with the gods and reaches its height during the period of eclipse of personality under the metaphysical and scientific systems of adjustment control, as expressed in terms of pantheism, the postulates of Natural Law, and scientific sequence and coincidence or correlation of phenomena. That is to say, the overt behavior and the literary or symbolic language forms of magic are both closely correlated with personality, although the literary and language forms of magic are associated with higher forms of personality than are the overt behavior forms. The integrated logical forms begin in the period of the highest personality development but they also survive personality, just as they also survive magic itself as a means of control of adjustments.

The overt behavior forms of magical control by means of mana, or detached will power, fall into the two classes of contact and imitative magic. Mana is transmitted by touch, which may take on the form of force. Forceful manipulation, such as a blow or a kick, or a shove, may convey will as well as momentum. Sometimes primitive peoples beat their fetishes, their totems, leaders, or even the images and living incarnations of their gods, in order strongly to impress upon them, or the spirits which they represent, their own willed attitudes or desires, much in the same way that they beat their domestic animals, their slaves, or their women for the same purpose. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the use of such physical violence for purposes of control of the behavior of other people and things is not regarded as merely an exercise of physical force, in the scientific sense of that term, but rather as a special and more violent than usual application of will power, or mana, motivation. In the minds of the perpetrators, it constitutes magical rather than mechanical method, but this process of conveying will power, or mana, by means of force is perhaps exceptional rather than the general rule. The usual method of this type is by light touch, such as the laying on of hands, touching the body or the raiment; or it may even be limited to pointing at the person or object that is to be influenced. Many magic-ridden primitives object very strenuously to having strangers or enemies point at them, or even talk about them in their absence, or when they cannot hear. This aversion to being talked about still persists in fact and in its modern form it is by no means always purely a rational dislike but is frequently based on an assumption of magic. The expression, "My ears burn; somebody is talking about me," illustrates this superstitious belief in magic.

The magic of similarity is more advanced and correspondingly more complicated. In its higher forms of verbal mimicry, it runs over into the literary forms of magical control. In its simplest manifestation, it consists of pantomime, in which the object whose virtue the magician wishes to possess or whose conduct he desires to influence is imitated in body movements. Instead of pantomime, drawing, painting, or sculpturing (making of an effigy) the object may be resorted to, supposedly with equal, or almost equally valuable, results. All of these processes may involve total mimicry, or they may be only partial in their imitativeness. Gesture is the most typical form of partial mimicry. The trait or behavior desired is indicated rather than completely described in gesture magic. Verbal magic is almost always partially imitative and largely indicative, but whatever form of overt behavior magic is used, the purpose is always the same,—to convey or to receive mana, or will power, from one object to another.

The literary or symbolic language forms of magic control are not entirely separate from the preceding forms. They are simply more complicated and more highly organized or integrated verbal expressions of the same attitudes. They develop out of the lower forms of overt magical practice,

largely through gesture language. Their distinctive characteristics are that they have complex, describable meanings. That is, they consist of spells, blessings, curses, and prayers or petitions for the reception of good mana, or good will, or for the avoidance of bad mana, or evil will. Spells may be laid wholly through overt contact, but more easily and effectively through overt imitative procedures or gestures, and more easily still by means of a mixture of descriptive and emotional verbal language. In either case, if they are to be distinguished from mere overt behavior magical performances of the contact or imitative types, the spells must be accompanied by or consist of some sort of gestural, pantomimic, or verbal meaning expression. In their highest forms, however, they are clearly verbal, and consist primarily of benedictions, curses, and petitions, as stated above.

The literary or language form of magical performance has two distinctive advantages over the other forms. Their linguistic expression renders the process more easily definable and, as a result, more effectively communicable or transmissible. Thus, the conditioning of the requisite responses in the subject is greatly facilitated. Both of these advantages apply alike to the person or object to be influenced and to the one who wishes to acquire the magic art or magic control over another person or thing. In order that the form of the magic may be effective in its influence upon its object, it seems to be necessary both to define it and to communicate it to the object. Thus is the subject conditioned properly to respond to the suggestion which is the essential element in literary or verbal magic.

The integrated logical or philosophic forms of magic grow out of and overlap the preceding forms, at least in the more primitive developments of this higher type of magic performance. This fact is, of course, one of the evidences of the continuity or unilateralness of the development of form in magic control. There are no mutations from one form or level of magical performance to another but merely growth in complexity and in organization. The ritual, which is the lowest integrated logical form of magic, is not even philosophical, although in the course of time every ritual tends to develop a philosophical explanation or tradition. It is at first almost completely overt, harking back to the overt behavior patterns of magical control through detached will power, or mana, when literary forms of magic were as yet very inadequately developed; but in time ritual adds verbal processes to pantomime, to partial mimicry, and to gesture; and ultimately it is swallowed up in the next succeeding stages of magic forms. These of course are mythologies and theologies. There is no essential difference between mythologies and theologies, except that a mythology is a dead or outmoded theology which has become largely esthetic, or a means to intellectual amusement, instead of a settled conviction and an obligation to magical performance. By virtue of this fact of relative power of survival, we may safely assume that the mythology, while it still remains in its

original theological pattern, is more crude in form and expression and less abstractly verbalized, and in fact less verbalized altogether. In its later nontheological development, when it has lost its serious and sacred character, mythology becomes a subject for art in a sense that would be impossible for an active theology. As such, the imagination is brought to play upon it in a variety of ways which result in its fanciful and loquacious elaboration that may render it highly literary and artistic on the lighter and more fanciful side. Both mythology and theology, however, deal primarily with personalities, natural and supernatural, and are highly integrated systems developed originally for the purpose of facilitating magic control through the transmission of detached will power, or mana.

When the personal will aspect of this magic control begins to drop out, the mythologies and theologies also have begun to decay. Personality and theology are as inextricably bound up as are magic and will power, or mana. In fact, the two systems parallel and supplement each other. One is not possible without the other. As we have already pointed out, metaphysical categories of essences and logical principles, embodied ultimately and systematized in the form of Natural Law, replace supernaturalistic personalities in accounting for human behavior and human destiny. At the same time, the magic of a detached personal will power, or mana, is replaced by the magic of a pantheistic or universal and impersonal will.

The process of analyzing this universal or metaphysical logic into its concrete specific processes leads to science, just as the process of instrumentalizing its magic by means of mechanical and psychological processes develops practical and nonmystical technologies of mechanical and symbolic controls. Thus, a scientific theory and a scientific technology emerge together from the metaphysical logic that replaced theology. This scientific theory and this practical common sense technology expand ultimately to include a social science and a social technology, which in turn give rise to a theory and a technology of social control that are analogous to the physical sciences and technologies and which, like these, dispense with the magic of will power, or mana. Thus, finally, man learns to consummate his adjustments to environment more effectively without either the use of magic or the employment of objects with detached will power, or mana. The magic is replaced by naturalistic mechanical, psychic (symbolic), and social processes, and the assumed use of will power, or mana, as a means to compelling desired results through supernaturalistic agents gives way to scientific analysis of the conditioning factors involved and to their constructive utilization for the production of desired ends. Here, therefore, we have come to the limit of the second part of our theme, which was to trace the unilateral elements in the personality sequence of early supernaturalism, both as to will and as to form. The analysis has been brief and highly compressed, but it is hoped that in outline, at least, it has been not unclear.

DESIGN FOR SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS*

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INTRODUCTION. From diverse experiments with the experimental method in education, psychology, and sociology, a pattern of practicable procedure has begun to emerge. It is our opinion that this pattern of procedure supplies the outlines of a long desired design for social experiments. To avoid misunderstanding of terms, let us state at the outset that by experiments we do not mean such trial and error efforts as the NRA, the AAA, the TVA, or similar gigantic social-economic reforms which are without controlled variables or adequate devices to measure their effects. We mean by experiment the observation of the changing relationship in an interval of time between two variables, meanwhile holding constant or controlling several other variables, which if uncontrolled might themselves explain or cause the effects. Suffice it to say that we shall attempt to describe briefly the efforts made to adapt the experimental method of physical science to the study of cause and effect or functional relationships in the social field. Our analysis is based upon three published or otherwise recorded experiments available for examination by those who are interested.

2. *Example of the Published Results of a Social Experiment* (Dodd). One of the best documented and recorded results of an experiment that has been published is Stuart C. Dodd's, "A Controlled Experiment on Rural Hygiene in Syria."¹ Dodd set out to discover the relationship between a program of rural hygiene and the hygienic practices of the families that were supposed to benefit by the program. The program of education in hygiene was put on by an itinerant travelling clinic of the Near East Foundation from 1931 to 1933. The beneficiaries were 40 families in the Arab village of Jib Ramli in Syria. It is generally believed that efforts to improve the hygienic practices of individuals and families actually result in such improvement that morbidity and mortality are lowered, and general comfort and happiness is increased. Strange as it may seem, the validity of this assumption has seldom been tested, although millions of dollars are spent annually throughout the world on preventive medicine.

Dodd decided to set up an experiment that would attempt to measure the effects of hygienic education upon the hygienic practices of a group of individuals and families. In Dodd's study, "Hygiene means all the knowledge, practices, and environmental conditions which are under the control

* From a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society at Detroit, 1938.

¹ Publications of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, *Social Science Series*, No. 7, American University of Beirut, 1934, pp. 336.

of the family and which tend to increase health."² To determine the progress in hygiene, it was necessary to measure change in hygiene in the direction desired by the groups undergoing it. Observe that there is no arbitrary or absolute goal to be attained. The goal is one determined by the opinions of the people. The scale to measure hygienic change was, however, constructed in an objective manner and its reliability and validity determined. A preliminary list of 270 questions was scored on a 1000-point scale with the assistance of nine competent judges who allocated the weights. From this list, a shorter form of 77 significant questions was derived.³ Sources of error were examined and shown not to exist as between samples, different informants in one family, different interviewers and different scorers. Reliability coefficients of $+ .91$ on informants and $+ .94$ on interviewers were found. Validity coefficients of $+ .76$ were obtained with indices of mortality or "survival," of $- .53$ with morbidity, and of $+ .65$ with longevity.⁴

The scale to measure hygiene having been standardized, the next problem was to select villages to serve as controls on the experimental village that received instruction. Three Arab villages were selected as controls although only one survived the test as an adequate control. These villages were located so that there was little likelihood of hygienic practices spreading to them from the experimental village of Jib Ramli. The control villages were selected also with reference to their similarity both to the experimental village and among themselves on nine different factors, which if variable, might themselves explain the final effect, rather than the final effect being the result of the program of instruction in hygiene. The controlled variables were: geographic, demographic, historical, economic, religious, domestic, educational, recreational, and sanitary conditions. The extent to which these controls were quantitatively established is not clear.

In 1931, all four villages were scored on the hygiene scale. Then for two years, that is, from 1931 to 1933, the experimental village of Jib Ramli received systematic instruction by visits from the travelling clinic. The control villages received no such instruction and were by geographic location supposed to be isolated from any influence spreading from the clinic. In 1933, all four villages were again measured on the same hygiene scale and their scores compared. It was found that the experimental village increased its score from 253 points in 1931, to 304 points in 1933, a gain of 51 points, at the close of the period of hygiene instruction. The control village also increased its score from 241 points in 1931, to 286 points in 1933, a gain of 45 points without visible instruction in hygiene. Does the fact that the experimental village gained six points more than the control village prove that the effects of a hygiene program are less marked than is

² *Ibid.*, xii.

³ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

generally believed? Dodd makes no such claim. He concludes that the experiment may have been vitiated by incomplete isolation of the control village from the influences of the clinic.⁵ Our opinion is that an additional weakness in the experiment was the inability to obtain adequate control of the nine factors supposedly held constant.

This example of the application of the experimental method to the study of a socio-educational problem is valuable in three ways: first, it is an admirable demonstration of the technique of constructing a scale of measurement in a difficult field of individual behavior; second, it is a clean-cut demonstration of the pattern of an experimental setup; and third, the results are allowed to speak for themselves, with critical comments by the experimenter on the weaknesses of his experiment. To prove the relationship between instruction in hygiene and progress in hygiene, similar experiments are required. In other words, a sociological experiment demonstrates the existence of a postulated relationship only after it has been repeated a number of times and its results verified. The significance of this statement should not be lost. Please note the sentence, "repeated a number of times and its results verified." Reproducibility and verifiability are qualities of scientific observation that the experimental method supplies to the sociologist who is patient enough to do the hard work extending over months or years, and willing to stay by his research until he secures results that can have wide acceptance.

But to return to the Dodd experiment, it is evident that the crucial problem was that of controlling the variables in the situation under investigation. Since the heart of the experimental method is the observation of the relationship of two variables when all others are controlled, it is evident that failure to control these other variables vitiates or at least obscures the results. In 1931, we published a paper, "The Problem of Controls in Experimental Sociology,"⁶ in which the various techniques of control then used were analyzed on the basis of several published experimental studies. Since the publication of the Dodd experiment, the problem of controls again comes to the front as a crucial problem, which if unsolved, is likely to hold back the application of experimental method to the study of social relationships. In view of the fact that two social experiments under our direction were concluded in June and July of 1938 by graduate students in sociology and social work at the University of Minnesota, we shall now examine these experiments to see the effectiveness of the techniques used to secure more adequate control of variable factors.

3. *Examples of Recorded Results of a Social Experiment* (Christiansen). The first experiment is that of Mrs. Helen F. Christiansen, "The Relation of School Progress, Measured in Terms of the Total Amount of School

⁵ *Ibid.*, xiv.

⁶ *J. Educ. Sociol.*, May 1931, vol. 9, no. 9.

Attendance or Course Completion, to Subsequent Economic Adjustment."⁷ This experiment was based upon the high school records and community experiences of 2127 boys and girls who left four St. Paul high schools in the school year of 1926, as graduates, or after having completed from one to three years of their high school course. There were only four St. Paul high schools at this date so that the experiment concerns the whole universe and not a sample. The year 1926 was taken because it was the earliest year for which comparable records on a large number of students were available. Moreover, since the follow-up was to the year 1935, there was thus a period of nine years in which these individuals could work out economic adjustments.

The working hypothesis of this study was: a greater degree of progress in high school leads to a correspondingly higher degree of economic adjustment in the community. Thus, the two variable factors whose relationship is to be measured are ones that lie at the heart of educational policy. Do we not spend millions of dollars annually to support high school education on the assumption that this hypothesis is a true statement of social relationship? Of course, there are other purposes of high school education besides economic adjustment, but certainly economic adjustment is one of the most practical considerations.

Having set up the working hypothesis of the experiment, it next becomes necessary to secure measures of the two variables to be observed. The independent variable, school progress, was measured by the number of years of the high school course completed when the student left school in 1926. Of the total of 2127 boys and girls, 1130 graduated from high school in 1926 after completing four years and 997 dropped out in 1926 after having been in high school for the regular one or two or three years of the course. The measure of economic adjustment selected for the dependent variable was the percentage of shifts on jobs from 1926 to 1935 that involved no change in salary or an increase in salary as contrasted to the percentage of shifts that involved decrease in salary.

Now it is perfectly obvious that these are extremely crude measures. Factors of age difference as between those who left at the end of the freshman high school year and those who remained to graduate might affect economic adjustment. Sex differences are often significant. Boys or girls from homes of higher status would have an advantage in gaining and holding employment not possessed by children from homes of lower status. Differences in the nationality of the parents would influence the chances of getting a job. The neighborhood of the home from which the boy or girl came might be a factor in economic adjustment. The intelligence or mental ability of the different individuals would exert its influence upon securing a job, holding the job, and upon promotion in rank and salary on the job.

⁷ M.A. thesis, June 1938, University of Minnesota Library.

This network of factors is also one of the interrelationship. An American boy whose father was a successful professional man living in a restricted neighborhood would have several factors combined in his favor in comparison with the Jewish boy whose father was a clerk and lived in a deteriorated neighborhood. Since every one of these variable factors are recognized by sensible people as influencing the course of individual economic progress, the way to obviate their disturbing influence is to control them. Here, therefore, we come again to our crucial problem of controls.

In the Christiansen study, each of these six factors, chronological age, sex, nationality of parents, father's occupation, neighborhood status, and mental ability (by computing high school marks because the measurement by I.Q. was not available) was controlled. The chief contribution of this study was to demonstrate the comparative value of different methods of controlling these factors. The pragmatic test of the value of different methods of control is the effect upon the closeness of relationship between the measured change in the dependent variable and the measured change in the independent variable. But before we can present the results of this comparison it is necessary to describe some of the practical procedures that intervene between the formulation of the working hypotheses and the measurement of the results of observation under conditions of control.

It took a full year of systematic work in home visits and interviewing to trace the 1130 graduates of 1926, and the 997 drop-outs of 1926, to their status of 1935. In this process, there was a shrinkage of 933 individuals in the total. Of this number lost, 21 were deceased, 42 had moved out of town, 575 could not be traced in the follow-up, and 295 had records so incomplete as to make comparison worthless. Thus, of the original 2127, there were located a group of 671 graduates and a group of 523 drop-outs.⁸

Christiansen thus had a control group of 523 drop-outs, and an experimental group of 671 graduates. It was then necessary to control the six factors mentioned as potential disturbing influences on the real relationship of high school education to economic adjustment in after life. The process of gaining control began with the selection from the control group of a child who was then matched with another child from the experimental group for sex and nationality of parents. This reduced the two groups to smaller groups with identical proportions in sex division and in the distribution of parental nationality. At this point the control of factors by identity through individual matching had to be supplanted by control through the correspondence of frequency distributions on each factor. The reason for this change was that the condition of individual identity on a factor by matching eliminated so many cases that the sample dwindled in size at an alarming rate after each new control was set.

The correspondence of frequency distributions on a given variable factor

⁸ Christiansen, *op. cit.*, 7.

is a far less rigorous control of this variable factor than is identity by matching individual with individual, but it is probably the most frequently used method of control in contemporary experimental studies. Its selection and application on grounds of reducing the attenuation of the sample is justified when the results of the experiment are significant. When the results are not significant and no other explanation is reasonable, then it is necessary to resort to the more expensive process of individual matching, but this means repetition of the experiment, or at least increasing the number of cases observed.

Setting the six controls reduced the final sample to a total of only 290 cases, 145 in the control group and 145 in the experimental group, a decline of 86.4 per cent from the original group of 2127 students! This is the price of observation under conditions of control. The longer the list of controls and the more rigorous their method of application, the smaller the final sample. At this point, some statisticians may say that we end up with a sample too small to be representative of conditions in a large original group, but let me remind them that an experiment is designed to obtain a homogeneous and "pure" sample. In fact, our sample has been purged of the very factors that made for heterogeneity in the original group and whose presence obscured the real relationship between the factors we set out to study. To discover the *real* relationship between a magnet and iron, we must have "pure" iron and not iron ore that is complicated by the presence of other minerals and metals, which it would be if "representative" of the original ore. Homogeneity, not representativeness, is the essential condition to the discovery by experiment of a real relationship between two factors. Consequently, if the present experiment shows that there is a relationship between the amount of high school education and the degree of subsequent economic adjustment, this relationship is more likely to be a *real* relationship than is the case under conditions in which the social situation is complicated by several uncontrolled factors. Within certain limits (the limits of the given experiment), the homogeneity of the two subsamples is more important than their representativeness of variable factors that originally obscured the relationship.

Finally, if we turn now to the differences in economic adjustment of the control group of drop-out students and the experimental group of graduates we find that 88.7 percent of the graduates experienced no changes in salary or had increases in salary from 1926 to 1935, whereas 83.4 percent of the drop-outs reported increases or no changes in salary from 1926 to 1935. Putting it the other way, only 11.3 percent of the graduates suffered salary decreases in this period, whereas 16.6 percent of the drop-outs suffered salary decreases. This is a small difference of 5.3 percent.

When the length of high school education before drop-out is analyzed,⁹

⁹ *Ibid.*, 64, 89.

we find that 74.1 percent who left school in 1926 at the end of one year of high school had salary increases or no changes in salary during the period 1926-1935; and of those who ended two years of high school, 85.1 percent were adjusted economically; and 89.6 percent of those who ended three years of high school were adjusted. Thus, in general, the longer the period of high school education, the higher the percentage of adjustment in the economic terms used as a criterion. None of these differences are statistically significant as single differences. The important point is that they are consistent and in the same direction. It is a matter of opinion whether small differences that are corroboratory and in the same direction are as important as differences that are large and statistically significant. Our opinion is unequivocally that small differences in the same direction may be as important as one large difference that is statistically significant. There are two reasons for this opinion. First, social phenomena are complex and not likely to show large differences because of the configurational character of the social situation. The separate factors in a social situation are usually functionally related. Second, the conventional tests of the significance of sampling are based upon the theory of random samples, and in experimental work as we have attempted to show, it is the terminal homogeneity and purity in the sample, rather than initial representativeness of heterogeneity, that is important in demonstrating the *real* relationship between two variable factors.

The Christiansen experiment involved the collection of other information than that about salary changes, and the analysis of this information revealed the existence of other small differences in favor of the experimental group of graduates. For example, it was found that the percentage of non-graduates or drop-outs who reported nonvoting was 24 percent as compared with the nonvoting graduates which were 14.5 percent of the total.¹⁰ It was found that the average number of interests in activities tended to increase with the number of years high school education, one-year individuals, .50; two-year individuals, .67; three-year individuals .63, and graduates, .91.¹¹ Likewise, the average number of years additional education increased with the amount of high school education.¹² One-year individuals had an average of .46 years, two-year individuals, .73 years, three-year individuals, .89 years, and graduates, 1.45 years. It will be observed that all of these differences are small, but that they are predominantly in the same direction, that is, they show more favorable adjustment in direct proportion to the amount of high school education. One last measure of economic adjustment was found in the occupational class to which these young people had climbed by 1935. This rough measure of economic adjustment was also distinctly favorable to the graduate group. This group had four times as many individuals in the highest occupational class as the nongraduate

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹² *Ibid.*, 47.

group. Contrariwise, the graduate group had smaller numbers in the lower occupational classes.¹³

Thus the Christiansen experiment, in spite of the crudity of measuring devices used, was nevertheless a successful experiment if the argument in favor of corroboratory small differences is accepted, because these small differences in salary changes, percentage voting, average number of interests in activities, average number of additional years education, and occupational class attained, all support the hypothesis by showing evidence of better adjustment with every increase in the amount of high school education. Doubtless there will be those who will observe that the experiment has merely proved that which we expected to be true. But justification by expectation and wishful thinking is quite a different thing from corroboration by factual evidence. On the other hand, there may be critical persons who will observe that the results of this experiment are almost too good to be true. To all such, we may reply that the evidence is available for critical appraisal in the thesis, and that in any event we do not claim that one successful experiment proves a relationship to be true. The experiment needs to be repeated and the results verified before the *principle* is established on factual evidence rather than on wishful opinion.

In this experiment, we have found that control of such variable factors as age, sex, nationality of parents, occupation of father, neighborhood status, and high school marks, is sufficiently adequate control of the social situation to lead to definite scientific results. What would have happened if we had exercised a more rigorous control by the device of identity secured through individual pairing for every variable factor instead of relying on the rough control of correspondence between distributions in the case of the four factors of age, father's occupation, neighborhood status and high school marks?

Since the completion of the thesis, Mrs. Christiansen has found the answer to this question by actually pairing against each individual in the control group of drop-outs, another individual from the experimental group of graduates of the same sex, identical chronological age, the same parental nationality, the same father's occupation, the same neighborhood status and identical high school marks. This process of more exact control reduced the total from 290 to only 46, of which 23 were in the control group of drop-outs, and 23 were in the experimental group of graduates. When the economic adjustment of these two contrasting groups is examined, the following results emerge: 92 percent of the experimental group of graduates had salary increases or no change in salary from 1926 to 1935, whereas only 58 percent of the control group of drop-outs experienced salary increases or no salary change for the period. This is a difference of 34 percent in favor of the graduates. In comparison, the difference was only 5.3 percent

¹³ *Ibid.*, 50, 58.

for subgroups of the 290 cases under less rigorous controls. Thus, the labor of more exact control was amply repaid because it demonstrated in a very decisive manner and in terms of a difference statistically significant, the superior economic adjustment of the experimental group of graduates. In this case, the real relationship was more clearly demonstrated by more rigorous controls. Of course, this further analysis might have disclosed that the real relationship was less marked, rather than more marked. Scientifically speaking, the use of controls aids us in getting at the underlying true relationship, *whatever* that relationship may be. Whether the analysis confirms the hypothesis or disproves the hypothesis is a consideration entirely irrelevant to the experimental method. This point comes out in the analysis of the next (Mandel) experiment to which we shall soon turn.

We may now summarize the conclusions from our analysis of the Dodd and the Christiansen experiments. (1) If there is a real relationship between two social variables and this is a substantial relationship, then even crude controls of other variable factors will demonstrate the existence of this relationship. (2) Demonstration of the real relationship between two observed variables may be established within the limits of one experiment quite as decisively by many small differences that are in the same direction and are in agreement, as by the conventional criterion of statistically significant differences. (3) When the number of cases observed is large, it repays the effort to apply control of variable factors by the method of identity through individual matching, since this procedure will demonstrate with finality (within the limitations of the given experiment) the degree of real relationship by satisfying the criterion of a statistically significant difference. To illustrate this latter point, we find that a difference of 5.3 percent after crude control has a critical ratio of only 0.123, whereas the difference of 34.0 percent after more rigorous control has a critical ratio of 2.90. Since such a difference would occur by chance only once in 267 (or 3.74 times in 1000) random cases, we conclude the difference is statistically significant of a real difference.¹⁴ Furthermore, since the critical ratio of 2.90 is computed from a difference between extremely pure samples, its significance is much enhanced by this fact. The reason is that the use of the standard error of a difference as a device to determine significance is based on the theory of sampling that derives directly from chance in the throwing of identical coins. In most research, such a degree of homogeneity as found in identity is usually lacking, hence the very exacting rule of three times the standard error or one case in 370 is adopted as a guard against fluctuations caused by great heterogeneity. When, however, as in the case of the Christiansen experiment, we obtain a high degree of homogeneity by selec-

¹⁴ H. E. Garrett, *Statistics in Psychology and Education*, 1930 ed., 134, and G. U. Yule, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, 1912 ed., 310.

tion and control, then a critical ratio of 2.0 may be accepted as quite significant of a real difference. (4) The Christiansen experiment is an *ex post facto* experiment and unlike the Dodd method which is a projected experiment. What we mean by this is that the Christiansen experiment began with conditions of adjustment as they existed in 1935 and then by the method of control traced the relationship back to conditions that existed at the beginning, that is, in 1926; whereas the Dodd experiment set up the controls at the beginning, measured the status in 1931, then *after* the clinic had been in operation two years, again measured the status of each group in 1933, and compared the results. Wherever adequate records are available the *ex post facto* experiment is possible. Hence, it is very important to have good records of relevant factors to a relationship among variables that we wish to test.

We have stated our opinion that the controls in the Christiansen experiment were crude in spite of its obvious success. Let us elaborate for a moment the reasons why these controls were crude. Take chronological age for example, pairing on this factor usually assumes that this device gives control of the degree of maturity of two individuals, and yet it is common knowledge that two persons of the same sex who are both 18 years of age may not be equally mature. Within the sex factor there are doubtless differences in sex appeal which may have some marginal influence upon course grades given by a teacher of the opposite sex. In the case of such rough social status measures as nationality of parents, father's occupation and neighborhood rating, there would be slight differences in spite of identical pairing. What then is the explanation of the successful effect of such unprecise pairing? The explanation probably lies in the fact that the separate status factors, for example, tend to supplement one another rather than to offset one another. Similarly there is probably a cumulative weighting of the factor of mental ability through a combination and reinforcement of influences inherent in father's occupation and high school grades. The higher the father's occupation, the higher the increment of mental ability, even if slight, and this supplements the slightly higher mental ability that usually goes with higher marks in high school studies. In fact, there is some support for this explanation in the results of statistical analysis of social status in which a correlation matrix of five factors of status, income, education, occupation, participation and social status score, resulted in an approach to zero for the conventional tetrad equations.

Also, a recent factor analysis of the same correlation matrix by Louis Guttman of the University of Minnesota, using a more elaborate method, clearly demonstrated the existence of a "pure" status factor as a general factor.¹⁵ The factors other than status may also have underlying factors in

¹⁵ "An Experimental Isolation of Pure Social Status as a General Factor," an unpublished seminar paper by Louis Guttman, 1937.

common. If so, then we have an explanation of the surprisingly decisive result of using the technique of identical pairing on essentially unmeasured factors. If further research with the experimental method should support this explanation, then the problem of controls is greatly simplified whenever we have reason to believe that separately rated or separately measured factors possess a common general factor. In fact, such an explanation would supply the justification empirically, at least, for a systematic search for control factors that had a general factor in common. It would then be unnecessary to devise elaborate and expensive scales of measurement, because if the factors chosen for control were influential, they need not be precisely measured provided they possessed a general factor in common. Of course the requirement of more precise methods still obtains. Our conclusion merely applies to the present rough techniques of the experimental method used in empirical studies.

4. *Example of the Results of a Recorded Social Experiment* (Mandel). In conclusion, let us now turn to a third experiment that utilized the same techniques of the Christiansen method and gave equally interesting results. Mandel¹⁶ set out to analyze the relationship between the duration of Boy Scout tenure in the Minneapolis area, and subsequent participation in community activities and in community adjustments of these Boy Scouts four years after leaving the organization. Here again, large sums are spent annually in the belief that the program of the Boy Scouts of America "builds character." The national officials directing this program are aware of this problem and have encouraged a number of studies to evaluate the results of the program.¹⁷ The Mandel study differs from all other studies previously made in that it is a more thoroughgoing application of the experimental method. Its results are consistent with earlier results in so far as comparability is possible. No attempt was made in the Mandel study to test the building of character. As we shall see, a simpler and more limited objective was studied.

The procedure was as follows. From the 2050 cards in the 1934 drop-file of the Metropolitan Division of the Minneapolis Area Council, a random sample of every tenth case was taken. This gave 205 individuals. Next, an effort was made to follow up all of these former Scouts. A total of 102 were located and personally interviewed in 1938. The remaining 103 could not be located, had moved away, were deceased, or were not cooperative. The sample of 102 was then divided into a group who had dropped out of scouting during the year 1934 and whose average tenure was 1.3 years. This group was called the control group of drop-out scouts. The second group consisted of Scouts who had completed an average of 4 years of tenure by

¹⁶ "A Controlled Analysis of the Relationship of Boy Scout Tenure and Participation to Community Adjustment," M.A. Thesis, University of Minnesota, July 1938.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 28-49, 86-89.

the year 1934. This was called the experimental group of active scouts. Next, the two groups were paired by equating the frequency distributions on place of birth (rural or urban), father's occupation, health rating on the Bell test, and age-grade ratio (a rough rating on mental ability). Enforcing these four controls eliminated twenty-two individuals, so that the final control group of drop-out Scouts consisted of forty boys, and the experimental group of active Scouts consisted also of forty boys. In the course of the interview in 1938, each of these eighty Scouts was scored for participation on the Social Participation Scale,¹⁸ a scoring device developed by Chapin in 1927 and since then partially standardized for reliability and validity; on the Bell Adjustment Inventory¹⁹ and on the Rundquist-Sletto²⁰ scales of morale and general adjustment. These latter are all fully standardized scales with established reliabilities and validities. Thus the Mandel experiment, although it used the crude control technique of equated frequency distributions rather than identical individual pairing, used as measures of adjustment, scales that had been previously standardized and widely used.

The results of this experiment showed that the active Scouts of 1934 showed a better adjustment in 1938 than the drop-out Scouts did on both the Bell and Rundquist-Sletto adjustment scales. This characteristic is supplemented by a record of fewer delinquencies and of less serious nature on the part of active Scouts than of drop-out Scouts. Thus, the slight measured differences in adjustment (not statistically significant) are supported and reinforced by the evidence of nonquantified factors and again demonstrate the value of the criterion of agreement among small differences.

There was, however, one marked difference of statistical significance, and that was the participation score of 11.00 points, the average for the 40 drop-out Scouts, and the participation score of 5.82 points, the average for the active Scouts. Here we find a difference of 5.18 between the two group means, or a drop-out group score which is 89 percent higher than the active group score in 1938. Mandel points out that this difference which is statistically significant, may be due to the desire of individual boys in the drop-out group not to "channelize" their participation into scouting alone, but to diversify their participation in activities. Active Scouts seem to concentrate all of their interests in one activity. The higher social participation score of the drop-out Scouts may be explained as due to: (1) their search for a basis of integration for their individual desires, since the active Scouts may have found already *within* the varied program of the Scout organization a framework of integration not easily possible from


¹⁸ *Social Participation Scale*, 1937, by F. Stuart Chapin, Univ. of Minn. Press.

¹⁹ *The Adjustment Inventory*, 1934, by High M. Bell, Stanford Univ. Press.

²⁰ *Minnesota Survey of Opinions* (short form), 1936, by E. A. Rundquist and R. F. Sletto, pp. 394-398 in *Personality in the Depression*, Univ. of Minn. Press, 1936.

participation in diverse community groups; or (2) that the drop-outs did not wish to *narrow down* their activities to one type of organization at such an early age, but were motivated by the *wish* for new experience and the *wish* for response, which they satisfied in taking part in a variety of activities; or (3) that the drop-out Scouts' higher participation score was due to the *greater intensity* (more memberships on committees and more official positions held) as well as *greater extensity* (memberships in a larger number of organizations); or (4) that drop-out Scouts were more *socially acceptable*


CHART I
DESIGN FOR SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS.*



* (Based on Mandel Data)

than active Scouts to admission into a large variety of community activities. Since the drop-outs were a more variable group and more nonconformist in behavior, it seems probable that explanations (1), (2), and (3) are true, rather than (4). The fact that the drop-outs were slightly less well adjusted on the Bell and Rundquist-Sletto scale norms, tends also to minimize the value of explanation (4). In general, all the evidence of this experiment tends to show that boys who had stayed four years in scouting and thus secured the full benefit of the scout program up to the year 1934, are found to be on the whole a more conventional, conforming and homogeneous

CHART II
DESIGN FOR SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS *



Participation Scale
Free Variables Measured on vertical Scales X and Y

* (Based on Mandel Data)

group in 1938, than the drop-out group. The latter is more variable, less conventional and more nonconformist in 1938.

If it be accepted that the valid measure of adjustment is based upon attitudinal factors expressed in verbal responses measured by the Bell and Rundquist-Sletto scales, then the criterion of agreement among small differences is in favor of the active Scouts. On the other hand, if it be held that evidence of overt participation in community activities is a better measure of community adjustment, then the strikingly higher score of the drop-out Scouts indicates that they are the better adjusted. The final conclusion is then a matter of judgment. Evidently it is necessary to do additional research on this problem. It would be advantageous to repeat the experiment using similar techniques under like conditions.

Our design for social experiments may be summarized in visual form. We present this summary in Charts I and II using some of the data of the Mandel experiment to make the exhibit definitive. Chart I shows the general procedure followed in the use of the experimental method and indicates graphically the successive steps and the corresponding shrinkage in the size of sample observed. Chart II shows the more detailed technical aspects of using the technique of control by equating the frequency distributions of four variables which it is desired to hold constant. It also shows the relationship between the measured free variables. Thus, longer scout tenure (an average of 4 years for the experimental group) is associated with a significantly lower score on social participation, and shorter scout tenure (an average of 1.3 years for the control group of drop-outs) is associated with a social participation score that is 89 percent higher. The slight differences in the adjustment scores are not shown on the chart because of the difficulty of representing four-dimensional variation on a flat surface. Nevertheless, the charts serve to present the main outlines of a design for social experiment. It may be remarked parenthetically that this design for experiment is substantially the same as the schematic pattern we presented to this society in 1931 and subsequently published in *Social Forces*.²¹

²¹ F. Stuart Chapin, "The Advantages of Experimental Sociology in the Study of Family Group Patterns," *Social Forces*, vol. 11, no. 2, December 1932.

THE EXPENDITURE OF THE UNEMPLOYED*

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UNEMPLOYMENT and relief bring in their train a number of attendant problems. What happens to the living conditions of the unemployed? When they lose their jobs, are they destitute? If so, does relief mitigate the situation so that they and their families can live with some decency? Is their standard of living reduced? What items suffer? Is their consumption, particularly of food, so reduced that they tend to lose their working efficiency? Some of these questions receive at least partial answers for a limited sample and district from the data presented in this paper. In fact, the value of the study lies as much in showing what information may be obtained by an investigation of this sort, as in the conclusions themselves.

The families studied are part of the large unemployed population whom it was the aim of the relief administration to assist. They are families in Massachusetts whose chief wage earner had lost his regular job and had applied for relief. The Cambridge sample is, indeed, composed of 397 relief applicants who were on the A list of the Cambridge branch of the ERA. All of them had not yet received relief when the investigation took place, but they were considered urgently in need of relief. The unemployed families in the four small towns were all actually in receipt of relief. The Cambridge families were not, however, totally unemployed. In most cases, some member of the family had a job, usually temporary, the income from which was considered insufficient to support the family.

The majority of the chief wage earners were day laborers or factory workers,¹ most of whom (61%) had not gone beyond the eighth grade in school. Only 3% had gone beyond twelve years of schooling. The same was true of the homemakers, usually the wives; 67% had six to eight years of schooling, and 2% more than twelve. The average age of the chief wage earner was 40, that of the homemaker, 46. It is well, therefore, to keep in mind that we are dealing with a group of laboring families, whose education included only grammar school, and whose adult members were entering into middle age.

* This is the third study of an unemployed group in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which resulted from the survey conducted by the author under the auspices of a committee of Harvard professors and the Massachusetts ERA. The statistical analysis has been made possible by a grant from the Harvard University Committee on Research in the Social Sciences. Miss Helen Sorenson has been in charge of the statistical analysis and has been invaluable in the appraisal of the results.

¹ See E. W. Gilboy, "The Unemployed: Their Income and Expenditure," *Amer. Eco. Rev.*, June 1937, for greater detail on occupations.

The largest nationality group was native-born American white, comprising 35% of the total. The only other groups large enough to be of any importance were the Italian (17%), the Irish (12%), the Canadian (9%), and the Portuguese (5%). Lithuania, Poland, Greece, Russia, England, Scotland, Sweden, France, and Germany were all represented, but by a very few cases. The majority (56%) of the foreign-born had become United States' citizens. A few were colored.² The native Americans formed the largest proportion of the groups divided according to the number in the family, except in the case of seven in the family, which showed a greater proportion of Italians than of any other nationality. The Irish were the only other nationality represented in every size-of-family group. The nationalities seem to be scattered more or less at random among the size-of-family groups. There is perhaps some tendency for the Italians, Portuguese, Poles, and Greeks to be concentrated among the larger families, and for the native whites, English, and Scots to form a higher proportion among the smaller families. On the whole, there is no marked nationality bias.

The data on income and its sources for the unemployed samples in Cambridge and from other Massachusetts towns³ indicated that these groups earned up to about one half of their family income with the rest supplied by relief agencies and occasional gifts from friends and relatives. It was also found that the expenditure of these families consistently exceeded their income, on the average from 15 to 20%, and that the deficit was largely explained by unpaid bills such as rent and doctors' and grocers' bills. In brief, the situation of these unemployed families may be summarized as follows: the chief wage earner had lost his former regular job and applied for relief; he was still able to earn something from odd jobs, but this amount plus the contributions of other members of the family amounted to one half or less of his income; relief and gifts made up the rest; still, ends could not be met and the family subsisted on credit for current expenses such as housing, medical attendance, and food.

At the time this survey was made it was not possible to tell how typical the sample might be. Additional data are now at hand which indicate that the families investigated in Cambridge are not entirely representative of those on relief.⁴ On at least two counts the Cambridge sample is non-

² The colored families (7%) were not sufficiently numerous to be treated separately. They form a very small proportion of the size-of-family groups, except for three in the family, in which they are almost 15% of the total.

³ The data for Marlboro, Dracut, Winchester, and Gilbertville were supplied by Carle C. Zimmerman. See *Amer. Eco. Rev.*, June 1937.

⁴ A further study of Massachusetts relief applicants in 1935 is now being made from records of the ERA and WPA. Studies of the 1935 relief situation are also available from the Division of Social Research of the WPA in Washington. Comparisons have been made with the occupational distributions of the new sample and the WPA surveys and further comparisons of income, etc., will be undertaken.

representative. Its occupational distribution is overweighted with semi-skilled and unskilled workers, particularly the latter, and white-collar workers are underrepresented. In addition, the proportion of family income earned in private employment is much greater than for the usual relief case. We appear to be dealing with a group on the upper fringes of the unemployed, who had more opportunities for private employment than the typical worker on relief, but who were not able to support themselves completely. It would perhaps be more accurate to call them the "underemployed" rather than the unemployed.⁵

It is a little difficult to see why a sample taken at random from the official ERA list should turn out to be nonrepresentative. It appears, however, that the list was old and not properly kept up to date. It is also possible that the eligibility requirements were gradually tightened so that many of the names appearing there were later struck out. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the Cambridge sample represents the less needy cases (on the average) of those who applied for relief.

Nevertheless, it seems important to present the detailed expenditure data for this group. Apparently they are the only expenditure data which exist for any kind of relief sample.⁶ Although it must be remembered that the evidence cannot be taken as typical of the unemployed, it is certainly descriptive of a portion of that group and indicates the type of information it is possible to secure from relief sources.

The average reported expenditure for each item and for the whole group is given in Table 1. The average expenditure is also listed according to the size of the family. The expenditure items are rather more numerous than usual. Many of the items usually classified under miscellaneous are listed separately in order to obtain a more detailed knowledge of the expenditure of the group. Examination of the original schedules indicated that certain items such as food tended to be overestimated, whereas recreation (consisting largely of expenditure for the movies), clothing, travel, personal care, and alcoholic beverages were undoubtedly underestimated and sometimes omitted altogether. It was possible to secure some check on the annual expenditure figures, since 203 out of the 397 families kept weekly expenditure accounts for one or more weeks. Sometimes expenditures were noted in the weekly accounts which did not appear on the annual schedules. This was most frequently the case for recreation and personal care. Possibly the families were reluctant to disclose luxury expenditures, since many of them were on relief, and also because they were aware that the ERA was at the time sponsoring the survey.

⁵ I am indebted to Dr. A. Ross Eckler of the WPA Division of Social Research for this suggestion.

⁶ In an exhaustive search, with the assistance of the WPA, I have been unable to find any complete budgetary studies for relief cases. The Consumer Purchases study collected only a few incomplete data on the expenditure of relief families. These data were too inadequate to be used.

TABLE 1. AVERAGE YEARLY EXPENDITURE OF 397 CAMBRIDGE, MASS., FAMILIES APPLYING FOR RELIEF, 1935

| No. in Family | One | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Seven | Eight | Over Eight | All Cases |
|---------------------|-------|-----|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|---------------|--------------|
| No. of Cases | 15 | 78 | 88 | 60 | 55 | 45 | 26 | 16 | 14 | 397 |
| Average Income | \$358 | 545 | 730 | 871 | 967 | 886 | 1073 | 1055 | 1208 | 804 |
| Average Expenditure | 416 | 672 | 893 | 1005 | 1148 | 1092 | 1215 | 1208 | 1382 | 957 |
| Food | 166 | 280 | 365 | 421 | 512 | 522 | 618 | 589 | 718 | 425 |
| Clothing | 23 | 22 | 38 | 62 | 77 | 65 | 80 | 71 | 72 | 52 |
| Housing | 158 | 208 | 247 | 239 | 251 | 250 | 242 | 222 | 254 | 235 |
| Household Operation | 21 | 80 | 91 | 116 | 114 | 107 | 121 | 104 | 123 | 98 |
| Tobacco | 1 | 17 | 18 | 17 | 24 | 21 | 23 | 35 | 28 | 19 |
| Recreation | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 4 | 13 | 6 |
| Books, Papers, etc. | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 7 |
| Medical | 11 | 11 | 45 | 45 | 40 | 19 | 23 | 31 | 32 | 31 |
| Gifts | 3 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 12 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 7 |
| Travel | 9 | 12 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 15 | 22 | 25 | 36 | 17 |
| Personal Care | 4 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 6 | 14 | 7 |
| Education | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 3 |
| Taxes | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Alcoholic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Auto | 0 | 0 | 5 | 16 | 22 | 10 | 14 | 31 | 10 | 10 |
| Insurance | 8 | 19 | 35 | 40 | 50 | 47 | 30 | 67 | 56 | 36 |
| Miscellaneous | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |

The largest expenditure was naturally for food, \$425 a year on the average; the next for housing and household operation, \$333. No other items approached these two in size. Therefore the bulk of the income of these Cambridge families went to provide them with food and shelter. The amount spent for clothing was small, \$52 a year on the average. In many cases clothing was given to the families by friends or relief agencies, and it was impossible to secure an estimate of the value of these gifts. The other expenditure items are those commonly grouped under miscellaneous. Somewhat different figures appear in Table 2. These figures are averages only for those families which actually spent money for these items. As a result, the average expenditure is raised for many of these items. It is probable that the second figures present a more accurate picture of expenditure.⁷ In many cases, food may have been deliberately overestimated and luxury expenditures omitted or reduced in order to conform to what the family thought might please the ERA.

Since the expenditure figures for luxuries and incidentals are so open to

⁷ In the cases where incidental expenditures were not reported, some were undoubtedly zero. The comparison of the weekly and annual schedules which was possible for over half the sample leads me to believe that omissions were probably more frequent. Whether these omissions were deliberate or a result of forgetting the small amounts involved, I cannot say.

TABLE 2. AVERAGE EXPENDITURES ON "LUXURY"-ITEMS BY VARIOUS SIZED CAMBRIDGE, MASS., FAMILIES APPLYING FOR RELIEF, 1935

| No. in Family | One | | Two | | Three | | Four | | Five | | Six | | Seven | | Eight | | Over Eight | | Total | |
|-----------------|------|-----------|------|-----------|-------|-----------|------|-----------|------|-----------|------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------|-----------|
| | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. | No.* | Ave. Amt. |
| Tobacco | 2 | \$9 | 55 | \$24 | 58 | \$27 | 42 | \$25 | 41 | \$32 | 31 | \$31 | 15 | \$39 | 13 | \$38 | 10 | \$39 | 267 | \$29 |
| Recreation | 5 | 9 | 23 | 14 | 34 | 12 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 14 | 22 | 17 | 10 | 25 | 6 | 11 | 6 | 31 | 145 | 16 |
| Books | 9 | 10 | 62 | 8 | 67 | 8 | 41 | 9 | 41 | 10 | 28 | 10 | 15 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 286 | 9 |
| Medical | 7 | 23 | 51 | 17 | 62 | 64 | 42 | 64 | 43 | 51 | 27 | 32 | 20 | 30 | 10 | 49 | 12 | 38 | 274 | 45 |
| Gifts | 9 | 8 | 43 | 10 | 43 | 14 | 28 | 13 | 17 | 17 | 15 | 10 | 14 | 12 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 15 | 181 | 12 |
| Travel | 6 | 16 | 31 | 21 | 26 | 26 | 24 | 29 | 17 | 25 | 17 | 24 | 8 | 32 | 6 | 40 | 4 | 50 | 139 | 27 |
| Personal Upkeep | 7 | 8 | 51 | 7 | 67 | 7 | 50 | 9 | 43 | 11 | 34 | 13 | 21 | 15 | 11 | 9 | 12 | 15 | 296 | 10 |
| Education | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 182 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 64 | 2 | 55 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 2 | 8 | 17 | 66 |
| Taxes | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 16 | 2 | 25 | 3 | 17 | 3 | 15 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 99 | 3 |
| Alcoholic | 0 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 29 | 5 | 13 | 3 | 24 | 3 | 33 | 3 | 10 | 4 | 12 | 33 | 17 |
| Auto | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 46 | 8 | 122 | 10 | 121 | 7 | 64 | 2 | 184 | 3 | 164 | 2 | 70 | 43 | 94 |
| Insurance | 5 | 24 | 41 | 26 | 60 | 51 | 40 | 61 | 36 | 76 | 31 | 69 | 14 | 56 | 10 | 107 | 8 | 100 | 245 | 59 |
| Miscellaneous | 2 | 13 | 7 | 16 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 12 | 6 | 20 | 4 | 14 | 6 | 9 | 1 | 25 | 2 | 15 | 39 | 13 |

* Number of families, excluding those reporting no expenditure on the item.

question, a more important indication of consumption is probably the number of families who reported any expenditure upon these items. In any case, the amount they had to spend on such things was small and the fact that such items were included in their budgets at all is some index of their standard of living. Two thirds of the families reported expenditures on tobacco, and three quarters of them bought newspapers and spent money for medical care and personal upkeep. More than half were buying insurance. About 40% listed expenditures for recreation and travel, and almost half reported money gifts, principally church contributions. Seventeen families, most of whom were Italians who made their own wine, spent a small amount on alcoholic beverages. Twenty-seven families, or one in every fourteen, owned and operated automobiles during the year, and sixteen additional families paid for a license to drive. Only seventeen in all had educational expenses.

TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE DEVOTED TO VARIOUS ITEMS IN 397 CAMBRIDGE, MASS. FAMILIES APPLYING FOR RELIEF, 1935, BY SIZE OF FAMILY

| No. in Family | One | Two | Three | Four | Five | Six | Seven | Eight | Over Eight | All Cases |
|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|--------------|
| No. of Cases | 15 | 78 | 88 | 60 | 55 | 45 | 26 | 16 | 14 | 397 |
| Average Income | 86.1 | 81.1 | 81.7 | 86.6 | 84.2 | 81.1 | 88.3 | 87.3 | 87.5 | 84.2 |
| Average Expenditure | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Food | 40.0 | 41.8 | 40.8 | 41.8 | 44.6 | 47.8 | 50.9 | 48.7 | 52.0 | 44.6 |
| Clothing | 5.6 | 3.4 | 4.3 | 6.2 | 6.7 | 5.9 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 5.2 | 5.5 |
| Housing | 38.1 | 31.0 | 27.5 | 23.8 | 21.8 | 22.9 | 19.9 | 18.5 | 18.4 | 24.6 |
| Household Operation | 5.0 | 11.9 | 10.2 | 11.5 | 9.9 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 8.6 | 8.9 | 10.3 |
| Tobacco | .2 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Recreation | .7 | .7 | .6 | .7 | .4 | .7 | .8 | .3 | .9 | .6 |
| Books, Papers, etc. | 1.4 | 1.0 | .8 | .6 | .6 | .5 | .6 | .6 | .7 | .7 |
| Medical | 2.6 | 1.6 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 3.2 |
| Gifts | .7 | .8 | .7 | .7 | 1.0 | .6 | .4 | .5 | .7 | .7 |
| Travel | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 1.8 |
| Personal Care | 1.0 | .6 | .7 | .7 | .7 | .9 | 1.0 | .5 | 1.0 | .7 |
| Education | 0.0 | 0.0 | .7 | 0.0 | .5 | .2 | .1 | .5 | .1 | .3 |
| Taxes | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .1 | 0.0 | .1 | 0.0 |
| Alcoholic | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | .3 | .1 | .2 | .4 | .2 | .2 | .1 |
| Automobile | 0.0 | 0.0 | .6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 2.6 | .7 | 1.0 |
| Insurance | 1.9 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 2.4 | 5.5 | 4.1 | 3.8 |
| Miscellaneous | .5 | .1 | .1 | .1 | .2 | .1 | .2 | .2 | .1 | .1 |

A more accurate description of the standard of living may be gained from the examination of the percentage of total expenditure spent on each category. Ordinarily, expenditure is taken as a percentage of total income. For our sample, total expenditure is far more representative of the living

standards of the group, since expenditure constantly exceeded income, and the income figures do not indicate the actual consumption of the families. In Table 3, the expenditure figures are given as percentages of total expenditure. For the group as a whole, food comprises 45% of total expenditure, housing and household operation 35%, and clothing 5.5%. Miscellaneous and luxury items constituted the remaining 15%. Of these, insurance, medical care, tobacco, and travel were the most important.

It may be seen in Table 1 that most of the expenditures increase as the size of family grows larger. It is not clear whether this is the effect of increasing family size or of increasing total expenditure, since the two are obviously related in a positive manner. The percentages in Table 3, however, make it possible to isolate the influence of family size. The direct influence of increasing total expenditure is eliminated, since the group averages of total expenditure serve as the base for each group percentage. The only items in which a clear relation between expenditure and size of family is shown are food and housing. The percentage spent for food increases steadily as the family becomes larger in size. A family of two spent 42% for food; a family of over eight, 52%. An inverse relation naturally exists between the size of the family and housing expenditures. For a family of two, the figure is 31%, for a family of over eight, 18%.

The figures for relief cases in Marlboro, Winchester, Dracut, and Gilbertville offer some interesting comparisons.⁸ The average expenditure on food varied from \$387 in Marlboro to \$489 in Dracut. Household expenditures were lowest in Gilbertsville, \$157, and highest in Winchester, \$376. The other expenditures, including clothing, were very low. The expenditure categories are not as detailed as those of Cambridge, but reading, automobile, education, health, and insurance are itemized separately. The percentages (of total expenditure) for food, clothing, and housing totalled 79% in Gilbertville, 73% in Dracut, 75% in Winchester, and 76% in Marlboro. The proportion is somewhat less than in Cambridge, leaving the small town families 20 to 25% of their expenditure for miscellaneous, whereas the Cambridge families had only 15% for this purpose. The difference is probably in part a result of higher Cambridge prices, particularly rents. Household expenditure in the outlying towns was consistently a smaller proportion of total expenditure than in Cambridge.

In the study of incomes it was found that Gilbertville was more closely parallel to Cambridge than any of the other towns. The basic necessities, food, clothing, and shelter, comprised only 79% of Gilbertville consumption compared to 85% in Cambridge. Gilbertville families spent a considerably smaller proportion on housing but a much greater proportion on food.

⁸ The data for relief and nonrelief families in these four towns were collected by Carle C. Zimmerman in connection with his survey of rural conditions during the depression. The tables are not included in this paper for reasons of space.

TABLE 4. AVERAGE EXPENDITURE FOR VARIOUS ITEMS BY INCOME CLASSES OF 397 CAMBRIDGE, MASS., FAMILIES APPLYING FOR RELIEF, 1935
Percent of Total Expenditure

| Income Class | No. of Cases | Food | Clothing | Housing | Tobacco | Recreation | Books | Medical | Travel | Personal care | Alcohol | Auto | Other | Savings & Insurance |
|--------------|--------------|------|----------|---------|---------|------------|-------|---------|--------|---------------|---------|------|-------|---------------------|
| \$ 200-399 | 11 | 49.6 | 2.5 | 38.9 | .5 | .2 | 1.6 | .1 | 2.4 | .5 | 0 | 0 | 1.6 | 2.1 |
| 400-599 | 51 | 43.4 | 3.4 | 44.0 | 1.6 | .6 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 1.3 | .4 | 0 | 0 | .8 | 2.0 |
| 600-799 | 92 | 43.4 | 4.0 | 41.8 | 2.0 | .4 | .7 | 1.5 | 1.7 | .8 | .1 | 0 | .6 | 3.0 |
| 800-999 | 83 | 47.0 | 4.8 | 36.4 | 1.8 | .5 | .7 | 2.7 | 1.6 | .7 | 0 | .3 | .6 | 2.7 |
| 1000-1199 | 75 | 45.0 | 5.6 | 34.3 | 2.1 | .5 | .7 | 3.4 | 1.8 | .8 | .2 | .5 | 1.5 | 3.5 |
| 1200-1399 | 38 | 44.7 | 6.4 | 30.7 | 2.2 | .6 | .8 | 4.0 | 1.9 | .9 | .1 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 4.7 |
| 1400 & over | 47 | 42.3 | 6.8 | 28.2 | 2.1 | .9 | .6 | 4.7 | 2.3 | .7 | .3 | 3.0 | 1.8 | 6.1 |

| Amount (dollars) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----|-------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Average Expenditure per Income Class | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| \$312 | 11 | \$152 | \$ 7 | \$125 | \$ 2 | \$ 0 | \$ 6 | \$ 8 | \$ 7 | \$ 2 | \$ 0 | \$ 0 | \$ 5 | \$ 7 |
| 500 | 51 | 217 | 16 | 220 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 10 |
| 716 | 92 | 311 | 29 | 297 | 15 | 3 | 5 | 11 | 12 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 22 |
| 906 | 83 | 426 | 44 | 329 | 16 | 5 | 6 | 25 | 15 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 25 |
| 1081 | 75 | 489 | 61 | 371 | 23 | 5 | 7 | 37 | 19 | 9 | 2 | 6 | 16 | 38 |
| 1293 | 38 | 578 | 83 | 395 | 29 | 8 | 10 | 52 | 25 | 11 | 2 | 22 | 17 | 61 |
| 1698 | 47 | 712 | 119 | 471 | 37 | 16 | 10 | 87 | 38 | 12 | 6 | 53 | 33 | 103 |

The clothing ran about the same in two towns, around 5%. Medical care and reading were similar, about 3% and 1%. The proportion spent for insurance and automobile was doubled in Gilbertville. Despite the fact that the Gilbertville families were all actually on relief and many of the Cambridge families were not, the Gilbertville families had a slightly greater margin for incidental expenditures.

The Cambridge expenditures have also been tabulated by income classes, as shown in Table 4. The percentage spent for food and housing decrease as income rises, the former irregularly and only to a small extent; the latter, markedly and consistently. In both cases, the average amount spent per income class increases regularly. Among the other items, both the amount and proportion of expenditure go up with income for medical care, automobile, recreation, and savings. The approximate income-expenditure elasticity for the individual items was derived graphically by plotting average total expenditure and average amount spent per item by income classes on a double logarithmic scale. The types of expenditure which are most elastic are, in the order named: automobile, medical care, clothing, savings and insurance. Recreation, travel, and other expenditures are elastic for incomes over the 800-999 class, and tobacco is elastic for the lower income groups. It is of some interest that the elasticity of food seems to be, roughly, unity. With this sample it appears that as income rises, housing (the only definitely inelastic item) suffers at the expense of practically all the other items of the budget. The most significant conclusion from this analysis is the characteristic elasticity of almost all the budgetary items.⁹

We have now an approximate outline, in some detail, of the expenditures of several groups of unemployed families. We should like to know further whether these expenditures in amount and proportion correspond to any recognized standards of adequacy and how they compare with the expenditure patterns of similar groups among the employed. Only by such comparisons can we arrive at any realistic estimate of the standard of living of these unemployed.

We have two studies of employed families which are comparable with the data on unemployed families. One is the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of the incomes and expenditures of 516 white families of wage earners and low salaried clerical workers in Boston.¹⁰ It was one of the rules for

⁹ Since size of family was not eliminated in the above analysis, the same procedure was applied to the data on a per capita basis. The main conclusions concerning the consistent income-expenditure elasticity of the budgetary items was confirmed. All per capita expenditures were elastic with the exception of food, which showed an elasticity of slightly below 1, and housing with an elasticity of unity. There were certain differences in detail which cannot be enlarged upon here. On the whole, however, the elimination of the influence of family size did not markedly change the results.

¹⁰ I was generously given permission by the director of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dr. Isador Lubin, to copy some of the data obtained in the Boston Family Expenditure Survey carried on by that organization in 1934-35. Miss Faith Williams, Chief, the Cost of Living

the selection of families that a wage earner, not necessarily the chief wage earner, must be employed¹¹ and that a clerical worker must earn not over \$2000 a year. As will be shown later, the group seems closely comparable to the Cambridge unemployed sample, and appears to represent the social and economic strata to which these unemployed belong. The other comparison is made possible by the fact that Zimmerman's budgetary survey included both relief and nonrelief families. The expenditures of the families on relief have already been summarized; those of the nonrelief families will be given in this section.

The Boston families were on the average similar to the Cambridge families as to occupation, age, nationality, and education.¹² In every case, however, the Boston average was slightly above that of the Cambridge sample. Whereas the highest proportion of Cambridge homemakers and chief wage earners had had only six to eight years of schooling, in Boston the greater proportion (41% and 45%) had completed nine to twelve years of schooling. The average age of the heads of families was about the same in the two groups. The chief wage earner in Boston was 44; the homemaker 42. The same nationalities were represented, with a predominance of three types, native-born Americans, Irish, and Italians. In the Boston samples the native-born Americans were a higher proportion of the families, 61%. The Boston group also included more clerical and skilled workers, and the members were generally less heterogeneous in occupation than the Cambridge families. It is not without interest to find that the average family size was about the same in the two groups, 4.2 persons for Cambridge and 4.0 persons for Boston.¹³

It is reasonable to assume that the Boston sample is representative of the social and economic class to which the families of the unemployed in Cambridge once belonged. The Cambridge unemployed were perhaps the marginal members of that group. They were the less educated members; more of them were foreign born. They had the less skilled jobs. Possibly they were less efficient or essential and among the first to be let go in the depression. Perhaps they were merely the victims of business failures. At

Division, has gone over this paper and supplied some final figures, which will be noted as they are used. The statistical analysis has been carried on under my direction by my assistants, Mrs. Margaret Brainerd Rolfe and Miss Helen Sorenson. The methods and conclusions are entirely my own and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is in no way responsible for them.

We were able to copy data for only 358 of these families, since some of the schedules had already been sent to Washington, but the totals and percentages check closely with the figures published by the B.L.S. in the *Month. Lab. Rev.*, September, 1936, and with those supplied by the B.L.S.

¹¹ Their definition of employment was work for 3½ eight hour days in each of 36 weeks during the schedule year with earnings of \$300 or more.

¹² The figures in this paragraph are the final figures of the B.L.S.

¹³ The Boston sample did not include single persons, however, and the Cambridge sample did. If they were omitted the Cambridge family would be somewhat larger. On the other hand, the B.L.S. totals include boarders, while the Cambridge figures do not.

any rate they had lost their jobs, at an average salary of approximately \$1500 a year, which makes them economically of the class investigated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Boston. One would expect them to have a similar standard of living. To what extent this standard of living was maintained, and if it were reduced, what items suffered, are questions of considerable interest.

The average income of the Boston families was \$1573; their average expenditure, \$1571.¹⁴ Table 5 gives the distribution of these expenditures. They spent, on the average, \$561 on food, \$560 on housing and household, and \$154 on clothing. These are their major expenditures. Transportation (\$89), recreation (\$72), and medical care (\$49) are the only other relatively large expenditures. There were small expenditures on furnishings, personal care, education, community welfare, vocation, and gifts.

When the expenditure figures are taken as a percentage of total expenditure, it is found (see Table 5) that 35.7% was spent for food, 35.6% for housing (including operation and furnishings), and 10% for clothing. In other words, approximately 81% of total expenditure went for the major necessities of life, leaving 19% for luxuries and incidentals.

The following table will make comparison between Boston employed and Cambridge unemployed somewhat easier.

The amounts spent by the Cambridge families are naturally much lower than in the case of the Boston sample. The Boston families spent three or more times as much except for food, housing, recreation, and medical care. The expenditure for food by the Cambridge families comes nearest to approaching the Boston expenditure, which was about 25% higher. The percentage of total expenditure which went for food, shelter, and clothing is very similar in the two groups, 85% for Cambridge and 81% for Boston, but the distribution of these items is quite different. In Cambridge food was 9% more, housing almost the same, and clothing 5% less. Among the incidentals, the proportion for medical care was the same in both groups, recreation was 3.3% in Cambridge as against 4.5% for Boston, and for the other items, the Cambridge percent was approximately half that of Boston.

On the assumption that the Cambridge families had been accustomed to the standard of living of the Boston group, the comparative expenditure distribution, particularly that of the percentages, suggests that the Cambridge families were attempting to maintain that standard of living. Econo-

¹⁴ These figures are based on the whole sample and are taken from the September 1936 *Month. Lab. Rev.* The expenditure figures in Table 5 have been furnished by the B.L.S. They differ very little from those we derived from the incomplete sample.

The total income and expenditure figures for Boston are not quite comparable with those for Cambridge, as a result of the way in which capital assets and liabilities were handled. Such assets and liabilities were calculated separately and the net gain or loss was added to or subtracted from the income or expenditure figures. However, these net amounts were small and affected the totals to a negligible extent.

TABLE 5. AVERAGE EXPENDITURE AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE FOR DESIGNATED ITEMS OF 516 BOSTON EMPLOYED FAMILIES, 1934-35 AND 397 CAMBRIDGE UNEMPLOYED FAMILIES, 1935*

| Items | Amount | | Percent of Total Expenditure | |
|--------------------------------------|--------|-----------|------------------------------|-----------|
| | Boston | Cambridge | Boston | Cambridge |
| Food | \$561 | \$425 | 35.7 | 44.6 |
| House (inc. operation & furnishings) | 560 | 333 | 35.6 | 34.9 |
| Clothing | 154 | 52 | 9.8 | 5.5 |
| Transportation (inc. auto) | 89 | 27 | 5.7 | 2.8 |
| Recreation (inc. tobacco & reading) | 72 | 32 | 4.5 | 3.3 |
| Personal Care | 26 | 7 | 1.7 | .7 |
| Medical | 49 | 31 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Education | 7 | 3 | .4 | .3 |
| Gifts | 18 | 7 | 1.2 | .7 |
| Other Expenditures | 35 | 38 | 2.2 | 4.0 |
| Total | \$1571 | \$955 | 99.9 | 100.0 |

* The average size of family in Boston and Cambridge was approximately the same, 4.0 and 4.2 persons respectively. The inclusion of single persons in the Cambridge sample would not increase this difference markedly, as only 4 percent of the sample were single. It is possible, however, that the average family in Cambridge included more adults as a result of the tendency of relief families to band together. This difference in composition may explain in part the greater relative expenditure of the Cambridge families for food. Although the Boston and Cambridge families are not completely comparable, it is thought that they are sufficiently so to make the comparison valuable.

mies were made by necessity all along the line but are more noticeable in the case of clothing and transportation. Food was cut down least of all, partly at the expense of clothing and partly at the expense of luxury items. The proportion spent on luxuries and incidentals of various kinds in Cambridge was reduced 5%, but recreation and medical care did not suffer as much as the other items.

A comparison of the distribution of expenditures of the relief and non-relief families in the four small towns shows a situation similar to that between Boston and Cambridge, although the families are not as homogeneous in the small towns. The nonrelief cases are not restricted to the low wage-earning families. In all four towns, the nonrelief families spent a considerably greater proportion of their total expenditure upon commodities other than food, shelter, and clothing. Dracut is the only town in which the proportion was not as much as 11% higher. Among the necessary expenditures, a greater proportion went for food among the relief cases, particularly in Gilbertville. In fact, the actual amounts spent for food by families on relief were very little less than in the case of nonrelief families. What items, then, bear the brunt of economy? The proportions spent for automobiles and for investments (including taxes, savings, etc.) were cut drastically by the relief cases in all four towns. The clothing percentage dropped in all towns

except Gilbertville, but not as much as in Cambridge. The other incidental and luxury items suffered to some extent as well. We find the unemployed in these four towns cutting down incidental and luxury expenditures, but maintaining their housing and dietary standard almost at the nonrelief level. The other expenditures, however, were not abandoned, despite the existence of unpaid bills for rent, food, and medical care.

A few words may be said in conclusion concerning the adequacy of the living standard of these Cambridge families. As far as food is concerned, an analysis of the weekly food consumption in Cambridge¹⁵ for the 200 families who kept daily expenditure records for one or more weeks, indicated that all except the lowest income classes were able to secure a diet equivalent to the standard adequate diet at minimum cost.¹⁶ It is true that they consumed more meat and potatoes than recommended, and were deficient in fats, and to some extent in milk and vegetables. All except the very lowest income group met the standard 3000-calorie consumption per adult male.

In Boston, the diet approached the standard of the adequate diet at moderate cost and sometimes a liberal diet. As in Cambridge, the lowest income families were deficient in fats and milk and consumed more than the standard in meats, sugars, eggs, and potatoes. In both cities, the highest income groups spent enough to secure more than the liberal standard diet.

The Cambridge dietary standard for the sample of unemployed here examined is not far below that of the Boston group. It is noteworthy that the lowest income groups in Cambridge procured more calorie content than the same income groups in Boston. This overconcentration in proteins and potatoes may perhaps be explained by the preponderance of laborers and factory workers among the Cambridge workers. Certainly the Cambridge unemployed attempted to maintain an adequate diet and economies were not made in food as against other budgetary items.

The most markedly inadequate item on the Cambridge unemployed budget was clothing, which seems to have been the chief object of enforced economies. The average expenditure per family was \$52, or 5.5% of total expenditure. The lowest clothing budget set up for a farm family of five is \$150 a year. This assumes that clothing will be handed down from the older members of the family to be remodelled and that much of the new clothing will be made at home.¹⁷ Of course, a good deal of clothing was given to these families by friends, relatives, and relief agencies. Even so, it was the

¹⁵ See "The Economics of Low-Income Diets," *Quart. J. Eco.*, August 1937, by Helen L. Sorenson and the author.

¹⁶ Various standard diets have been set up by the Bureau of Home Economics and are described in the above article.

¹⁷ U. S. Dept. of Agri. Ext. Ser., by Florence H. Hall in cooperation with a committee of extension clothing specialists in the Eastern states. The budget is based on 1932 prices. (Mimeographed report, No. 6358.)

impression of the interviewers that most of the families in the Cambridge group were badly in need of clothing. The Boston expenditure of \$154 per year on clothes is not far above the minimum farm standard, but at least makes possible adequate clothing.

Other expenditures were reduced, although the proportion spent for housing was about the same as in Boston. In many cases, families were living together in homes or apartments formerly kept by one family alone, so that the housing standard must have been lowered. Also, many of the families kept shifting about in order to avoid paying rent. Luxury and incidental expenditures were likewise cut but not abolished.

The percentage distribution of the expenditure of the Cambridge families corresponds fairly closely with that for common labor in Zimmerman's 1927 study of various classes in Minnesota towns.¹⁸ The Boston distribution is between that for semiskilled and common labor, with about the same proportion on luxuries plus automobile, but more on necessities. The proportion spent for food in both Boston and Cambridge was higher, indicating a lower standard of living.

These Cambridge families lived on a low economic level which was, however, adequate for health in everything except clothing. Their diet was, on the average, above the minimum standard. Most of them carried insurance, went to the movies, smoked, and spent a small amount on personal upkeep. One in every fourteen families owned and operated an automobile. In proportion to their total expenditure they spent more on food and less on clothing and luxuries than the employed group in Boston. In order to spend anything for goods and services other than food, clothing, and shelter they had to resort to credit and to the use of whatever capital assets they had. Rent, doctor's bills, and in some cases, grocers' bills went unpaid so that their consumption might be more diverse.

It must be remembered that this group in Cambridge were probably on a higher economic level than the typical unemployed family or relief case. Possibly the lower income groups in this sample are more nearly representative of the unemployed. This part of the sample consisted of single persons or large families with barely enough to eat and almost no resources except public relief. About one quarter of the families and one third of the persons who kept weekly accounts were in this situation.

A more representative analysis of the living conditions of relief cases must await the completion of the larger study now under way. It will then be possible to define more accurately the economic and social characteristics of the relief population. For the present, the group described in this paper stand as a very small sample of part of the unemployed population and indicate the kind of information necessary before conclusions can be advanced as to the living conditions forced upon workers by unemployment and depression.

¹⁸ Carle C. Zimmerman, *Consumption and Standards of Living*, 326, New York, 1936.

INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY*

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MEANING OF "*Invisible Government*." Realistic study of social affairs today makes it increasingly evident that government, as the general system of authoritative social control, has two basically important, natural aspects: (a) the more concentrated, official, "visible" part; and (b) the more diffused, unofficial, and "invisible" part. In the United States, the former is made up of the publicly chosen and established officials and agencies. The invisible part of the government, far less obvious but no less real, is made up of those more private, organized pressure groups that are continually working for the public assistance of their interests.

Chart 1 illustrates the more common distribution of functions in the invisible government in this country. Connected with each of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in the different governmental areas, national, state and local, are the hordes of private and informal agents, bosses, advisers, fixers, attorneys, spies, and accomplices, that make up the special agents of the invisible government,—the functional interest pressure groups.

The Democratic Evolution of Invisible Government. As social evolution increases its speed today, we are becoming more keenly aware of these "invisible" parts of the government. They are powerfully affecting the course of affairs, and they are not under adequate and orderly control. The phase of social control in which they always center is in the struggle of the less privileged members of the community for larger rights of social membership, against the conditions of general ignorance and the usual alarmed resistance of the more privileged and "comfortably fixed" groups.

Throughout the world, and especially in the West, the gradual extension of the right to vote for general public officers by increasingly larger groups of the population has been the common indicator of the growing national union and democratic relationships. Consider, for example, the advances of the suffrage in England: (1) the granting of Magna Charta, 1215 (admitting the greater barons definitely to the visible government); (2) The Bill of Rights, 1689 (marking the rise of the lesser nobles and commercial gentry); (3) The Great Reform Bill, 1832 (the rise to power, in the Industrial Revolution, of business enterprise, with transition from *aristocratic* to more *plutocratic* leadership); (4) granting of national suffrage to the city

* Part of paper on "Visible and Invisible Government in the United States Today," at annual meeting of The American Sociological Society, 1937.

| CHART I. INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Carrying on unofficial and informal functions of political influence, party organization, elections, etc., with an eye to "income.") | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|---|---|--|
| Through Executive | | Through Legislative | | Through Courts | | | |
| NATIONAL | | | | | | | |
| Informal Associate Councilors of executive officers from the great corporations and other "special interests"; officers of national parties; "ghost writers," etc. | | The Lobbies of Congress: representatives of the 200 leading business interests, coal, lumber, oil, steel, railroads, etc.; some representatives of consumers, farmers, labor, etc. | | Professional Law Agents: bondsmen, spies, runners, etc., of business, civic, criminal, and other organizations interested in influencing court action. | | | |
| STATE | | | | | | | |
| State "Bosses," usually chairmen of the State Central Committees of leading political parties, in charge of conventions, elections, party offices, party funds, state "jobs." | | The Lobbies of the Legislature, representing substantially the same interests as those in Washington, D. C., in cooperation with, or under the bosses. | | Legal Agents: same system as with the Federal Courts, working in cooperation with, or under, the state and local bosses. | | | |
| CITY | | | | | | | |
| City Bosses, ward bosses, precinct executives and confidants. | | Private Council of the bosses, their agents and associates. | | Court Agents of the bosses, bondsmen, attorneys, spies, etc. | | | |
| COUNTY | | | | | | | |
| County Bosses: Township workers and associates are less completely organized than in the cities, states and nation. | | | | | | | |
| FUNCTIONAL INTEREST PRESSURE GROUPS (OF THE "OVERWORLD" AND "UNDERWORLD") (Represented by above agents, and constituting basis of invisible government.) | | | | | | | |
| MAINTENANCE | | REFLECTION | | CONTROL | | APPRECIATION | |
| Sustenance Groups | Equipment Groups | Communication Groups | Education Groups | Civic-Religious Groups | Governmental Groups | Recreational Groups | Art Groups |
| OVERWORLD: REPUTABLE AND PUBLICLY SERVICEABLE | | | | | | | |
| Farming Food and Drink Real Estate Homemaking Rooming Catering Labor | Mining Housing Transport Manufacture Power and Light Merchandise Capital | Research Accounting Press Radio Telephone Telegraph Mail Library | Forum School University Training Medicine Law Hospital | Social Work Lodge Church Mission Reform Conservation Peace | Police War(?) Legislation Administration Court Correction Finance | Sport Athletic Rendezvous Club Travel Festival Dance Reading | Drama Architecture Music Dance Poetry Literature Sculpture Painting |
| UNDERWORLD: DISREPUTABLE AND CRIMINAL | | | | | | | |
| Adulteration Prostitution Intemperance | Exploiter Robber Fraud | False Propaganda, Fake Advertising | Unscientific Shyster Quack | Fanatic "Red" "Reactionary" | Dictator Racketeer Gangster | Vice Gambling Narcotic | Fake Art "Jazz" "Modernism" |

laborers in 1867; and (5) to the rural laborers, in 1884; (6) to the women in 1918 and 1928; and finally (7) the growth of the Labor Party and increasing political influence of organized labor in recent years. The rise of women and of organized labor seems to mark the recent, more definite coming of a democratic order in the western world. A very similar trend has, of course, been notable in the United States. From the rise of business government in the Declaration of Independence, through the abolition of slavery and the development of the trusts, to the enfranchisement of women and wider organization of labor in recent years, we observe the invisible changing into the more visible government. This rise of status and influence was achieved through increasing public education, wealth, and other social forces gradually extended, in (usually) voluntary, organized movements among the people at large.

It is well known that as each class "arrived" in the visible government it tended to become more conservative and somewhat resisted the advance of the rising classes below it. This process of widening the union, however, has gone on increasing the mutual understanding, power of cooperation and teamwork of the people generally. As has been well said, "*Your business and my business are becoming our business.*" As collective responsibility increases, we learn to control together the things we need to use together.

Difficulty in Advance of Democracy and Labor. The part which organized labor is playing today, particularly in the rapid formation of industrial unions, cooperatives, and international federations, seems to be the leading factor in this historical development, apparently preparing for a more genuine industrial, as well as political, democracy. To be sure, the frightened revolt of the more privileged, conservative classes, particularly as in fascism with its domineering, "vigilante" state, has been against this development and has led to dictatorships that have been compromises between the older autocracy and the newer democracy. At the focus of this social conflict today, the invisible government is intensively involved. The chief difficulty of the advance may be stated as the increasing comprehensiveness and complexity of the interests that need to be habituated to teamwork. This difficulty has been temporarily too great in many places for the earlier and cruder political forms of democracy, such as the older types of municipal and parliamentary government; and the weakness of its political forms has induced the autocratically inclined to discredit democracy altogether.

The Nature of the Democratic Ideal. Such a situation obviously calls for a clarification of the concept and improvement of the practice of democracy. If this trend to the larger union is the essence of democracy on the formal side, what is the heart and motive of it? How may it be reorganized to function more successfully? Such an inquiry may throw considerable light on the nature of the visible and invisible phases of government; for democracy

may turn out to be just *the norm or ideal of any organically united, and therefore efficiently functioning, society*. The prevailing, scientific concept of democracy, I believe, is coming to be: democracy is a society in which every person is functioning to the best of his ability, because he is duly recognized and organically adjusted as a true *member of the community*. John Dewey says, for example,

Democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself . . . the clear consciousness of communal life in all its implications . . . The prime difficulty . . . is that of discovering the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to *define and express its interests* . . . *The problem is, in the first instance, an intellectual problem: The search for conditions under which the Great Society may become the Great Community.*¹

Sociology can render a large service today by stating more clearly and comprehensively the democratic frame of reference needed to guide the government in developing more just and stable social control. The elements of such a pattern of relations obviously must include, on the one hand, a statement of the basic system of common interests that every one is attempting to satisfy; and, on the other, a description of the system of group associations that have developed in the service of the individual's interests.²

According to this organic conception, society is the system of somewhat specialized associations, in which each tends to function for all mainly through the growth and promotion of a particular service interest. As society grows larger, the parts become more specialized and more interdependent. Government develops from the earlier form of an alien, dictatorial control by one part over the others, to an intimate, intelligently representative control of all, through one, as the main control agent, operating for the benefit of all. In the democratic trend, government thus becomes less a violent function of general domination by a privileged group, and more a specialized service of general coordination by publicly employed political experts. The total system of basic interests may be listed as those of sustenance, equipment, information, education, morality, government, fellowship, and art, operating respectively to promote the values of vitality, wealth, knowledge, wisdom, justice, order, friendship, and beauty.

In a perfect democracy, which is seldom or never fully achieved, the reciprocity of service becomes so complete that these values are developed in the experience of all the members of the community to the fullest extent of their native capacities. World thought is today unbalanced, with excessive attention to narrow, more physical, private objectives, e.g., things, gadgets, and blind thrills. Democracy and sanity require more attention

¹ *The Public and Its Problems*, 146-149. Professor MacIver and other sociologists have been advancing much the same view. Above italics are by the present writer.

² For a more explicit statement of this, see article by the present writer in *Social Forces*, March 1936, "Social Technology in Relation to Social Planning."

to larger, public ends,—communities, human purposes, significant meanings,—in a thoroughly shared life. This is democracy.

The ideal of democracy is thus a social order in which every person has a real opportunity to "make good." This implies at least four conditions: (1) for every child, a normal birth, liberal education and healthy environment; (2) for every adult, a secure job adapted to his abilities; (3) for every person, an income adequate to maintain him in the position of his best social service; and (4) for every person, such influence with the authorities that his needs and ideas receive due consideration by them.

Dictatorship versus Democracy. The democratic ideal is constructed on the main principle that the maximum enrichment of the experience of *all* the members of the community is the due concern and objective of all. In other words, the heart and motive of democracy is respect for personality wherever it is found. In the dictatorships that are developing today, this is not clearly the main objective. In the case of fascism, the main stated objective is the development of the "corporative state" as above and superior to *all* the individual persons that make it up (with the possible exception of the "leader"). Of course, logically and practically, this is an absurdity. If all the member-persons are to give up their lives for the state, it is wiped out, at least on "this earth." The aim of the dictators for genuine solidarity, as organic union, however, is a legitimate and important aim. But so desperate has been their need to achieve this, in the present disordered condition of the world, that they have been led into the ultimately impossible means of trying to achieve it by despotic repression of the basic civil rights of free communication. This amounts almost to complete contempt for personality itself. Their confused repudiation of democracy has been due both to their misconception of the fundamental place and function of the individual's interests in society, and to the weakness of the older political forms of democracy, such as the old, slow committee methods. They have lately been inadequate to deal effectively and swiftly with the fast-moving, complex problems of social control. Doubtless these political forms of democracy need revision, but the principle of democracy, as organic union through free communication and *informed, voluntary, loyal team work of all for all*,—this remains the unshaken ground of all healthy community life.

The Basic Necessity of Free Communication. In this view of normal community life, *all persons and interest groups have an essential function of advice and consent in the government.* As previously indicated, the invisible government is that natural part of the government, made up of those informal influences of advice and pressure which, under usual conditions, are continually expressing the interests and desires of the citizens in the general political control. The basic theory of democracy is that no government is wise enough, nor, in the long run, strong enough, to direct general order and

progress, without such popular advice, criticism, pressure, and consent. For a while, backed with dramatic mass propaganda, dictatorship works for cooperation and order, but not well nor long today.³

The Tree of Community Life is rooted in the needs and wishes, the interests, of living human beings. Its branches, flowers, and fruitage are the cooperative fulfillment of those interests through the institutions of our ever richer and wider community life. The state is the trunk of this tree of community life. In a democracy, it functions to build this cooperation, with individual initiative duly recognized and made free to contribute its utmost to the common good. Dictatorship, in its drastic effort for solidarity, cuts the roots of the state by intolerantly denying the freedom of informed, individual initiative. True democracy conserves the roots of the state by tolerantly promoting the freedom of informed, individual initiative, through the citizen groups of the invisible government and the official groups of the visible government. Working together in a friendly union with intelligent leadership, they coordinate the essential social functions of maintenance, reflection, control, and appreciation.

Transformation of the Visible by the Invisible Government. The course of history seems to indicate that the invisible government groups are always modifying the forms and functions of the visible government. In our day, the lobby, "the third house of the legislature," tends to become a recognized, regular part of the government. In some countries, as in Russia and Italy, its principle of representation for vocational groups, is beginning to be commonly applied. The idea of organic cooperation of vocational groups in "the corporative state" is sound. Similarly, in respect to the executive branch of the government, the growing vocations are tending continually to increase the number of commissions and reorganize the departments in cabinets and councils.

I believe the main tendency is thus toward a more comprehensive and proportional representation of basic community interests in the visible government. This seems to be indicated, for example, by the proposals for the organization of new departments of education, social welfare, recreation, and art in the state and national administrations. It is in such ways, through interaction of visible and invisible government, that the earlier, more divided and contentious "acquisitive society" becomes the more unified and cooperative "functional society,"—the Great Community.

New Factors in the Problem of Industrial Democracy. In our day, the greater community, despite vast waste and confusion, is plainly growing, especially, as we have suggested, through the new expansions of organized capital and organized labor. Labor in particular is today on the march; but neither capital nor labor clearly knows whither they are going. That the general direction of the movement is toward wider teamwork and planned

³ See argument of William H. Chamberlain in his book, *Collectivism, A False Utopia*.

control seems to be evident. This is, in a general sense, evident in the spread of the syndicates, of consumers' cooperation, of social insurance, of socialized medical service, of organized labor, and of many other forms of social cooperation. If "*your business and my business are becoming our business,*" if "*the things we need to use and do together, we are learning to plan and control together,*" then these tendencies spell industrial democracy. Here in the struggle for larger industrial union, however, the forces of the visible and the invisible government come into sharp conflict. Here the pressure groups of the overprivileged and the underprivileged are often fiercely pitted against each other.

These conflicts and wars occur chiefly because no adequate distribution of the social income is agreed upon and arranged. To what groups and by what groups should the income be assigned? Normally, the goods of the production process, flowing from land and labor through the extracting transforming, and exchanging industries, should be distributed to the various functional groups of society so as to meet adequately the ultimate consumer's essential interests (as listed above). In reference to the kinds of groups or activities for which incomes should be assigned, we need, of course, to consider their relations of dependence and service to the community. To the class of *normal dependents* such as children, aged, sick and injured, goods should, of course, go freely "to each according to his need," without any exacted return. Similarly, to the *efficient, necessary workers* by hand and brain, goods should go so as to maintain and increase their efficiency. However, if society is to be maintained in a healthy condition, goods cannot be used to support *mature, competent persons in parasitic activities*, whether such activities be those of vice and crime, of inefficient work or of artificially privileged rank, ownership, or prestige.

The Crucial Question of Economic Distribution. The crucial question in our society is the control of economic production because this is where the division and assignment of consumer's goods and capital goods takes place. The question is, who shall say, and by what forms of ownership, what proportions and qualities of goods and services shall go to the immediate functional uses of the community at large, and what proportions and qualities, to the process of production for profit and reinvestment, especially, as it is now managed by private speculators?

It is a well established fact that under the present system of management, some industries are grossly overcapitalized and overbuilt, others neglected; luxury supplies for the wealthy are emphasized, and millions of consumers deprived of a decent, or even tolerable, livelihood.⁴ By stinting of incomes for the masses, general markets are weakened, and business depressions alternate with orgies of speculation.

⁴ See Goslin and Goslin, *Rich Man Poor Man*, 1-28. Also S. S. Wyer, *Contribution to a Way Out of Today's Depression*, 16, 18, 20; H. S. Moulton, *Income and Economic Progress*, Intro. and chaps. 1, 2; Ferdinand Lundberg, *America's Sixty Families*.

The control over the apportionment of incomes to the different functional interests in society is still nominally and largely in the hands of the traditional private owner and investor groups. The control is now, however, becoming extensively divided between the two opposed camps of capital and labor, through the unstable system of collective bargaining. This is not socially efficient. These two camps build up powerful, conflicting organizations of the invisible government. The consequence is an elaborate system of spies, strikes and lockouts, with an exaggerated turmoil of hiring and firing. In England, with her long experience and developed public regard for social order, industrial democracy has advanced considerably.⁵ In the United States, the public exercises no adequate control over the situation.

The Current Change in the Nature of Property Ownership. One third of all the "property" of the United States is now said, on good authority, to be owned by scattered millions of corporation stockholders who necessarily know little and care less about the technical nature, the employees, and the public services of the business they are supposed to own and control.⁶ "Ownership" and responsible control are thus becoming extensively separated. This is in striking contrast to the old system of grandfather's responsible ownership of his farm. He knew his land, his employees, his customers, and was proud of a responsible, stable service to the public.

The newer, "corporate" control, under present conditions, necessarily is lodged in the hands of a comparatively few financiers, managers, directors, and other minority "insiders." These gentlemen of the inside control are tempted, through a labyrinth of directorships, affiliates and holding companies, to exploit their holdings in the markets at the expense of their associates and the public, and the laws are often made to favor such "ownership" against the employees and customers. Yet, over a period of years the national total of profits seems to be regularly offset by an equal or greater total of business losses.

These conditions of the struggle for speculative income greatly intensify the efforts of the pressure groups in the invisible government for unearned income through political influences and business favoritism, especially through the banks and other financial agencies. The fact that the private banks virtually create and assign money, through their credit loans, makes them powerful, almost public, members of the invisible government. Their motive as private bankers is private profit. Their knowledge of the public needs is very limited. Economists, political scientists, and sociologists are increasingly urging that the essential elements of this power be lodged solely in visible government hands.

⁵ See Report, in September 1938, of President Roosevelt's Commission to Study Industrial Relations in Europe.

⁶ See Berle and Means, *The Corporation and Private Property*, chaps. 3, 4, esp. 45-46, 66-68.

The Confusion about Profit. The growing confusion about the term "profit" is also intensifying activities of the invisible government. Years ago, the term meant just the pay of small business enterprisers who owned and managed their business and secured their pay for management, in the form of the difference between their "gross income" and their "total expenses," under the simpler conditions of small scale business. This seemed fair pay for the risks of loss, the work of management, the service of invention, and the skill of pioneering new enterprises. Today the skill of inventing and pioneering new things in the relatively smaller, new concerns seems about the only remaining kind of public service properly to be paid by profits strictly speaking, for, in the larger corporate concerns, nearly every general, economic service has become standardized and specialized, as, for example insurance by insurance companies, management by salaries managers, and invention by hired research specialists. Since all of these are paid for as "expenses," profits become reduced to very fortuitous surpluses, due to conditions of general prosperity or wide gambling chances of commerce, over which even the most skilled business managers have individually little control. Thus, when business outgrows the smaller unspecialized form, and becomes huge, standardized, widely organized and "affected with a public interest," its "profits" are no longer really the payments for general skill in a pioneering service, but become collections of income either by pure luck, or by fighting ability against competitors, or virtually by more or less "invisible" governmental influence over truly public, economic processes.

In other words, as competent students are pointing out,⁷ several important facts affecting the whole theory and practice of government are now appearing in the new setup and practices of corporate industry. Since expenses, strictly speaking, cover the payments for all kinds of legitimate services, and thus make up the total purchasing power of the market, in any nation as a whole, monetary profits as national monetary income above national expenses do not exist. The argument is that, under the existing system, owners of business, especially of large, standardized business, capture profits of necessity by excessively contentious methods, thus inflicting losses on others; or they secure them from the exploitation of natural resources or of foreign countries. Over a series of years, the alleged profits of a country like the United States, seem to be completely offset by losses.⁸ Recent confused financial manipulations of the New York Stock Market would seem to support this view.

The Changing Nature of Governmental Control. From such considerations, it would seem to follow that some further socialization of the economic process is necessary for national welfare. This socialization, if orderly society is

⁷ See H. P. Fairchild, *This Way Out*, 26-46.

⁸ See R. R. Doane, *Measurement of American Wealth*, 144, 158, and Ryllis and Omar Goslin, *Rich Man, Poor Man*, 28, 29, ff.

to survive, will have to take the form of placing the *ultimate* control of general policies squarely in the hands of the mature and responsible public, under public spirited leadership; and the control of the technical services in the hands of trained and permanently employed technicians. These responsible technicians must be willing and competent to produce and assign the proper proportions and qualities of goods and services for the adequate support of the basic interests of society. This may not necessarily mean some form of "socialism," or other "ism," as popularly conceived in this country. It might, as a result of further tests, include such devices as the change of the private corporation advocated by Professor Fairchild; or the use of visible-government operating trusts, as advocated by Stuart Chase and others, supplemented by the more extensive use of organized consumers' cooperation (see Childs, *Sweden, The Middle Way*). In any case, the invisible governments of the more progressive, legitimate pressure groups are urging the movement of public affairs in that direction.⁹

The Paradox of Scarcity Today. The basic difficulty of the current economic system, lack of adequate, steady purchasing power of the masses of people to sustain the markets of industry, the paradox of scarcity for many in the midst of possible plenty for all, is now being partly overcome by legal measures, against the resistance of some leaders and many agencies of the "invisible" government.

In this connection, recent democratic improvements in the legal status of organized labor in the United States, against forces of reaction, are significant.¹⁰ In 1898, the Erdman Act was passed by Congress, outlawing the "yellow dog" contracts. (By such contracts an employee was compelled to agree not to join a trade union nor to urge others to do so.) In 1908, the Supreme Court declared this law unconstitutional. In 1914, the Clayton Act endeavored to check the extreme power of the federal courts in granting injunctions against labor activities. In 1921, this, also, was declared unconstitutional. In 1932, Congress renewed its efforts to improve the status of organized labor by passing the Norris-La Guardia Act which forbids federal courts to enforce yellow dog contracts, or to enjoin persons "interested" in labor disputes from peacefully assembling for organization and from making public the facts of a labor dispute. In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (by Senator Wagner) strengthened the collective bargaining rights of labor by: (1) *prohibiting certain unfair practices of employ-*

⁹ See Stuart Chase, *Government in Business*, chaps. 13, 14; David C. Coyle, *Uncommon Sense*, Pts. 3, 5; Paul H. Douglas, "An Economist's Idea of Good Government," *Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, Sept. 1933; Edward A. Filene, *Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, March 1934; and the whole issue of same journal for May 1935, devoted to *Pressure Groups and Propaganda*.

¹⁰ See A. H. Fry, "What's Behind the Strikes?" *Harper's Magazine*, Jan. 1938, and S. H. Walker and Paul Sklar, "Business Finds Its Voice," same issue.

ers, such as antiunion discriminations, refusing to bargain collectively, and having "company unions"; and (2) *establishing the National Labor Relations Board* to administer the Act (with the help of Federal Circuit courts).

April 12, 1937, *this Act was declared constitutional* by the Supreme Court; and January 3, 1938, the Tennessee Valley Authority work was strengthened by the Court decision upholding the right of P.W.A. to lend money to cities to build power plants and secure light and power from the T.V.A. These decisions and the recent increase of the liberal personnel of the Supreme Court, together with the rapid increase of industrial unions throughout the country, have formed an advance in the direction of industrial democracy and better control of the problem of scarcity.

Against these trends must be set the still divided conditions of organized labor, e.g., between C.I.O. and A.F.L. factions, and the continued efforts of some employers to prevent labor organization through such devices as "The Mohawk Valley Formula." This is declared illegal by the National Labor Relations Board, because it tends to the use of company unions and "citizens" committees of "vigilantes," and inclines armed, ill-advised police forces to intimidate peaceful strikers. Under these conditions, violent community antagonisms are often aroused by fake "back to work" movements and confused demands for a false "law and order." The obvious need of the time is far better teamwork of all parties for the larger social union. The passage of both state and federal better wage and hour laws and better cooperation of business and government now seem to be wholesome movements in that direction. Can we today build broadly this friendly union?

Conclusion. Secretary Henry A. Wallace answers this question, wisely, I believe, in the following way.¹¹

In all civilized lands today we stand appalled by the tragic nonsense of misery and want in the midst of tremendous stocks of essential goods. The alarming thing in Washington is not that there are so many special pressure groups, but that there are so few people who are concerned solely with looking at the picture from the broad national angle . . . The hard but necessary first lesson we all must learn is that we cannot prosper separately. Even individual pressure groups must catch the idea that pressure on behalf of any individual group makes necessary, sooner or later, compensating pressure in behalf of other groups. In our march to a real democracy, governmental powers should not be loaned too lightly to any group. For the ultimate security of that loan, there must be clear-cut evidence that the power will be used to advance a harmonious relationship between forces now contending. The degree to which this principle can be grasped and applied by business men, laborers, and farmers reared in a freebooter tradition remains to be seen.

¹¹ *New Frontiers*: chaps. 3, 6, and *America Must Choose*, 21. See also O. W. Riegel, *Mobilizing for Chaos: The Story of the New Propaganda*. chap 1.

INGROUP MEMBERSHIP AND ACADEMIC SELECTION

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TO WHAT extent does membership in academic ingroups influence selection to faculty posts? We took as criteria of ingroup membership three factors: (1) academic training leading to the successful completion of one or more degrees at Indiana University; (2) known friendship ties between personnel in this and another university; and finally (3) blood and marriage ties between faculty and nonfaculty people. That is, our purpose was to determine how these factors influence the appointment of new staff.

The data presented cover all faculty appointments, instructor and above, made in Indiana University from January 1, 1885, to June 30, 1937. These dates were chosen because they mark the beginning of David Starr Jordan's and the end of William Lowe Bryan's presidencies. The 802 appointments did not include visiting professors, lecturers, army officers, athletic coaches and other special, or part time personnel. The data will be presented in the order of the criteria enumerated to determine ingroup relationship.

Because the administrative system informally delegated the selection of new staff almost entirely to the department head or dean,¹ it enabled him to place the selection of his men on a personal basis, if he chose to do so. The whole system was built up around personal relationships and personal authority, from the president down to instructors. We mean by the phrase "personal relationships" that men in their day to day experiences build up friendships, sentimental attachments, biases, and antipathies toward the men with whom they work. These evaluations usually take the form of emotional attitudes, and act as strong ties binding men together, as well as diverting them into hostile groups.

I. Alumni Appointments. Alumni of Indiana University who were known to the faculty, and, in a sense, automatically members of the university ingroup, comprised 42.89 percent of the 802 appointees from 1885 to 1937.² The selection of staff on the basis of personal biases is evident in certain departments, such as Botany (16 to 6), Chemistry (21 to 2), Mathematics (19 to 9), and Physics (19 to 7), which have appointed alumni to faculty positions in almost all cases. The figures clearly demonstrate that member-

¹ In Indiana University, departments in the Arts College have department heads who report directly to the president while the professional schools have deans who deal with the president. Department head and dean are almost synonymous titles for this study.

² The source of these and all subsequent figures is data in the president's office and university catalogues.

ship in the academic ingroup acquired by training in Indiana University has been a potential factor in determining the selection of appointees in almost every division of the university, since 344 alumni have been appointed. Some alumni appointments have been made in each of the 32 departments except art and home economics. Furthermore, this practice has not greatly diminished as the years have passed.

Recruiting practices have varied from one rank to another to such an extent that they have to be considered separately. Approximately one department head out of five brought to the university to fill a vacancy has been an alumnus; whereas more than one half of the instructors have been Indiana trained. The intermediate ranks occupy percentage positions comparable to their station in the rank hierarchy, except for associate professor, where the proportion of alumni has been lower than for any other rank (Table 1). There has been an inverse relation between rank and alumni appointments; the higher the rank the lower the proportion of alumni appointees, except for associate professors as noted; conversely, the lower the rank, the higher the proportion of alumni appointees.

TABLE 1. NUMBER AND PERCENT OF APPOINTMENTS TO EACH RANK, CLASSIFIED BY PLACE OF TRAINING, INDIAN & OR ELSEWHERE, 1885-1937

| Rank | Indiana Trained | | Trained Elsewhere | |
|--------------------|-----------------|---------|-------------------|---------|
| | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Dean or Dept. Head | 9 | 16.4 | 46 | 83.6 |
| Professor | 12 | 20.0 | 48 | 80.0 |
| Assoc. Prof. | 8 | 15.4 | 44 | 84.6 |
| Assist. Prof. | 35 | 28.0 | 90 | 72.0 |
| Instructor | 280 | 54.9 | 230 | 45.1 |
| Total number | 344 | 42.89 | 458 | 57.11 |

The prevalence of alumni in administrative offices even more clearly illustrates the influence of ingroup membership on institutional participation. A factor of greater significance, however, than merely filling an administrative office is the influence a particular person exerts in university councils. Although this cannot be measured objectively, other than by weighing the evidence gathered from various sources, then imputing a judgment on such data, the investigator is convinced that the destiny of the university during the period studied has been centered in the hands of the alumni occupying administrative offices. We do not believe this is a condition unique to Indiana University, but rather a general condition in university organization. Three of the four presidents whose administrations were studied took one or more degrees from Indiana. During 46 of the 52 years studied, the president was an alumnus, and this spring (1938) the Trustees elected an-

other to the presidency. All the registrars and comptrollers have been alumni or received what academic training they had here; two thirds of the librarians have been Indiana graduates. One third of the deans and department heads have been alumni, but this class has remained in office much longer than those trained elsewhere. The net result has been that alumni have occupied these positions slightly more than one half of all the time spent in them by both groups (Table 2). Furthermore, 54.5 percent of the persons promoted from a lower rank to a dean or department head was alumni.

TABLE 2. NUMBER AND PERCENT OF ALUMNI (I.U.) AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS AND TOTAL YEARS AND PERCENT OF TOTAL YEARS OF ALUMNI AND OTHERS IN EACH CLASS OF OFFICE, 1885-1937

| Admin. Office | Number of Persons | | Percent of Persons | | Total Years Served | | Percent of All Years Served | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--------|--------------------|--------|--------------------|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
| | I.U. | Others | I.U. | Others | I.U. | Others | I.U. | Others |
| President | 3 | 1 | 75.0 | 25.0 | 46 | 6 | 88.5 | 11.5 |
| Comptroller | 4 | 0 | 100.0 | 0 | 52 | 0 | 100.0 | 0 |
| Registrar | 5 | 0 | 100.0 | 0 | 52 | 0 | 100.0 | 0 |
| Deans and Dept. heads | 33 | 66 | 33.3 | 66.6 | 620 | 601 | 50.8 | 49.2 |
| Librarian | 6 | 2 | 66.6 | 33.3 | 45 | 7 | 86.6 | 13.4 |

II. Personal Relations. Personal relationships have operated in many appointments, but the loss of many records, the death and resignation of persons involved and the natural reticence of those who still remain regarding their own selection, compelled the use of a sample rather than the entire collection of cases. However, personal relationships were found in so many cases (89)³ that it appeared this has been a consistent dynamic factor in the selection of new staff from instructors to presidents. This is the reason for the wide difference in alumni appointees in some departments as compared to others. To illustrate this, a little known incident of great importance in the subsequent history of the university is related here.

David Starr Jordan, while a professor in Indiana University, gathered about a half dozen young men into a congeniality group called the "Specialists' Club." The members were almost all young fellows who recently had been appointed either to the faculty of the preparatory school, now the high school, or to the university staff by President Moss, Jordan's predecessor. Most of them had been or were Jordan's assistants, and almost all were students or alumni. The club continued to function after Jordan became president, and as the years passed, he came to rely upon the advice

³ Only appointees who received no training in Indiana University are considered in this class. Personal influences operating in this group are, however, similar to those among alumni.

the group gave him in administrative matters. In this group, were three men who succeeded Jordan to the president's chair, one after another, a librarian, a registrar, two longtime department heads, later deans, and one department head who never became a Dean.⁴ The former "Specialists" who became president one after another occupied this office until June 30, 1937.

A few cases will have to suffice to indicate how personal relations influence the appointment of new personnel; unfortunately, we were unable to measure this factor accurately. Nevertheless, we know that the entire faculty structure is powerfully influenced by personal relationships.

The selection of department heads has been an obscure process, but every department head or dean appointed during the last quarter of a century who did not receive a part or all his training in Indiana University, has been a good friend, or a friend of a friend, or somebody already on the campus. *Case I* will illustrate this. The retiring head was an intimate friend of the president; he was given a free hand in selecting his successor. He did not look around very much as he had a good friend in another university who was well known by several people on the campus, but more particularly by two men in key positions, one of them a dean who talked to the president in support of the head's recommendation. In due time, this friend was appointed.

Three of the 8 professors permanently appointed to the Arts College in the last 35 years were alumni and former students of the men who later brought them back to the university as professors. Four of the remaining 5 were all personal friends of the men in the departments to which they were appointed. The fifth had formerly belonged to the faculty, in a lower rank, but had left to accept a better position in another university. However, as soon as his former head was able to bring him back, he did so.

In *Case II*, Professor G was appointed head of a department upon the recommendation of his good friend Professor A, who had known him for a score of years. Following G's appointment, the department expanded, and the new appointees were selected in the following manner: G wrote to his professional friends and asked them to suggest suitable candidates. The man finally selected from this list was unknown to G, but he was a former student, colleague, and close friend of one of G's most intimate professional friends. When another man was needed, G immediately appointed a former student, friend, and research collaborator. When the next vacancy occurred, G appointed a man who had been highly recommended to him by a good friend. When the next vacancy developed, another former student and friend of G's was immediately appointed. In all these cases,⁵ personal

⁴ Jordan's estimate of these men is given in his *Days of a Man*, Vol. 1, 237-240, 295-296, New York, 1922.

⁵ None of these men was an Indiana alumnus.

relationship was a potent factor, both in the selection of the department head, and in all of his appointments.

Two other interesting instances of inner selection demonstrate from another angle the prevalence of personal evaluations and the strength of in-group friendship ties in staff selection. In the first instance, the head was brought, about a generation ago, from a small Middle Western college. All appointments he has made since, either came from that college, or have been students of his since he has been connected here. In the other case, the head has appointed 12 persons in the fifteen years he has been on the staff. Four of them have been his own Indiana students; 8 have come from a single university where a very good friend of this man is the chairman of the department; one appointee took his work in a third university, but he was recommended by a friend of his who was also a good friend of the local head.

These cases are typical illustrations of the network of personal relations that have operated in the appointment process. The system works somewhat along these lines: a vacancy occurs, and the men on the ground who know about it first, recommend some personal friend to the head of the department, or the head may simply write to a friend and offer him the position, if he does not happen to have any students to appoint. After the head makes his decision, he usually confers with the president. Frequently, however, the head talks the matter over with the president, and receives suggestions from him.

III. Family Ties. Throughout the university's history, family connections have played an important part in determining faculty appointments.

TABLE 3. TOTAL FACULTY APPOINTMENTS, NUMBER AND PERCENT OF RELATIVES APPOINTED BY DECADES, 1885-1937

| | 1885-94 | 1895-04 | 1905-14 | 1915-24 | 1925-37 |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| No. Appointments | 97 | 83 | 148 | 252 | 222 |
| No. Relatives Appointed | 21 | 20 | 28 | 50 | 46 |
| Percent Relatives | 21.5 | 24.1 | 18.9 | 19.8 | 20.7 |

One person in five (20.45 percent) appointed to the faculty since 1885, has been related to someone connected with the university in an administrative or faculty position.⁶ Nepotism has been well scattered through the staff. The proportion of appointments involving relatives has been fairly stable from decade to decade (Table 3). Sometimes two relatives were in the same

⁶ We have traced all known family connections and tabulated them whether or not the person's relative was on the staff at the time of the appointment. Present and past family connections were included because tradition always has been strong in the university, and familism is an important part of this social heritage.

department, but usually one has been in one department, another in another, although one department had four relatives on its staff when this study was concluded. The authority of position has been a significant factor in determining whether or not children of faculty members will be placed on the staff. The children of 14 department heads, deans, or other high administrative officers have been placed in faculty positions since 1885, whereas only one professor has managed to get a child on the faculty, and no one below this rank.

Approximately 7 relatives out of 10 (72.6 percent) exhibited relationships of the first degree, that is, husband-wife, parent-child, and siblings. The remainder (27.4 percent) represent second degree relationships, that is, cousins, in-laws, nephews, nieces, and grandchildren. Husband and wife relationships have been the most frequent type represented; moreover, this has been almost entirely a development of the last quarter century. Previous to 1915, there were only 11 cases; since then, there have been 43. The next most frequent association has been between the generations, father-son, or father-daughter, 36 cases. Siblings and cousins follow in the order named (Table 4).

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF KNOWN FACULTY APPOINTEES RELATED THROUGH FAMILY TIES, AND THE DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP, BY PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT, 1885-1937

| Degree of Relationship | 1885-94 | 1895-04 | 1905-14 | 1915-24 | 1925-37 | Total |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| Husband-Wife | 4 | 4 | 3 | 24 | 19 | 54 |
| Siblings | 3 | 5 | 10 | 7 | 4 | 29 |
| Father-Son; Father-Daughter | 10 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 36 |
| Cousins | 2 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 22 |
| In-Laws | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 10 |
| Nephew-Niece | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 11 |
| Grandchildren | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 21 | 20 | 28 | 49 | 46 | 164 |

Some Concluding Considerations. This paper has attempted to show how membership in three ingroups, alumni, friendship, and family, has influenced the selection of new staff in Indiana University between 1885 and 1937. We found that 42.89 percent of all appointees have been alumni, and 20.45 percent have been members of families already connected with the staff, but we were unable to measure statistically the extent that friendship ties have influenced appointments. However, we are convinced that these three factors account for at least four fifths of all appointments, and that only a small minority may be attributed to professional competition; i.e., the selection has been largely social rather than competitive. The author offers the following tentative explanation of the facts presented.

1. *Alumni Appointments.* A person conditioned to the cultural values of an institution he knows is easily directed along the lines laid down by the policy making and executive group. Indeed, he knows nothing else, unless he has been counterconditioned by other social values. Executives are consciously and/or unconsciously influenced by this in selecting personnel. This "selection from within" tends to outweigh all other considerations, unless there is a definite policy of replacing personnel by persons trained elsewhere who will bring in new ideas, values, programs, and techniques. This "internal selection," sometimes contemptuously referred to as "inbreeding," is natural for at least three reasons: first, the administrators are usually egocentric, prizing their own viewpoints above all others; second, they are personally familiar with the men and know whether they are "sympathetic" and "reasonable"; third, it is easier to engage a person who is on the ground or readily contacted than to spend time, money, and energy looking for outside personnel. Pride in your institution, familiarity with the men you have trained, and their more general docility, are apparently some of the factors that tend to "inbreeding."

2. *Friendship Ties.* Professional institutional administrators have the responsibility of shaping policies, executing them, and making the institution function, generally, along the lines determined by the culture, and, specifically, within the framework of their own policies. Their immediate task is to keep the institution, or, so far as this paper is concerned, the department or school, operating as smoothly as possible. Therefore, it is but natural that the responsible head of a department gathers around him persons sympathetic to his policies, men who understand them and him, men loyal to person and program. Almost every executive, is proud of his administration; he has done the work the way he thought best and is ready to defend his actions. Moreover, he usually likes to be sure his policies and programs will be carried on with the least friction and alteration not only during his administration, but in the future as well. Administrators tend to be egocentric; the institution, ethnocentric. Then, too, a man always likes to help his friends, and the best way to do this in our culture is to make possible financial gain and improved status.

3. *Family Ties.* Our inheritance laws safeguard the transmission of tangible property from legator to legatee, but our democratic mores specifically forbid the legal inheritance of social position. This, however, is guaranteed by the use of personal prestige in procuring favors for relatives that might be denied if rules of merit were applied. The selection of institutional functionaries on the basis of kin and friendship ties circumvents the operation of these principles in the maintenance of an institution. Nepotism is a form of social organization which tends to solidify a family's position in an institution or a community. The main factor conditioning the selection of relatives for a given office is the personal interest elders have in

seeing descendants have a favorable niche in the struggle for wealth, prestige, and status without having to demonstrate their ability for the office. Such positions are secured through influence; all too frequently, the recipients are not as well qualified as those who apply unsuccessfully because the position has already been filled by a relative, or the relative of a friend in an influential position. The desire to maintain an economic and social position, once it has been attained, is deeply rooted in the family and person by the cultural values in our social heritage. The struggle for prestige and wealth that is so characteristic of our culture, conditions the person to strive for a higher position than his parents attained. Parents, in turn, are frequently very desirous that their children have "an easier time" than they had. Needless to say, providing economic security for a relative through a position of some kind has long been a powerful factor in perpetuating a family's heritage and position.

The principles outlined in this section are, perhaps, as old as institutions; certainly they are fundamental in any harmonious organization, whether it be a business, the army, government, or a university. The author believes further investigation along the lines herein outlined would give us a greater knowledge of the functioning of institutions.

THE DEFINITION OF EMINENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FAMOUS ENGLISH MEN OF GENIUS

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IN THE PAST it has been assumed that the relative number of eminent men produced by a given social class could be expressed as a function of either biological superiority or nurture in the narrow sense, or both.¹ It is here proposed to reconsider the problem from the point of view of the interaction of the traditions of class and caste as revealed in the kinds of famous men produced by given social classes with the changing definition of eminence in time as displayed by the activities by which fame is most frequently achieved.

The data are from the *English Dictionary of National Biography* and include nearly one half, 13,551, of all the biographies found in this work between the birth periods 1400 and 1850. The biographies were taken from volumes chosen at random from the set and should, therefore, represent an unbiased sample of the 30,000-odd biographies found in the *Dictionary*.²

The data thus obtained were used to determine in general the relationships which exist between social origin and fame. For purposes of amplifying and checking the results obtained from the sample, the list of names on British genius assembled by Havelock Ellis³ was used. It is hoped that by employing the technique of analysis and comparison, a fairly accurate statement can be made concerning the bearing of the traditions of class and caste on the achievement of fame in a civilization where the historical conditions for the achievement of eminence were rapidly altered in the sequence of time.

In Table 1 the data assembled are classified according to field of distinction and social origin. A word is necessary at this point to describe how these groupings were arrived at.

The classificatory scheme by field of distinction or activity in which fame was obtained followed the general pattern set up by the editors of the *DNB*. Although the biographies in the *DNB* appear in alphabetical order, each name is followed by a word or two describing the activity in which fame was attained, e.g., divine, statesman, poet, inventor and engineer, etc. For the most part, the category into which an individual was

¹ See the author's "Social Class, Historical Circumstances and Fame," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, July 1937, 43:37-53, where an aspect of this problem has been dealt with.

² The volumes used by number were I-XI, XVII, XX, XXIII-XXV, XXVIII, XXXII, XXXVI-XLI, L-LV, LX-LXI.

³ *A Study of British Genius*, London, 1904; new ed., rev. and enl., London, 1927. All references are to the 1927 edition.

placed by the editors agreed with the biographer's judgment of the field of distinction. When the class into which the subject of a biography was placed by the editors did not agree with that of the biographer, changes were made in keeping with the views of the latter. When a subject was placed into more than one category by the editors, and to avoid counting an individual more than once, the judgment of the writer of the biography was used to determine the activity in which the subject achieved most outstanding fame.

TABLE 1. THE FAMOUS MEN IN SAMPLE CLASSIFIED BY FIELD OF DISTINCTION AND SOCIAL ORIGIN

| Field of Distinction | Total (1) | Social Origin Known | | Social Origin Unknown | |
|------------------------|--------------|---------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| | | Number (2) | Percent (3) | Number (4) | Percent (5) |
| Total | 13,551 | 7449 | 54.97 | 6102 | 45.03 |
| Church | 2539 | 1128 | 44.43 | 1411 | 55.57 |
| Law, Politics | 2340 | 1575 | 67.31 | 765 | 32.69 |
| Army, Navy | 1209 | 818 | 67.66 | 391 | 32.34 |
| Scholarship | 1799 | 942 | 52.36 | 857 | 47.64 |
| Science | 838 | 460 | 54.89 | 378 | 45.11 |
| Letters | 1274 | 725 | 56.91 | 549 | 43.09 |
| Art | 1742 | 812 | 46.61 | 930 | 53.39 |
| Medicine | 678 | 345 | 50.88 | 333 | 49.12 |
| Engineering, Invention | 199 | 116 | 58.29 | 83 | 41.71 |
| Miscellaneous | 933 | 528 | 56.59 | 405 | 43.41 |

Out of the 13,551 names used, a description of the social class or occupation of the father appeared in only 7449 biographies (Table 1, col. 2), after the elimination of all biographies of royalty and those in which the social class was described by such words as "poor" and "rich." Comparison showed that all biographies had to be discarded in which the social class of the subject was described in language signifying economic well-being. Social groupings erected on these designations revealed no recognizable trend of activity choices when compared with those groupings erected upon definite statements of occupation or social class, thereby indicating that the data brought together under headings descriptive of wealth or affluence included individuals coming from all occupations and classes in the British population. The technique for arriving at the social class or occupational origin of the remaining cases was as follows. (1) Individuals of noble birth were always grouped by social class, never by occupation. The only exceptions allowed were those pertaining to a commoner father who was ennobled after the son's birth. (2) In those cases, and again to prevent counting an individual more than once, where more than one occupational or class list-

TABLE 2. THE PERCENTAGE OF FAMOUS MEN IN SAMPLE CLASSIFIED BY SOCIAL ORIGIN AND FIELD OF DISTINCTION

| Social Origin Field of Distinction | Nobility (1) | Gentry (2) | Politicians (3) | Lawyers (4) | Soldiers, Sailors (5) | Divines (6) | Administrators, Civil Servants (7) | Schoolmasters, (8) | Men of Science (9) | Men of Letters, Journalists (10) | Artists (11) | Doctors (12) | Engineers, Inventors (13) | Publishers, Printers (14) | Business men, Shop keepers (15) | Farmers, Yeomen (16) | Craftsmen, Artisans (17) | Labors, Servants (18) |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|----------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Total Percent | 1160 100.00 | 773 100.00 | 256 100.00 | 445 100.00 | 516 100.00 | 1157 100.00 | 203 100.00 | 204 100.00 | 66 100.00 | 39 100.00 | 384 100.00 | 411 100.00 | 19 100.00 | 127 100.00 | 850 100.00 | 284 100.00 | 468 100.00 | 87 100.00 |
| Law, Politics | 49.31 | 31.95 | 50.00 | 33.03 | 14.72 | 10.71 | 16.74 | 4.90 | 1.51 | 7.69 | 1.56 | 9.00 | — | .78 | 15.76 | 7.39 | 6.41 | 2.29 |
| Army, Navy | 21.21 | 15.26 | 8.98 | 6.06 | 45.34 | 5.27 | 11.82 | 1.47 | 4.54 | — | .78 | 5.10 | 10.52 | .78 | 3.17 | 2.81 | 1.92 | 3.44 |
| Church | 7.59 | 15.39 | 11.32 | 9.43 | 5.03 | 34.91 | 10.34 | 17.15 | 6.06 | 12.82 | 2.08 | 8.51 | 10.52 | 11.02 | 16.35 | 25.35 | 15.59 | 13.79 |
| Scholarship | 5.26 | 11.25 | 4.68 | 15.95 | 8.72 | 19.69 | 19.70 | 31.37 | 18.18 | 17.94 | 5.72 | 17.03 | 5.26 | 16.53 | 13.06 | 13.73 | 10.89 | 5.74 |
| Science | 1.72 | 5.04 | 1.95 | 6.29 | 5.81 | 4.92 | 5.41 | 13.72 | 45.45 | 5.12 | 1.56 | 10.21 | 15.78 | 3.93 | 7.88 | 11.26 | 7.69 | 5.74 |
| Letters | 6.12 | 8.66 | 8.59 | 13.70 | 6.00 | 4.85 | 11.33 | 10.78 | 7.57 | 35.89 | 6.77 | 7.05 | — | 16.53 | 13.06 | 15.14 | 12.17 | 18.39 |
| Art | 1.98 | 3.10 | 2.73 | 5.16 | 6.00 | 4.78 | 12.80 | 7.35 | 3.03 | 15.38 | 78.64 | 7.05 | 21.05 | 17.32 | 9.17 | 7.39 | 26.49 | 29.88 |
| Medicine | .26 | 2.33 | 1.17 | 4.04 | 1.74 | 5.96 | 6.90 | 4.90 | 6.06 | — | .78 | 30.90 | — | 1.57 | 5.53 | 2.81 | 2.13 | 1.14 |
| Engin., Invention | — | .90 | .39 | 2.02 | .96 | .95 | 1.97 | .49 | 4.54 | — | — | .72 | 31.57 | .78 | 2.47 | 3.87 | 6.41 | 3.44 |
| Publ., Print- ing | .09 | .13 | — | — | — | .51 | .98 | 2.45 | — | 2.56 | .58 | — | — | 20.13 | 1.88 | 2.46 | 1.92 | — |
| Business | .17 | .13 | 3.51 | — | .58 | .17 | — | .49 | — | — | — | .48 | — | — | 3.29 | 3.16 | .64 | — |
| Crafts | .09 | .13 | .39 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | .26 | — | — | — | — | — | 1.92 | — |
| Philan., Reform | 1.03 | 1.55 | 1.95 | 1.79 | .58 | 1.12 | .49 | 1.96 | 1.51 | — | — | .48 | — | .78 | 4.82 | 1.05 | 2.56 | — |
| Travel, Explor. | .52 | 1.03 | 1.17 | .89 | 2.71 | .60 | .49 | .98 | 1.51 | 2.56 | .26 | 1.45 | — | — | .94 | — | .21 | — |
| Miscellaneous | 4.65 | 3.10 | 3.12 | 1.57 | 1.74 | .51 | 1.47 | 1.96 | — | — | .52 | 1.94 | 5.26 | .78 | 2.59 | 3.52 | 2.99 | 16.09 |

ing was given for the father, the first was used, unless a statement appeared in the biography describing the occupation of the father at the time of the son's birth. (3) The groupings set up were those which would summarize into a manageable number of categories the numerous related occupational and class designations appearing in the *DNB* (Table 2).

There is a definite tendency for persons born into an occupation or functional group in which it is also possible to become famous⁴ to achieve distinction in that occupation or some closely allied activity (Table 2). The son of a noble⁵ almost always achieves eminence in politics, law, or war, and almost never achieves eminence in science, art, or medicine. Out of a total of 1160 cases, 906, or 78.11 percent, achieved fame as statesmen, soldiers or sailors, and clergymen (Table 2, col. 1). Art is represented by only 23 cases, or 1.98 percent of the total, and these were almost all patrons, critics, and connoisseurs. Medicine is represented by only 3 cases, or .26 percent of the total. A relatively larger number of persons of noble birth attained fame in the church; although even here the range of activity was confined almost exclusively to the Catholic and Anglican faiths. Of the 88 cases classified as eminent churchmen, only 14 were dissenters, or 15.91 percent of all clergymen.

The gentry and the ambiguous group classified under "politics"⁶ showed a similar trend (Table 2, col. 2 and 3). In the gentry, there are some important deviations from the situation obtaining in the nobility with respect to science, art, and medicine, but in general it is not wrong to lump these two groups with the nobility and to speak of the three together as constituting the "upper classes."

At the opposite extreme from the upper classes, but still within the activities in which social origin and fame coincide, is the artist class (Table 2, col. 11). This group, which includes fathers who were painters, sculptors, engravers, actors, and musicians, produced as few eminent lawyers, politicians, and soldiers as the nobility produced famous artists. The artist class also showed the same high incidence of occupational succession as the nobility, i.e., 78.64 percent of all artists' sons in the *DNB* sample became

⁴ The law, army, navy, church, scholarship, science, letters, art, medicine, and engineering are professions and possible fields of distinction. Business, farming, and labor, excepting in rare instances, are not.

⁵ The nobility is both a status and a functional or occupational group. Indeed, it may be questioned if there now exists or has ever existed a status group which was not also at one time functional. It should also be added here that by "noble" is meant anyone born into a family possessing a hereditary or titular rank, providing, of course, that the individual in question is not a *remote* relative or descendant.

⁶ This group includes all those cases in which the father was specifically described as a member of parliament, a diplomat, mayor, or the like. For the most part, this group is identical with the gentry. The exceptions are few and pertain only to cases where the father was described as being a municipal official; in these instances, the persons in question do not always stem from the gentry but from the commercial and crafts classes.

famous artists as compared to 70.52 percent of all persons of noble birth who became famous in law, politics, and war.⁷

The occupational groups falling outside the upper classes and the professions, viz., commerce, agriculture, crafts, and labor, also showed characteristic activity choices leading to fame. Of all groups, the commercial class (Table 2, col. 15) showed the greatest freedom of choice among the activities producing eminence. Over 10 percent of the individuals born of fathers engaged in one kind of business or another achieved eminence in law and politics, the church, scholarship, and letters. Science is represented by 7.88 percent, art by 9.17 percent, and medicine by 5.53 percent.⁸ It should also be observed, in keeping with the present argument, that the commercial class produced relatively the largest number of famous business men and philanthropists.⁹

The yeoman-farmer class is oriented with reference to the church (Table 2, col. 16). One fourth of all the eminent men produced by this class were clergymen, of whom 51.38 percent were dissenters of nonconformists. One half of the men of letters produced by the yeoman-farmer group were poets, a significant fact, because the lower down the social scale we go the larger becomes the proportionate number of persons who achieved eminence as poets. The relatively large number of men of science produced by this group is in part accounted for by the classification of scientific farmers, husbandmen, stock breeders, and horticulturists as men of science.¹⁰

The crafts-labor groups may be considered together. There are some differences between the two, however. Labor (Table 2, col. 18) produced fewer politicians but more soldiers than the crafts, fewer scholars and inventors and engineers, but more artists and men of letters. The church is

⁷ It would be interesting to speculate upon the reasons for the high incidence of succession in two classes in many respects at the opposite ends of the social ladder, as well as the mutual avoidance of each for the activities favored by the other. The latter tendency can be accounted for on purely sociological grounds. An explanation of the former would be more difficult, but it would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on the biological aspect of the problem. Occupational succession in the arts may be due to the unfavorable attitudes expressed by the community toward the artist, just as the restrictions surrounding privileged persons may explain the activity choices of the nobleman.

⁸ The presence of adequate means plus the absence of an intellectual or cultural tradition for the business classes probably explains the versatility of this group. If this observation is correct, we have here an example of the wide range of interest, or generalized capacities, which are present in all the social classes, but which because of poverty and cultural limitations or conditions of caste, are not allowed to express themselves.

⁹ The publisher-printer group showed a very close similarity to the commercial class, and might have been included with the business group were it not more desirable to call attention to the great amount of occupational succession which also occurred in this field (Table 2, col. 14).

¹⁰ Out of the 32 cases falling into the category of science, 18 were biological scientists. Of this number, 9 were agriculturists, stock breeders, etc., or 28.12 percent of the total. The only other group showing a similar distribution is the gentry, a closely allied group; out of a total of 39 men of science of all kinds produced by the gentry, 15 were biologists and of this number, 7 were agriculturists, stock breeders, and the like.

about equally represented in each group, about half in each being dissenters.

These two groups reveal several interesting trends with respect to letters and art which are relevant to the whole controversy of the differences of achievement among the several social classes in a population. Among the crafts group, 37 out of the 73 cases classified as men of letters were poets, while 14 out of the 16 men of letters classified as the sons of laborers were poets. It would appear from this that among the lower classes the individual becomes more dependent upon forms of achievement which require little tutoring and concentrated effort over a long period of time. The grouping in the arts reveals a similar situation; labor produced relatively more artists than the crafts.

The accepted argument, so far as the crafts group goes, has been that the proportionately large number of painters, engravers, sculptors, etc., produced by this group should be explained in terms of the biological inheritance of artistic skill and temperament from the craftsman parent. While this explanation is a possible one, it must be pointed out that the percentage of painters, sculptors, engravers, etc., produced by labor was almost as high as for the crafts group viz., 65.38 percent of all artists produced by the labor group fell into the categories enumerated, as compared to 71.77 percent for the crafts. This difference seems too slight to make meaningful the assumption that the explanation for the relatively large number of artists produced by the lower classes is biological. Rather, the case seems similar to that which prevented a nobleman from participating in other activities than politics and war. The lower classes produced relatively more poets, dissenting clergymen, and artists, for two reasons: first, the limited cultural heritage of the group restricts achievement to those activities for which formal training is least important; second, because of their status, the lower classes tend to achieve fame in those activities which at any particular time are least esteemed.¹¹

The implications of these relationships for the present argument are obvious if we turn once more to Table 2. The data in this table show that fame and social origin go together; the activity-choices which an individual makes are limited by the social class into which he is born. The son of a baron does not become famous as an artist no matter what the opportunities for personal distinction in this field may be;¹² neither does the son of an artist aspire to political leadership however troublous the times. The activity-choices of both the baron's son and the artist's son are channelized by the conditions associated with the phenomena of class and caste.

¹¹ Additional support for this view is found by comparing the number of persons who became famous in the fields of engineering and invention. The crafts-labor group again stands out before the period when engineering became a recognized profession requiring formal instruction.

¹² During the century 1700-1799 the nobility produced 335 eminent persons, of whom 13 were artists. (See Table 3, col. 9, 1700-1799).

A further study of Table 2 shows also that not only do the activity-choices expressed by any social class indicate a preference for a single activity on the part of any group, but that the bulk of the achievement of the group falls into a restricted range of activities closely related to the preferred activity. For example, it was discovered that achievement in the nobility was restricted to politics, war, and religion, in the order named. Moreover, the concentration in the first two activities was rather large. Although the nobility as a group accounts for only 15.57 percent of all the famous men for the entire period of British history,¹³ the group claimed 36.31 percent of all the politicians and 30.33 percent of all the soldiers and sailors. Hence, it would appear that the history of these two activities might have some bearing upon the number of famous persons coming from the nobility from time to time, and quite apart from any other considerations.

The second step in the present argument is to show that the definition of eminence tends to change with the shifting historical scene. Table 3 was prepared from the total sample to reveal this information. An examination of the figures in this table yields two observations: first, that the number of persons who achieved eminence in the church and politics declined irregularly but consistently from the first (cols. 3 and 4); second, that the number of persons who became eminent in pursuits not related directly either to religion or the state increased irregularly but generally.¹⁴

The data in Table 3 may be passed by except to show their bearing upon the figures in Table 2. The data in these two tables make clear, first of all, that although all achievement is individual, some of the conditions for this achievement are included in the phenomena of class and caste. The individual is restrained in his activity choices by the fact that he is born into an organized group possessing its own definition of achievement (Table 2) i.e., the activities in which the individual may participate. Second, we find that distinguished achievement is part of a larger experience than that which dictates the activity choices of the individual (Table 3). The changing scene of cultural activity in an area like the British Isles is determined by historical change, and leads to a continuous redefinition of what constitutes distinguished achievement. Third, historical change no doubt impinges upon social organization and so produces modifications in the limitations which the traditions of class and caste impose upon the individual, but the fact remains that the dependence of the one upon the other is so loose as to reveal a noticeable persistence¹⁵ of the latter. Thus we

¹³ See Table 4, col. 3.

¹⁴ See cols. 6-12. War shows an increase along with all nonpolitical and nonreligious pursuits, but since it never accounts for more than about 10 percent of all the persons who achieve fame, excepting in the birth periods 1400-1419 and 1760-1779, the trend is swamped by the decline in the related activities of politics and the church.

¹⁵ Many would substitute the word "lag" here. I have not done so intentionally. The word

TABLE 3. THE PERCENTAGE OF FAMOUS MEN IN SAMPLE BY FIELD OF DISTINCTION AND PERIOD OF BIRTH

| Field of Distinction | TOTAL | Leadership Activities | | | | Other Activities | | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|------------------------|---------------|
| | | Total | Church | Law, Politics | Army, Navy | Scholarship | Science | Letters | Art | Medicine | Engineering, Invention | Miscellaneous |
| Period of Birth | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Total Percent | 13,551 100.00 | 6,088 44.91 | 2,530 18.73 | 2,340 17.26 | 1,209 8.92 | 1,799 13.27 | 838 6.18 | 1,274 9.40 | 1,742 12.85 | 678 5.00 | 199 1.46 | 933 6.88 |
| | No. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. |
| Before 1400 | 568 | 100.00 | 83.61 | 40.84 | 34.50 | 8.27 | 7.92 | 1.76 | 4.57 | .52 | — | 1.58 |
| 1400-1419 | 40 | 100.00 | 82.50 | 22.50 | 45.00 | 15.00 | 2.50 | 5.00 | 10.00 | — | — | — |
| 1420-1439 | 42 | 100.00 | 83.33 | 26.19 | 52.38 | 4.76 | 4.76 | — | 4.76 | — | 3.38 | 4.76 |
| 1440-1459 | 48 | 100.00 | 74.99 | 45.83 | 25.00 | 4.16 | 10.41 | 2.08 | 6.25 | 2.08 | — | 4.16 |
| 1460-1479 | 65 | 100.00 | 72.29 | 23.07 | 44.61 | 4.61 | 9.23 | — | 6.15 | — | 4.61 | 5.69 |
| 1480-1499 | 103 | 100.00 | 80.57 | 33.01 | 42.71 | 4.85 | 9.70 | .97 | .97 | — | 1.94 | 5.82 |
| 1500-1519 | 229 | 100.00 | 70.70 | 36.24 | 28.35 | 6.11 | 11.79 | .87 | 3.49 | 2.18 | 2.18 | 8.73 |
| 1520-1539 | 330 | 100.00 | 56.35 | 26.36 | 24.24 | 5.75 | 14.54 | 2.42 | 6.66 | 6.06 | 3.03 | 10.91 |
| 1540-1559 | 422 | 100.00 | 55.68 | 29.62 | 20.61 | 5.45 | 14.92 | 3.79 | 10.42 | 3.55 | 3.55 | .47 |
| 1560-1579 | 467 | 100.00 | 59.94 | 31.69 | 21.62 | 6.63 | 9.20 | 2.14 | 13.27 | 5.99 | 3.21 | .42 |
| 1580-1599 | 512 | 100.00 | 65.22 | 29.68 | 27.73 | 7.81 | 10.93 | 2.14 | 10.93 | 2.73 | 2.93 | .39 |
| 1600-1619 | 651 | 100.00 | 66.81 | 34.56 | 22.58 | 9.67 | 9.52 | 2.61 | 7.22 | 3.84 | 4.60 | .30 |
| 1620-1639 | 632 | 100.00 | 58.69 | 32.59 | 19.03 | 6.17 | 11.23 | 6.17 | 6.48 | 6.01 | 5.06 | .31 |
| 1640-1659 | 479 | 100.00 | 51.97 | 25.05 | 18.99 | 7.93 | 12.94 | 4.38 | 6.05 | 10.64 | 5.22 | .41 |
| 1660-1679 | 477 | 100.00 | 51.77 | 24.73 | 16.98 | 10.06 | 10.90 | 4.82 | 10.06 | 9.85 | 5.24 | .83 |
| 1680-1699 | 479 | 100.00 | 44.08 | 21.38 | 13.80 | 8.00 | 16.70 | 6.68 | 9.35 | 12.02 | 9.13 | 1.11 |
| 1700-1719 | 582 | 100.00 | 34.60 | 13.74 | 11.16 | 9.79 | 18.38 | 4.81 | 10.48 | 15.80 | 7.73 | 1.89 |
| 1720-1739 | 751 | 100.00 | 34.07 | 11.85 | 11.31 | 10.91 | 15.58 | 5.99 | 8.65 | 20.90 | 6.12 | .66 |
| 1740-1759 | 1035 | 100.00 | 35.54 | 11.49 | 12.36 | 11.69 | 12.85 | 7.05 | 11.40 | 21.07 | 4.47 | 1.25 |
| 1760-1779 | 1193 | 100.00 | 35.94 | 7.37 | 13.07 | 15.50 | 13.83 | 6.62 | 10.14 | 19.95 | 5.78 | 1.76 |
| 1780-1799 | 1402 | 100.00 | 33.08 | 12.05 | 10.55 | 10.48 | 13.05 | 8.06 | 10.55 | 17.11 | 6.20 | 2.49 |
| 1800-1819 | 1616 | 100.00 | 32.54 | 11.44 | 14.85 | 6.25 | 14.60 | 11.01 | 9.34 | 17.14 | 5.32 | 3.03 |
| 1820-1839 | 1125 | 100.00 | 30.54 | 9.33 | 14.40 | 6.84 | 15.64 | 9.06 | 12.17 | 16.35 | 5.77 | 3.20 |
| 1840-1849 | 304 | 100.00 | 30.59 | 6.90 | 17.49 | 6.25 | 17.76 | 9.54 | 11.18 | 15.46 | 3.94 | 2.63 |

find, for example, that despite the cultural changes which England has undergone since the 15th century, the nobility as a caste continued to define achievement as success in politics, war, and religion for the whole period here under consideration;¹⁶ yet the data at hand make it clear that this persistence of a traditional or customary behavior pattern must lead

lag is so encumbered with normative attributes as to make its usage in such contexts as this definitely incorrect.

¹⁶ In the 15th century, 95.08 percent of all noblemen attained fame in politics, war, and religion; in the 16th century, 83.81 percent; 17th century, 79.66 percent; 18th century, 72.66 percent; and first half of the 19th century, 59.39 percent.

to a relative decrease in the number of persons from the nobility who will in the future be given space in the *Dictionary*.¹⁷

Table 4 was prepared from the 7449 cases whose social origin is known. Of this number 1160, or 15.57 percent (col. 3), were classified as belonging to the nobility and were distributed into twenty-year periods by birth beginning with the 15th century. During the period covered by the data, the relative number of famous persons of noble origin declined from 62.50 percent in 1400-1419 to 7.82 percent in the decade 1840-1849. Part of this decline is due to the imperfection of the record. There is evidence that the decline in the frequency of noble births is due, in part, to the fact that the social origins of those persons who achieved fame in politics and war is more likely to be known than in the case of those, for instance, who achieved fame in the arts.¹⁸ However, it should be remembered that during the period when the nobility produced relatively the largest number of famous persons, the activities favored by this group were also flourishing most strongly. Consequently, and irrespective of any criticisms which may be directed against the data from the standpoint of imperfection, there is evidence to support the contention that part of the decline sustained by the nobility from 1400-1419 to 1840-1849 represents the outcome of a re-definition of eminence induced by changes in the historical experience of the English people.

A better case can be made for the present argument in view of the admitted limitations of the historical record¹⁹ by enlarging the nobility to include the gentry, politicians, lawyers, soldiers, sailors, and clergymen.²⁰ These classes taken together (Table 4, cols. 2-7) produced 94.54 percent of all the eminent clergymen, politicians, lawyers, and soldiers and sailors in the 15th century, and 71.31 percent in the 18th. The data in Table 4 show that the élite produced all persons of known social origin born in 1400-1439. This proportion declined consistently in the ensuing birth periods, reaching the low figure of 46.06 percent in the decade 1840-1849.

¹⁷ An absolute increase in the number of persons from the nobility occurs in the data. The number of famous noblemen born in the 18th century is five times as large as that for the 15th, whereas the number of persons of all classes who achieved fame is fifteen times as great for the 18th century as for the 15th.

¹⁸ The social origin is known for 67.31 percent of the persons who achieve fame in politics and law, and for 67.66 percent of those who achieve fame in the army and navy; whereas, the social origin is known for only 46.61 percent of the artists in the data (Table 1, col. 3).

¹⁹ For the birth period before 1400-1499, the parentage of only 37.14 percent of all the cases is known; 1400-1499, 43.96 percent; 1500-1599, 39.03 percent; 1600-1699, 51.54 percent; 1700-1799, 56.43 percent; 1800-1849, 70.28 percent.

²⁰ This lumping together of social classes is not one of arbitrary convenience. It has two advantages: first, it obviates some of the difficulties of classification; second, as a group, these classes represent the élite in English society in a way that the remaining social and professional classes do not. No gentleman, as both the data used in this study testify and the historical usage of the word implies, tends to engage in medical, teaching, scientific, artistic, or commercial activity.

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TABLE 4. THE PERCENTAGE OF FAMOUS MEN IN SAMPLE BY SOCIAL ORIGIN AND PERIOD OF BIRTH

| Social Origin | Period of Birth | ÉLITE | | | | | | | | | | | Business Men | Craftsmen, Laborers | Farmers |
|---------------|-----------------|-------|----------|--------|---------|----------------------|----------|--------------------------------|---------|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------|
| | | Total | Nobility | Gentry | Divines | Politicians, Lawyers | Soldiers | Administrators, Civil Servants | Doctors | Schoolmasters, Scientists | Men of Letters, Artists | Engineers, Inventors | Publishers, Printers | | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. | P.C. |
| 7449 | 4307 | 1160 | 773 | 1157 | 701 | 516 | 203 | 411 | 204 | 423 | 19 | 127 | 850 | 555 | 284 |
| 100.00 | 57.79 | 15.57 | 10.37 | 15.53 | 9.40 | 6.92 | 2.72 | 5.51 | 3.61 | 5.67 | .25 | 1.70 | 11.42 | 7.44 | 3.81 |
| Before 1400 | 96.19 | 62.08 | 21.33 | 2.36 | 7.58 | 2.84 | .47 | .47 | — | .47 | — | — | .94 | .94 | .47 |
| 1400-1419 | 100.00 | 62.50 | 25.00 | — | 12.49 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1420-1439 | 100.00 | 52.94 | 20.41 | — | 11.76 | 5.88 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1440-1459 | 100.00 | 69.23 | 30.77 | 38.46 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 15.38 | 7.69 | 7.69 |
| 1460-1476 | 100.00 | 93.93 | 45.45 | 36.36 | 3.03 | 9.09 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3.03 | 3.03 | — |
| 1480-1499 | 100.00 | 84.08 | 40.91 | 27.27 | 9.09 | 6.81 | 2.27 | — | 2.27 | — | — | — | 4.54 | 4.54 | 2.27 |
| 1500-1519 | 100.00 | 84.95 | 31.39 | 30.32 | 4.65 | 17.43 | 1.16 | — | 1.16 | — | — | — | 5.81 | 3.48 | 2.32 |
| 1520-1539 | 100.00 | 81.52 | 30.09 | 31.06 | 5.82 | 10.67 | 3.88 | .97 | .97 | 1.94 | — | — | 4.85 | 4.85 | .97 |
| 1540-1559 | 100.00 | 70.87 | 25.50 | 26.84 | 5.37 | 12.07 | 2.68 | .68 | .68 | .67 | .67 | .67 | 7.38 | 8.05 | 2.68 |
| 1560-1579 | 100.00 | 69.44 | 17.30 | 23.68 | 14.73 | 11.57 | 2.10 | 2.63 | 4.73 | 1.05 | — | 1.05 | 10.00 | 4.78 | 3.15 |
| 1580-1599 | 100.00 | 78.89 | 18.56 | 28.69 | 16.03 | 13.50 | 2.11 | 1.68 | 2.11 | 2.53 | — | .42 | 7.17 | 5.48 | 1.68 |
| 1600-1619 | 100.00 | 73.20 | 19.35 | 17.41 | 12.25 | 12.25 | 2.26 | 1.61 | 2.90 | .96 | — | — | 7.74 | 6.76 | 2.58 |
| 1620-1639 | 100.00 | 70.53 | 22.32 | 16.07 | 20.24 | 9.22 | 2.68 | 1.78 | 3.57 | 1.77 | — | — | 7.14 | 4.46 | — |
| 1640-1659 | 100.00 | 75.17 | 21.95 | 15.44 | 22.76 | 7.71 | 7.31 | 2.44 | 4.06 | 3.25 | — | .81 | 7.44 | 4.06 | 1.22 |
| 1660-1679 | 100.00 | 69.21 | 21.79 | 14.10 | 20.51 | 8.54 | 4.27 | 2.99 | 5.55 | 3.84 | — | .42 | 7.26 | 6.41 | 1.28 |
| 1680-1699 | 100.00 | 65.44 | 20.00 | 8.72 | 21.46 | 10.17 | 5.09 | 1.81 | 4.30 | 4.00 | — | — | 12.72 | 4.72 | 2.90 |
| 1700-1719 | 100.00 | 61.27 | 16.09 | 8.21 | 21.92 | 10.60 | 4.45 | 2.39 | 4.11 | 3.41 | — | 1.02 | 9.59 | 9.92 | 5.47 |
| 1720-1739 | 100.00 | 56.94 | 17.16 | 7.71 | 18.40 | 9.94 | 3.73 | 1.74 | 5.47 | 2.21 | .24 | 1.74 | 2.21 | 11.93 | 5.47 |
| 1740-1759 | 100.00 | 49.27 | 12.84 | 5.90 | 15.97 | 8.49 | 6.07 | 2.60 | 6.07 | 3.11 | .34 | 1.79 | 10.06 | 11.62 | 5.90 |
| 1760-1779 | 100.00 | 48.95 | 10.55 | 6.74 | 14.06 | 6.15 | 10.55 | 2.34 | 7.48 | 3.65 | — | 2.19 | 12.17 | 9.81 | 4.83 |
| 1780-1799 | 100.00 | 44.13 | 8.59 | 4.24 | 14.25 | 7.18 | 9.87 | 3.53 | 7.18 | 3.88 | .59 | 2.12 | 16.49 | 8.00 | 4.94 |
| 1800-1819 | 100.00 | 47.96 | 8.04 | 4.40 | 13.79 | 9.38 | 12.35 | 4.40 | 6.99 | 7.56 | .38 | 2.68 | 15.90 | 5.84 | 3.45 |
| 1820-1839 | 100.00 | 47.42 | 7.27 | 4.38 | 16.51 | 9.32 | 8.89 | 3.35 | 8.66 | 6.81 | .34 | 2.42 | 15.35 | 7.50 | 3.92 |
| 1840-1849 | 100.00 | 46.06 | 7.82 | 2.17 | 17.39 | 14.34 | 4.34 | 3.04 | 5.21 | 7.38 | 1.30 | 2.61 | 14.34 | 5.95 | 3.91 |

This decline is paralleled as in the case of the nobility taken singly, by a falling off in the relative number of persons who achieved fame in religion, politics, and war (Table 3, col. 2).

The method employed in the previous section yielded too general results to indicate more than the fact that the changing definition of eminence in time does limit the number of eminent persons a social class may produce. It is now proposed to examine in detail the implications of the relationship between the traditions of class and caste and the changing definition of eminence in time by considering a single group. For this purpose the data assembled by Ellis in his study of British genius was drawn upon,²¹ and attention focused on the group which he designated as the "upper class."²² The selection of Ellis's upper classes for detailed consideration is consistent in emphasis with what has gone before, and provides opportunities for comparisons. It is possible to show that the decline in the relative number of eminent persons produced by the English upper classes in the course of time is related to several specific factors, a fact which could not be brought out by means of the data examined in the previous section.

Table 5 presents the absolute and relative number of known men of genius in Ellis's data of upper class origin classified by activity or field of distinction. An examination of these data shows that the known men of genius of upper class origin tend to make two activity choices: the first is politics and war, the second is letters (cols. 2-6). These choices, as the data show, persist throughout the whole period of English history. That is, the class character of the group remains more or less unchanged in time, thus proving the consistency of the classification itself.²³ Further analysis also reveals: first, that before 1650-1674 the group produced a number of eminent philosophers, scholars, physicians, and divines; second, that the number of politicians increased after 1625-1649, but that the number of lawyers and soldiers declined; third, that the number of poets declined after 1625-1649; fourth, that the number of men of science shows a marked increase after 1625-1649; and finally, that the arts are not participated in to any significant extent. The observations here made conform for the greater part to what was said about the élite in the previous section.

²¹ Ellis's data show a much larger proportion of persons whose social origin is known than occurs for the *DNB* sample. In Ellis's list, the occupation or social class of the father is known in 80.69 percent of all the cases as compared to 54.96 percent in the sample. During the 16th century, the social origins of 61.49 percent of the cases is known; in the 17th, 80.92 percent; in the 18th, 86.06 percent; and in the first half of the 19th, 85.58 percent.

²² By "upper class," Ellis means the social group usually referred to as the gentry or established families. The classification does not include royalty under any conditions, and includes only noblemen whose achievements cannot very well be made out as the product of prerogative and special privilege. For example, we find Lord Shaftesbury, the philosopher, included on the assumption that there is no necessary association between nobility as such and metaphysical speculation. (Ellis, as cited in note 3, 67-68.)

²³ Ellis's data were to a certain extent selected with respect to the decision to exclude nobility as well as royalty.

TABLE 5: * MEN OF GENIUS OF UPPER CLASS ORIGIN IN ELLIS'S DATA BY ACTIVITY** AND PERIOD OF BIRTH

| Field of Distinction Period of Birth | Total | Law (2) | Politics (3) | War (4) | Poetry (5) | Letters (6) | Church (7) | Science (8) | Philosophy (9) | Scholarship (10) | Medicine (11) | Stage (12) | Art (13) | Music (14) |
|---|--------|---------|--------------|---------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|----------------|------------------|---------------|------------|----------|------------|
| Total | 140 | 4 | 42 | 17 | 23 | 17 | 13 | 13 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | — |
| Percent | 100.00 | 2.85 | 29.99 | 12.14 | 16.43 | 12.14 | 9.29 | 9.29 | 1.43 | 4.29 | .71 | .71 | .71 | — |
| Before 1500 | 16 | — | 6 | — | 2 | 1 | 6 | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Percent | 100.00 | — | 37.50 | — | 12.50 | 6.25 | 37.50 | — | 6.25 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1500-1649 | 70 | 3 | 16 | 11 | 17 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | — | — | — |
| Percent | 100.00 | 4.28 | 22.85 | 15.71 | 24.28 | 12.85 | 7.14 | 2.85 | 1.42 | 7.14 | 1.42 | — | — | — |
| 1500-1524 | 5 | — | 2 | 2 | 2 | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | — |
| 1525-1549 | 4 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1550-1574 | 19 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | — | — | — | — |
| 1575-1599 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | — |
| 1600-1624 | 22 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 7 | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | — | — |
| 1625-1649 | 7 | — | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1650-1874 | 54 | 1 | 20 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 11 | — | 1 | — | 1 | 1 | — |
| Percent | 100.00 | 1.85 | 37.03 | 11.11 | 7.40 | 12.96 | 3.70 | 20.37 | — | 1.85 | — | 1.85 | 1.85 | — |
| 1650-1674 | 3 | — | 1 | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1675-1699 | 6 | — | 3 | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | — | — |
| 1700-1724 | 6 | — | 3 | 1 | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1725-1749 | 6 | — | 2 | 1 | — | 1 | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1750-1774 | 7 | — | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1775-1799 | 8 | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1800-1824 | 14 | 1 | 4 | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | — | — | — | — | 1 | — |
| 1825-1849 | 3 | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 1850-1874 | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | — | — |

* Compiled from Ellis, Appendix A, 321-323. No individual was counted more than once.

** Ellis's classification throughout, excepting scholars. This group was included by Ellis with men of letters.

The problem raised by these observations is: how did it come about that after the 1625-1649 birth period the upper classes produced fewer divines, lawyers, and poets, and that the number of philosophers, scholars, and divines, all but disappeared? One answer to this question might be that the upper classes after 1649 constituted a relatively smaller proportion of the general population than earlier. Although this observation may be correct, it does not explain the activity distribution of the upper classes after 1649. At the most, it could only account for the relative decline in the total number of known men of genius produced by the upper class (Table 6, col. 3). But even this possibility is disadvantaged by the fact that the total decline for the upper class must be accounted for in terms of a decrease in the kinds of famous men produced after 1649.

TABLE 6. THE FREQUENCY OF MEN OF GENIUS OF UPPER CLASS ORIGIN IN ELLIS'S DATA BY PERIOD OF BIRTH*

| Period of Birth | Total Social Origin Known (1) | Upper Class | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------|
| | | (2) | (3) |
| Total | 796 | 140 | 17.58 |
| Before 1500 | 30 | 16 | 53.33 |
| 1500-1649 | 191 | 70 | 36.65 |
| 1500-1524 | 13 | 5 | 38.46 |
| 1525-1549 | 13 | 4 | 30.77 |
| 1550-1574 | 35 | 19 | 54.28 |
| 1575-1599 | 38 | 13 | 34.21 |
| 1600-1624 | 53 | 22 | 41.51 |
| 1624-1649 | 39 | 7 | 17.95 |
| 1650-1874 | 575 | 54 | 9.39 |
| 1650-1674 | 35 | 3 | 8.57 |
| 1675-1699 | 30 | 6 | 20.00 |
| 1700-1724 | 43 | 6 | 13.95 |
| 1725-1749 | 65 | 6 | 9.23 |
| 1750-1774 | 90 | 7 | 7.77 |
| 1775-1799 | 117 | 8 | 6.83 |
| 1800-1824 | 143 | 14 | 9.79 |
| 1825-1849 | 47 | 3 | 6.38 |
| 1850-1874 | 5 | 1 | — |

* Compiled from Ellis, Appendix A, 311-320.

A second explanation might be that the frame of reference employed is not consistent. It might be argued that, owing to the decision to exclude known men of genius from his list because of their questionable class origin, Ellis found it impossible to be consistent in his classifications. There is no need to deny this contingency, but the problem raised is not resolved by

making this assumption. Criticize the technique employed by Ellis in grouping his data by social origin as we will, it still remains to be explained why Ellis's upper class produced fewer famous men of a given kind after a certain date. Ellis's data conform to the observations derived from a consideration of the *DNB* sample. There it was discovered that every social or occupational group, no matter how closely related to some other group, tends to display a certain consistency in the activity choices made (Table 2). Ellis's upper class is no exception to this rule: the orientation is with reference to politics and war and letters for the whole course of British history. Therefore, we must conclude that factors other than the way the data here under consideration were handled are responsible for the results obtained.

A probable explanation for the problems raised by the data in Table 5 and 6 resides in a consideration of the changed conditions surrounding distinguished achievement after 1649. Among these may be mentioned the rise of professionalism. The upper class, while a functional group, is not a professional caste. Participation in activities leading to distinction outside of politics and war are always on an amateur plane in the strict sense. The role of a "gentleman" tends to conflict with the conditions of professional success because no gentleman aims to become a specialist in the narrow meaning of this word. Therefore all tendencies toward professionalism affect this class adversely, despite the privileges which it enjoys in entering its youth in any profession. The trend toward professionalism after 1600 in England shown by Table 4 made participation in many activities no longer possible. Even the army after 1640 shows definite professional tendencies. The fact that during the period after 1650 science in England continued to flourish largely outside the universities explains the large number of individuals from the upper class who became men of science, and so confirms what has just been said.²⁴

A significant change in the spirit of the times can also be made out in the data in Table 5. Religion in England after 1600 shows a marked shift toward low church, or a successful nonconformity. This tended to reduce the number of eminent divines drawn from the upper class after 1600 until the 19th century high church revival in the Tractarian or Oxford movement. Indeed, so far as Ellis's data go, the upper class was completely pushed out and the emphasis was turned in the direction of the business-labor group and the church itself.²⁵

Poetry also reveals a trend toward gradual elimination of the upper class from participation. Before 1650, almost one fourth of all the known

²⁴ Science, it should be added, is definitely not an upper class activity. Including doctors with men of science, the business-labor group accounts for 35 percent of the total as compared to 13.20 percent for the upper class. The church is responsible for 19.81 percent.

²⁵ The total number of eminent churchmen in Ellis's data after 1624 is 60; of this number 24 are from the business-labor class and 20 are from the church.

men of genius produced by the upper class were poets. For the period after 1674 the proportion dropped to less than one tenth. Contrasting these periods in detail, we find that the decline seems to accompany a shift from what may be called rural to urban dominance. Up to 1650, 19 out of a total of 33 poets were from the upper class and the yeoman-farmer group, or almost three fourths of the total. Three more were from the church, bringing the total for the enlarged rural group to 23.²⁶ This leaves eleven to be accounted for by the business-labor, officials and clerks, and law groups. After 1649, the number of poets produced by the upper class and yeoman-farmer groups declined to 7 out of 46. The church shows an increase to 8, bringing the rural group to 18, or about 40 percent of the total. Law accounts for 3, the officials and clerks group and the newer professions, for 10, and business-labor, for 18. Thus it appears from an analysis of the data at our immediate disposal that after the 1625-1649 birth period, the form and subject-matter of poetry changed sufficiently under the impact of conditions associated with the rise of modern industrialism to work against rural participation.²⁷

This additional light which Ellis's data cast upon the results obtained from an analysis of the *DNB* sample seems to indicate that not only does the changing definition of eminence in time limit the number of known men of genius a class may produce, but that changes in the nature of the activities in which fame may be achieved do the same thing. Not only were the upper classes in England unable to produce relatively so many famous men after 1649 because it became more difficult to achieve eminence in politics, war, and the church, but conditions associated with the rise of professionalism and the changing spirit of the times as revealed in a transfer from rural to urban dominance contributed to the same end. Therefore, in spite of whatever defects the data may contain and irrespective of any changes in the class composition which English society underwent during the long historical period here considered, it is safe to conclude from the preceding analysis that the relative decline in famous men produced by the English upper class must in part be explained by the interaction of conditions of class and caste with changes in the historical experiences of the group, and only secondarily by changes in biological inheritance.

To recapitulate the preceding argument, it may be observed that two distinct steps were involved in the demonstration that the interaction of the definition of eminence and the traditions of class and caste determines the number of famous men produced by a given social class. First, it had to be shown that class-character is relatively fixed in time; that is, individuals

²⁶ The order here followed is a hierarchical one. After the church comes law, and then the army and navy. Ellis, *op. cit.*, 66-67.

²⁷ It is also a well known fact that changes in dominant literary forms conflict with class and caste ideals. The novel is not an aristocratic medium of expression. In drama, the tragic form prevails, and in poetry, the epic.

born into a given class always tend, over a period of time, to make the same activity choices. Second, it had to be shown that the number of persons who could achieve fame in any given activity varied in the course of time.

The conclusions which may be drawn from this method of handling data available in a standard biographical dictionary, like the *Dictionary of National Biography*, may now be stated. The kinds of activity in which Englishmen achieve distinction, when classified by social origin or occupation of the father, reveal that the activities in which fame is obtained are limited by the facts of social class or caste. An able person does not become eminent solely because the class into which he was born has made available to him, through the exercise of prerogative and special privilege, certain pursuits in which fame may be won. This is important, as the environmentalist never tires of repeating; and it is also important that the activity-choices open to an individual agree with the current definition of distinguished achievement. Put differently, the traditions which define the role of the individual as a member of a particular social class must also synchronize with the historical conditions defining eminence, if the member of that class is to achieve distinction. But the class environment tends to become relatively fixed and traditionalized; the class environment into which the individual is born tends to lose its effectiveness from the point of view of meeting the changing life situations to which the members of a population accommodate themselves from one age to another. It therefore follows, other things remaining the same, that the relative number of eminent men a given social class does produce over a period of years must be expressed as a function of the interaction of the forces which lead to permanent stratification and those which compel changes in the mode of life of an entire population in time.

THE ALLEGED IGNORANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

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PHYSICAL scientists have so long regarded biologists and social scientists with bemused contempt that the latter tend to take themselves seriously as somehow below the salt. A truly righteous physicist or chemist will usually contend that a biologist is scarcely a scientist while a political economist or a sociologist simply is not a scientist at all. Indeed, the social sciences are not sciences, if a physicist is speaking.

The social scientists tend obediently to accept their place in the hierarchy without dispute. They say that human beings and animals are different from metals and muscles and are most incalculable. They say you very well know what will happen when you put two chemicals together, but that there is no way on earth of telling what may happen when you put two human beings together.

We have a whole nestful of fallacies here. For one thing, you pretty certainly can tell what two human beings will do when one wishes his hair cut and the other is a barber, and they are added together. Indeed, in many of his activities, *genus homo sapiens* is painfully calculable. We know precisely what he will do *en masse*; we can pretty safely guess what he will do as an individual in nine cases out of ten. We all tend constantly to react to similar situations quite the same at different times.

Those who hold to the dogma of maximum diversity in human beings usually have not stopped to study the animal. Perhaps they have never had a constant close association, professional, business, or marital, with one human being. Perhaps they have not dealt with large groups of human beings of pretty definite types, such as the kind who frequent department stores or who ride busses.

Every person who has been employed in such capacity as to meet the public expects great sameness in reactions. The same excuses are offered, the same efforts are made to trick one, the same comments are made, and the same general types of behavior reappear over and over again. People do or say the same thing with such monotonous regularity as to make those who deal with the public very tired and often somewhat cross.

Not only will human beings tend, in a vast majority of cases, to draw a comparison between a calm sea and a millpond, perhaps never having seen either, but they have other telling traits of the sort. Young people especially incline, if they feel the necessity for it, to take an alias that bears some relation to their real names. Criminals are often detected because of

the manner in which they slavishly follow the acts of criminals earlier detected.

An ambitious person, such as the superintendent of classified advertising on a daily paper, can work out a profitable business using this knowledge plus practical psychology. For instance, not one person out of a hundred will swear at the solicitor and hang up when an effort is made to sell him or her classified advertising by phone, usually because the individual already has inserted a perfectly good ad in another perfectly good paper.

Certain answers are almost invariably made to certain questions asked. Certain excuses for refusing the service recur with great regularity. An appropriate group of responses may be mapped out for the solicitor in such manner that the citizen being bothered will not hang up but will continue the conversation and, alas, in a majority of cases, give in and buy something no better than and probably not so good as that available from a more courteous paper.

What works here works generally in telephone solicitation. Something a little different works in mail order or general advertising solicitation. Certain words are known to sell. There is a book on that. These things succeed because human beings are so much alike in reactions, responses, actions, and conversation. When relatively simple situations are considered, it is very easy for those used to dealing with people to tell how individuals will act. It is also easy for them to work out systems which will make a vast majority of individuals act as the seller wishes them to act.

Of course, if the situation is very complex, it is more difficult, but it also becomes more difficult when you add together not just two simple chemicals like barium chloride and sulphuric acid, but a dozen or two dozen chemicals. It would be quite easy to pour a dozen or two solutions of chemicals into a beaker in widely differing proportions and to baffle the best of chemists as to what happened at each step and what the final result would be.

It is easy enough for a physicist to recognize minute traces of certain relatively simple chemicals by spectroscopic analysis, a purely physical determination; but give him a mixture of very complex chemicals and he is soon out of his depth. He knows the answer no more than a political scientist can surely predict the results of a general election, involving many factors and ideas, in the minutest detail.

Why is this? Some social scientists are still telling us that we can never approach human relations as scientifically as a chemist can approach common table salt and sulphuric acid. The chemist knows that when he adds a solution of sodium chloride to one of sulphuric acid he gets sodium sulphate and hydrochloric acid.

But it all depends. If many other chemicals are present, the result becomes harder to predict. So, render either the chemical or the human situation complex and prediction becomes all but impossible in any specific

instance. Both scientists prefer uncomplicated situations and rather simple problems concerned with masses or aggregates.

When the chemist mixes sulphuric acid and common salt together he is really working with great aggregates of molecules, atoms, electrons, and so on, not with simple individuals. He does not know just what would happen if he added a molecule of salt to a molecule of the acid. He can never tell anything about an individual molecule of anything. Maybe some individuals do not react at all.

The so-called phase rule indicates some do not. A chemical reaction seems to proceed so far and then to slow down almost to a full stop. Why do these million molecules react while those other thousands do not? Who knows? The chemist knows no more than the sociologist knows what will happen in some individual domestic triangle, but the sociologist can give you a rough idea of how such triangles turn out *en masse*.

In some instances, somebody kills somebody. In some instances, there is a divorce. In very many instances, there is a period of disruption followed by a pulling apart without actual separation or by a reconciliation between the original two parties. In aggregate, it can be pretty well calculated about how any thousand triangles will turn out, but just which triangle will turn out which way no one can tell. That sort of particularized information is too much to expect of any science, whether it be physics or sociology.

Generalized solutions of social and economic problems can, however, be worked out on a broad statistical basis. This is the same scientific approach exactly that the physical scientist makes to his aggregates. Moreover it is now known that the subjective mental attitude of the physical scientist has a very great deal to do with what he discovers. What he observes depends upon his sensitivity and his intellectual receptivity. Like the social scientist, he too forms part of his every experiment.

Moreover, the exceptions are not outside the pale of scientific law. They are statistical exceptions. It is quite impossible for the modern physicist to tell anything about what a particular electron is going to do. He cannot even determine its position and its velocity at the same time. If he concentrates on one, he loses sight of the other. Since he cannot ascertain the two factors simultaneously, he cannot accurately predict what the electron will do next.

That is the notable principle of indeterminacy which many shallow thinkers are telling us has brought free will back into science. But the finding really confirms and does not confute determinism. Thus, a person sitting through a solemn cathedral service may feel that he could, if he desired, get up and smash the bishop on the nose. Actually, he sits quietly in his seat and does nothing of the sort.

Why? There is even a mathematical chance that he could behave as described. It is statistically possible. It is also possible that the sun will not

rise tomorrow, and that a kettle of cold water will boil if placed on a block of ice or freeze over a lighted fire. All these alternatives are statistically possible. Those concerning the water kettle depend, however, upon a simultaneous reversal in the motion of all the countless molecules in a certain sample of water or ice.

Statistics may also prove that there is 1 chance in 80,000,000 of a gentleman in the congregation going up to punch the bishop's nose during cathedral service. If you individually represent that one chance alone then that is what you have to do, and they will put you in jail for it likely as not. But you may be one of the other 79,999,999 chances. Then you sit still. For if you got up and hit the bishop you would be violating the law of determinism. Determinism still rules in either case.

Social scientists generally tend to set as low an estimate upon themselves as the physical scientists have of them. Yet groups of economists have several times banded together in recent years, have asserted that a particular economic policy was definitely bad or good, and so it turned out. They know what they are talking about when the situation is relatively simple and aggregates are dealt with; we simply do not listen to them.

We respect physicists and chemists more because we think we understand their work a great deal less. The trouble often is that social scientists will try to settle some individualized or particularized problem a physical scientist would not attempt. Scientific technique dealing with mass statistics naturally has no application.

Take child marriage for instance. It would be unwise to adopt a rule that no one should marry if but twelve years old, or under. Until further research has been undertaken, i.e., until we know the results in great masses of cases, we do not know how marriages turn out as related to age at marriage. Some child marriages perhaps turn out very well; certainly some marriages of mature individuals turn out to be neighborhood scandals.

Sufficient statistical study would, however, give us an idea what ages to set up as those of the marriageable. Similar studies would also enable us to arrive at some useful general conclusions with regard to parole laws. Thereafter, individual instances would have to have consideration but within the frame of reference of the generalized principles established statistically. The same rule holds in all science.

The broad problem in physics, chemistry, biology, and social science is one of factors, aggregates, and masses. The same thing is true of the chemist's common salt and sulphuric acid as of the buying preferences of consumers. The chemist's problem can no longer be solved if he dumps mixtures of unknown chemicals into his beaker also. We can find out nothing about consumer buying preferences if we let advertising confuse consumers, and keep the value and quality of consumer goods an unknown factor.

All science is one and social science is quite as truly scientific in approach and method as physical science. The chemist is statistical master of the aggregates with which he works. Social scientists must be regarded as, and can become, statistical masters of human aggregates. We already know how to influence people. We need only the scientific attitude and the statistical studies to tell us in what manner they should be influenced.

What our nation shall be in the future depends as much upon the skill and energy of our social scientists as upon the research genius of our physical and biological sciences. We must learn, then, to set up goals intelligently. We are already masters of the social psychology techniques which, added to the sameness of human response in similar situations, will enable us to achieve those goals.

The social sciences tend to be more complex, more inclusive, and more exact, in the sense of making contact with life at more points, than the physical sciences. The physical sciences attain their boasted exactitude at the expense of latitude and comprehensiveness and by dealing with artificially simplified situations. They are not better than the social sciences; they are simply more abstract and unreal. Social science must gain self-respect.*

* The author is editor of Scientific Publications of the United States Department of Agriculture but this article is an expression of personal opinion without official significance.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

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STUART CHASE, by popularizing the recent investigations into the nature of the symbolic process, has made us blab-conscious. Blabitis, we are realizing, is an insidious and extraordinarily widespread disease whose major symptom is the emission of meaningless noises. The capacity to talk nonsense seems, however, to be particularly prevalent in intellectual circles. One might almost characterize it as an occupational disease of the intelligentsia. This does not mean that intellectuals have a peculiar inherited susceptibility to blabitis but rather that the nature of their professional activities makes them more readily vulnerable to it. Since they talk and write more, they are more exposed to the possibility of talking and writing nonsense.

This is a general situation. Our essentially extravert culture has placed a high premium on the ability to produce a steady and mellifluous stream of sounds, but has not offered an equally high reward for making these sounds meaningful. However, this paper proposes to discuss blabitis only in relation to sociology. It will be concerned with but one question: what can the sociologist do to inoculate himself against talking nonsense? How, to change the metaphor, can he take out absurdity insurance? Needless to say, this essay does not intend to propose a foolish panacea to cure mankind of foolishness. Its aim is simply to suggest a method by which we may be able to be somewhat less foolish than is our wont.

Out of the present concern with the nature of verbal communication, at least one important proposition has been firmly established, namely, that one can do linguistically or symbolically that which it is impossible to do manipulatively. Thus it is possible, by literary, verbal expression, to construct an ideal democracy without reference to the nature of human nature. This was admirably pointed out three decades ago by Graham Wallas. Referring to Bryce's views of an ideal democracy as one characterized by "the intelligent independence of the individual voter" and to Bryce's own admission that this ideal is "far removed from the actualities of any state,"¹ Graham Wallas remarks that an ideal democracy can mean only

the best form of democracy which is consistent with the facts of human nature. No doctor would now begin a medical treatise by saying 'the ideal man requires no food and is impervious to the action of bacteria, but this ideal is far removed from the actualities of any known population.' No modern treatise on pedagogy

¹ Quoted in G. Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, 144-145, 3d ed., New York, 1921.

begins with the statement that 'the ideal boy knows things without being taught them, and his sole wish is the advancement of science, but no boys at all like this have ever existed.'²

That symbols and concepts are amenable to manipulations or operations which cannot be performed on the things symbolized or conceptualized was clearly revealed in physics with the establishment of the Einsteinian theories of relativity. One of the significant contributions of Einstein was, in fact, a "final disentanglement of that part of any physical event which is contributed by the observer from that which is inherent in the nature of things and independent of all observers."³ Bridgman, working out the methodological implications of the revolution in physical science wrought by Einstein, tried to develop a method of conceptualizing which would eliminate the need for, and hence the recurrence of, similar drastic changes in the conceptual frameworks of physics.⁴ His method was simply an insistence that concepts be made operational, that is, that they be defined not in terms of metaphysically conceived "properties" but rather in terms of observable physical operations.⁵

Thus was developed the operational point of view in physics. Its introduction into sociology has been recently and vigorously urged by G. A. Lundberg,⁶ who writes,

That sociologists exhibit only slight agreement even in the use of the most common terms is a matter of common knowledge. The same sociologist frequently uses the same term in various senses in the same article. This state of affairs is not surprising, because *the only way of defining anything objectively is in terms of the operations involved.*⁷

Lundberg's suggestion is a healthy one, for there is much that is fruitful in the operational approach. Unfortunately, however, operationalism has tended to become crystallized not as a series of methodological precepts or as a pragmatic scheme of analysis, but as a philosophical system with a metaphysic of its own. That metaphysic can and must in large part be rejected.⁸

² *Ibid.*, 145.

³ E. T. Bell, quoted in A. Korzybski, *Science and Sanity*, 635, New York, 1933.

⁴ P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, New York, 1927; *The Nature of Physical Theory*, Princeton, 1936; "Operational Analysis," *Phil. of Sci.*, April 1938, 5:114-131.

⁵ *The Nature of Physical Theory*, 9-10; *The Logic of Modern Physics*, 6. More recently, Bridgman has attempted to apply operationalism to social concepts such as duty, right, responsibility, state, etc. *The Intelligent Individual and Society*, esp. chap. 4, New York, 1938.

⁶ G. A. Lundberg, "Quantitative Methods in Social Psychology," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1936, 1:38-54; "The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology," *ibid.*, Oct. 1936, 1:703-723.

⁷ "Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology," 709. (Italics mine.)

⁸ Bridgman has disavowed the "ismization" of operational analysis. "I have a distaste for these grandiloquent words (operationalism and operationism) which imply something more philosophic and esoteric than the simple thing that I see. . . . We have here no esoteric theory of the ultimate nature of concepts, nor a philosophical championing of the primacy of the

To avoid unnecessary disputes as to what operationalism is or is not, the following statements are put in the conditional mode. Operationalism must be rejected if it requires a solipsist or a subjective-idealist epistemology.⁹ The conditions to which phenomena owe their being are, to use a formula of R. B. Perry, other than the conditions to which they owe their being known. It must be rejected if it assumes a raw empiricist position and neglects or denies the role of rational thought in physical operations.¹⁰ As Morris R. Cohen has remarked,

If you had watched the most famous and epoch-making experiments of modern times, e.g., Hertz's on electric waves, or Michelson's on the velocity of light, you might have seen all sorts of apparatus but you could not possibly have observed what these men observed unless you had gone through all the reasoning which these men had gone through before setting up their apparatus.

Operationalism must be rejected if it assumes an exclusive position and claims that no advances in science are possible without it.¹¹ Operationalism should be a habit of thought, not a substitute for thinking. It must be rejected, moreover, if it commits the fallacy of reductionism or atomism and fails to appreciate the reality *sui generis* of social life. In bringing operationalism into sociology, we should insist that it be made sociologically relevant. If the fundamental tenet of the operational view in physics is that physical concepts must be defined in terms of actual physical operations, then the operational postulate in sociology should be that social concepts must be defined in terms of social operations. The operations we select to define social data must be socially meaningful.¹²

What is eminently worth while in the operational approach are propositions such as the following. 1. No concept, definition, statement or proposal has any meaning apart from the methods which have been, are, or may be employed to establish or execute them.¹³ 2. As long as science clings to the well worn doctrine that things have essential natures in terms of which they can be defined, it will be constantly subjected to revolutionary changes

'operation'. . . . We are not dealing with anything new or definite enough to be dignified by being called any kind of an 'ism'," *Phil. of Sci.*, April 1938, 114, 116, 130.

⁹ Bridgman, *The Nature of Physical Theory*, 14-15; G. A. Lundberg, "The Concept of Law in the Social Sciences," *Phil. of Sci.*, April 1938, 191.

¹⁰ R. B. Lindsay, "A Critique of Operationalism in Physics," *Phil. of Sci.*, Oct. 1937, 456-470.

¹¹ Lindsay, *loc. cit.* Apropos of Lindsay's paper, Lundberg has written: "The criticism is really not of operationalism so much as of sole reliance on it. It is doubtless true that until strictly operational concepts are developed, nonoperational concepts may be useful. This concession may be made without detracting in any way from the desirability of operationalism as a goal to be sought." *Phil. of Sci.*, April 1938, 194, footnote 7.

¹² In his most recent writings, Bridgman has called attention to the fact that operational analysis may include mental, manual, and verbal as well as physical operations. *Phil. of Sci.*, 128, 130; *The Intelligent Individual and Society*, 86 ff.

¹³ Cf. E. Nagel, "Some Theses in the Philosophy of Logic," *Phil. of Sci.*, Jan. 1938, 46.

in its basic concepts, definitions, and propositions. 3. Verifiable observation is a fundamental condition of scientific method.

On the basis of these principles, sociologists should develop definitions which refer not to the metaphysical properties of social data but to observable, verifiable operations. Of what scientific value is such a definition of law as "the will of the state" or "the command of sovereignty" when it leads students to dispute the *true* meaning or the *real* essence of will, sovereignty, or what have you? However, the defining operations must be chosen for their social relevance; they must be socio-meaningful. In defining social class, for instance, the physical or biological actions of status groups would be, as such, irrelevant. The social must be defined in terms of the social.

There is still another modern point of view that needs to be introduced more systematically and consciously into sociology, viz., the philosophy of probability. The further we move away from the nineteenth century, the more keenly do we become aware of the tentativeness of our knowledge, the changefulness of the world, and the significance of chance. Man is a proud and self-centered animal and has attempted to impose on the universe the certainty and stability which he craves for himself. Bridgman writes:

Man has never been a particularly modest or self-deprecatory animal. The idea that thought is the measure of all things, that there is such a thing as utter logical rigor, that conclusions can be drawn endowed with an inescapable necessity, that mathematics has an absolute validity and controls experience—these are not the ideas of a modest animal.¹⁴

However, science has endeavored in recent decades to become more humble; humility and modesty are making headway. The new attitude was well expressed by Justice Holmes when he remarked that "certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cocksure of many things that were not so."

More and more, twentieth century thought is turning away from the view that knowledge is certain, and correspondingly it is concerning itself more and more with the calculation of probabilities. As E. Nagel has put it,

As long as it was supposed that we could have *certain* knowledge of universal laws of nature . . . it was obviously pertinent to raise various issues concerning the *truth* of universal propositions which were not simply analytic of the meaning of their terms. With the surrender of these alternative approaches to determining the truth of such statements, philosophic discussion took the turn of evaluating the probability of universal or general propositions.¹⁵

The task sociology should undertake is the setting up of definitions that combine the operational and probability points of view. Social phenomena should be defined both in terms of the probability of occurrences and in terms of social-meaningful verifiable operations.

¹⁴ P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, 135.

¹⁵ E. Nagel, *loc. cit.*, 50.

This suggestion is not new in social science; probability-operational definitions already exist. Attention need be called to only two examples, the definitions of law and social class status.

The following is proposed as a probability-operational definition of law: *Law is the probability that a rule of conduct will be enforced by the courts.* The operational test is clear and verifiable; what the courts do is readily observable. This definition draws its inspiration from the writings of Holmes, Cardozo, Frank, Cohen, and others.

Holmes' prediction or probability theory of the law is summarized in a passage that has become classic. He wrote:

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . . what constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you that it is something different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English Courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. *The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law.*¹⁶

In like manner he has defined a right as "only the hypostasis of a prophecy—the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it."¹⁷

Holmes' approach thus emphasized both the probable nature of legal conduct and its intimate connection with the operations (behavior) of socially categorized persons known as legal officials. Morris R. Cohen, although a critic of legal realists, nevertheless defines law in somewhat the same vein. "The law studied in law schools," he asserts, "and that about which men consult lawyers, is the law laid down by courts in the form of orders or commands."¹⁸

Remarkably similar to the view expressed by Holmes is the following statement of Walter Wheeler Cook:

We as lawyers, like the physical scientists, are engaged in the study of objective physical phenomena. Instead of the behavior of electrons, atoms or planets, however, we are dealing with the behavior of human beings. As lawyers we are interested in knowing how certain officials of society—judges, legislators, and others—have behaved in the past, in order that we may make a prediction of their probable behavior in the future. Our statements of the "law" of a given country are therefore "true" if they accurately and as simply as possible describe the past behavior and predict the future behavior of these societal agents . . . "Right," "duty," and other

¹⁶ O. W. Holmes, "The Path of Law," 10 *Harvard Law Review*, 1897, quoted in H. C. Schriver, ed., *Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers*, 23, footnote 21, New York, 1936. (Italics mine.)

¹⁷ O. W. Holmes, 32 *Harvard Law Review*, 1918, 42, quoted in H. C. Schriver, *op. cit.*, 23, footnote 21.

¹⁸ M. R. Cohen, *Law and the Social Order*, 240, New York, 1933.

names for legal relations are therefore not names of objects or entities which have an existence apart from the behavior of the officials in question, but merely terms by means of which we describe to each other what prophecies we make as to the probable occurrence of a certain sequence of events—the behavior of officials.¹⁹

Holmes' successor on the Supreme Court bench, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, has expressed himself on this subject in language reminiscent of his eminent predecessor. With his usual clarity, he has forcefully presented the case for the introduction into law of what he has termed "the logic of probabilities." He writes:

Law, like other branches of social science, must be satisfied to test the validity of its conclusions by the logic of probabilities rather than the logic of certainty. When there is such a degree of probability as to lead to a reasonable assurance that a given conclusion ought to be and will be embodied in a judgment we speak of the conclusion as law, though the judgment has not yet been rendered, and though, conceivably, when rendered, it may disappoint our expectation.²⁰

Law, Cardozo elaborates, is

that body of principle and dogma which with a reasonable measure of probability may be predicted as the basis for judgment in pending or in future controversies. When the prediction reaches a high degree of certainty or assurance, we speak of the law as settled, though, no matter how great the apparent settlement, the possibility of error in the prediction is always present. When the prediction does not reach so high a standard, we speak of the law as doubtful or uncertain. Farther down is the vanishing point where law does not exist, and must be brought into being, if at all, by an act of free creation.²¹

To a layman and a sociologist, the approach to law implied in these quotations seems reasonable, accurate and in accord with common sense. Is it not a sad commentary, therefore, if it be true, as Jerome Frank states, that "Holmes has convinced but a small part of the bar."²² Morris R. Cohen offers a possible clue to the resistances to the Holmesian approach in his dictum that "theories are mental habits that cannot be changed at will."²³

Turning now to the second example, one may propose the following probability-operational definition of social class status: *Social class status is the probability that an individual will reap the highest rewards available in a given society.* In a society in which the highest values are pecuniary, the operational test of social status is this: what are the chances that a given individual will become extremely wealthy? In a culture in which the highest rewards are beautiful wives, the test is similar: what are the chances

¹⁹ W. W. Cook, quoted in J. Frank, *Law and the Modern Mind*, 129, New York, 1930.

²⁰ B. N. Cardozo, *The Growth of the Law*, 33-34, New Haven, 1924.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 44, and 43, 70; J. Frank, *op. cit.*, 6 (footnote), 46, 288. Tourtoulon says, "The philosophy of chance seems to me the most natural conclusion of a philosophy of legal history. It substitutes the search for probability for the search for certainty." Quoted in Cardozo, *op. cit.*, 70, footnote 1.

²² J. Frank, *op. cit.*, 129.

²³ M. R. Cohen, *op. cit.*, 113-114.

that a given individual will obtain very beautiful wives? From this point of view, a social class would be a group of persons having equal probabilities of reaping social rewards.

One recognizes here Max Weber's concept of *Lebenschance* and indeed, I am indebted to Max Weber for the train of thought leading to the definition proposed. The German sociologist, however, unnecessarily places his concept into too narrow an economic context. To him, *Lebenschance* pertains to the concern for the possession of economic goods alone and is related to the conditions of the market of goods and labor.²⁴ Drawing on Max Weber's discussion, but taking *Lebenschance* out of its economic framework and applying it to social opportunity in general, T. H. Marshall, an English sociologist, has proposed that "if we are thinking of a Social Class as a group based on a certain resemblance of its members, we must regard it as a group of persons with similar social chances. . . ."²⁵

The calculation of status probabilities will obviously vary as we move from the one extreme of a caste system in which vertical mobility is practically zero (so that one's chances are determined by birth) to the other extreme of a highly competitive and relatively wide open class structure in which the vertical mobility is great. It will vary, too, as the objects of social valuations vary, but in all cases the phenomenon of hierarchical stratification will be found to be significant to social beings only as it bears on their comparative life-chances, i.e., on probabilities that the actual operations will take place whereby they will enjoy what the culture esteems highest.²⁶

The advantage of probability-operational definitions lies, as was suggested, in their serving as guards against the pitfalls of word-mongering. Justice Holmes has warned us that "we must think things, not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and true."²⁷ If sociology is to be more than a conspiracy to consume paper and thus to deplete our forests, if social science is to attain the clarity and meaningfulness without which understanding becomes a mere sham, it must devise methods for testing the sense of its proposals. The adoption of the probability-operational approach might well contribute not only to a more meaningful science of society but also to the more practical objective of forest conservation.

Somerset Maugham has remarked that words have weight, sound, and appearance. Is it too much to ask that they have meaning as well?

²⁴ "Wir wollen da von einer 'Klasse' reden, wo 1. einer Mehrzahl von Menschen eine spezifische ursächliche Komponente ihrer Lebenschancen gemeinsam ist, soweit 2. diese Komponente lediglich durch ökonomische Güterbesitz- und Erwerbsinteressen und zwar 3. unter den Bedingungen des (Güter oder Arbeits-) Markts dargestellt wird ('Klassenlage'). M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 632, of *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Tübingen, 1922.

²⁵ T. H. Marshall, "Social Class—A Preliminary Analysis," *Brit. Sociol. Rev.*, Jan. 1934, 26:60.

²⁶ In this connection, note Lasswell's definition of the influential as "those who get the most of what there is to get." *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, 3, New York, 1936.

²⁷ Quoted in H. C. Schriver, *op. cit.*, 23, footnote 21.

VALUE-JUDGMENTS IN SOCIOLOGY

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WHAT social science should do, or refrain from doing, about value judgments is a disputed question in sociology. To illustrate this fact, we may take two quotations. E. E. Eubank, author of the monumental work on *Concepts of Sociology*,¹ recently published the following statement:

Let us, at the risk of seeming dogmatism, dismiss in a few words this first and most grievous error which still haunts the writings of the pseudo-sociologists. . . . Sociology itself . . . passes no moral judgment and sets up no ethical standards for human conduct. It neither approves nor condemns specific policies nor programs of action as such, but simply describes, analyzes, and declares relationships of cause and effect, and leaves the question of what ought to be, to be settled in specific instances by those who are dealing with the moralistic and evaluative aspect of particular social problems.²

H. W. Odum, editor of *Social Forces*, had previously come to the following conclusions, seemingly in categorical antithesis to Eubank's views:

Another premise of error appears in the failure of sociology to include social values as one of its major areas of study and research. . . . This conclusion . . . is reflected in the extraordinary deficiency in social standards and objectives which the sociologists can make available for both theory and programs of social planning at the present time . . .

The error is illustrated further in that sociology today can provide no authentic analysis of societal values, either of those which have guided humanity in the past or which might be set up for society's future guidance. . . .

If civilization is largely a matter of values and civilization represents the product of society's on-goings to date, and if sociology is the scientific study of this society, the omission of social values assumes a larger significance than the errors of a pre-Copernican astronomy which assigned to the earth its wrong place in the scheme of things.³

The present article reviews somewhat systematically the recently published writings on this subject in an effort to discover how much agreement exists between seeming opponents, and to formulate some of the leading issues on which agreement has not yet been reached. In order to ascertain what current sociological thought on these issues is, all textbooks of sociology listed in *The Book Review Digest* as having been published in the years 1932 to April 1938 were examined.⁴

¹ Boston, 1932.

² E. E. Eubank, "Errors of Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1937, 16:180-181.

³ H. W. Odum, "Errors of Sociology," *Social Forces*, March 1937, 15:342.

⁴ The textbooks so listed are C. H. Cooley, R. C. Angell and J. L. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, New York, 1933; G. S. Dow, *Society and Its Problems*, New York, 1937; C. A.

From their tables of contents and indexes, passages relating to valuations (listed under such words as "attitudes," "desires," "progress," "social forces" and "values") were located, and pertinent passages copied. Articles listed under these words in *The Readers' Guide* and *The International Index* were similarly analyzed. From study of these notes, certain apparent agreements and certain unresolved issues became evident. An outline of these tentative agreements was drawn up, and the notes were cut up and sorted according to this outline. Further study of the material led to revisions in the statement of the agreements and issues. The present article resulted. It is recognized that this procedure is "scholarly" rather than "scientific." Its validity rests ultimately not on its methods but on the degree to which sociologists are prepared to accept in essence the alleged agreements here presented, and to recognize the alleged issues as questions central to the controversy and deserving of further study.

Some seeming agreements which emerge out of this study follow. 1. Sociologists, like other human beings, are ordinarily motivated by valuations⁵ which have been acquired unscientifically, through emotional experiences, subconscious suggestion, uncritical acceptance of traditions or conventions, and the like. If a sociologist wishes to conform to the generally accepted ideals of science, he must take measures systematically and scrupulously to prevent these personal valuations from distorting his selection or interpretation of data. In his role of social scientist, he must refrain from seeking to impose his private value-judgments upon other people. Exhortations and emotional pressures do not belong in scientific procedures. "The sole aim of science, as such, is the increasingly accurate determination of verifiable knowledge. Its methods should be influenced only by considerations relevant to this end."⁶

Ellwood, *Methods in Sociology: A Critical Study*, Durham, N. C. 1933; H. P. Fairchild, *General Sociology*, New York, 1934; M. Ginsberg, *Sociology*, New York, 1935; E. R. Groves, *Introduction to Sociology*, New York, 1932; F. H. Hankins, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, New York, 1933; E. T. Hiller, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1933; R. M. MacIver, *Society, A Textbook of Sociology*, New York, 1937; J. M. Reinhardt and G. R. Davies, *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, New York, 1932; E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to Sociology*, New York, 1933; R. L. Sutherland and J. L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology*, Philadelphia, 1937; L. von Wiese and H. Becker, *Systematic Sociology*, New York, 1932; and L. D. Zeleny, *Practical Sociology*, New York, 1937.

⁵ The term "valuations" will be used in this article to include all the attitudes and reactions which men show or experience toward their values as such. Valuations include desires, aversions and motives. Values include all goals and all the objects of interest.

⁶ G. A. Lundberg, "Social Methodology and the Teaching of Sociology," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, Mar. 1937, 42:715. A suggestive enumeration of sources of bias is made by W. P. Meroney, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:198-199. Others whose writings contributed to this agreement are Hankins, *op. cit.*, 160; MacIver, *op. cit.*, 415, 517-520; J. K. Folsom, "Changing Values in Sex and Family Relations," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Oct. 1937, 2:717; E. T. Krueger, in symposium on "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:194; H. P. Fairchild, *ibid.*, 179; M. T. Price, *ibid.*, 216.

2. It is widely asserted by sociologists, and denied by none, so far as the present writer has discovered, that ethical valuations, ideals, approvals and disapprovals, since they are socially conditioned, and since they influence social behavior and social change, enter in very important ways into the subject matter of sociology, are a proper concern of scientific sociology, and indeed cannot be ignored by the sociologist. Fairchild says that "desires . . . are the starting point of sociological phenomena."⁷ Indeed, Thorndike says that the topic of values "is important for workers in all sciences, and is especially important now."⁸

3. To enquire into the origins of human valuations, and to seek to express the basic nature of social motivation in its simplest and most usable terms, is a proper part of sociology.⁹

4. Certain personal desires, such as to escape from pain, to receive a larger economic income, to experience pleasurable excitement, to be approved of by at least certain people, to have the facilities one needs to carry out one's purposes, and to be free from coercion, are usually conceded to be fairly universal. On many other desires and tastes, human beings differ widely and even violently; valuations keep changing, and in seeking even those things which men in general desire, rivalries and conflicts arise. Certain social ideals, such as truth, justice, integrity, freedom under law and order, and devotion to the common welfare, are generally admitted as desirable, but great differences of opinion and acute clashes of interest arise when men seek to decide what is true, just or honest, who is to administer the law and order, and in what the common welfare really consists. If the valuations which motivate men are proper subject matter for sociology, it seems reasonable that our science should attempt to discover the relative prevalence of various motives and values, and to ascertain geographical, ethnic, historical, and temperamental differences in the valuations which motivate various groups.¹⁰

5. Aiding people to achieve the ends which they have in view is a function of applied science recognized practically universally. It is entirely proper, scientifically, for applied sociology, having discovered what human

⁷ Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 138. See also *ibid.*, 127-128.

⁸ E. L. Thorndike, "Science and Values," *Science*, Jan. 3, 1936, 83:1. Others whose writings contributed to this agreement are MacIver, *op. cit.*, 415; Folsom, *op. cit.*, 717; Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 27, 34; von Wiese and Becker, *op. cit.*, 6; M. M. Willey, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:214; J. H. S. Bossard, *ibid.*, 190; H. C. Brearley, *ibid.*, 191; H. E. Jensen, Introduction to Ellwood's *Methods in Sociology*, Durham, N. C., 1933, ix-xxiv.

⁹ von Wiese and Becker, *op. cit.*, 6; Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 134; S. A. Queen, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:208; E. S. Bogardus, *ibid.*, 212; M. M. Willey, *ibid.*, 214.

¹⁰ Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 106, 109, 180, 355-356; MacIver, *op. cit.*, 401-402; 413, 511, 513; Hankins, *op. cit.*, 451-452, 457-460, 543-545; Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, 97; Reinhardt and Davies, *op. cit.*, 609-611; Cooley, Angell and Carr, *op. cit.*, 484-485, 488; Folsom, *op. cit.*, 717; Dow, *op. cit.*, 71; A. E. Wood, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:185-187.

purposes are most fundamental or what ones are most widely accepted as ideal, to seek and disseminate knowledge as to how these purposes may be more adequately fulfilled.¹¹

6. The pursuit of certain values by a given individual may interfere with the achievement of other values of that same individual or with the values of other individuals. The pursuit of real estate profits, for example, may create congested urban areas in which schizophrenia and other generally disliked conditions flourish. The reckless pursuit of such values as speed thrills may interfere with the achievement of such values as highway safety. The pursuit of such values as imperial glory or Asiatic markets may imperil world peace. Every time a tax law is formulated, choices have to be made between competing values.

Part of the task of sociology is to enquire into the various interactions of values, so as to enable individuals and groups to attain more fully the values which they prefer among incompatible alternatives. If a sociologist were pondering whether to sell scientific assistance to agencies seeking to exploit the public, scientific investigation might conceivably give him insight as to the probable effects of such action upon his reputation, his self-respect, public health, labor relations or other values.¹²

Some debatable issues which still remain open, even if the six foregoing agreements are accepted, constitute the remainder of this paper. 1. What should be the demarcation between sociology and social ethics? It is frequently asserted that the sociologist must keep completely distinct the processes of evaluation and of scientific research. Science, it is stated, can say what is, but it cannot say what ought to be.¹³ Questions of value, it is asserted, must be left to social philosophy or to ethics.¹⁴ Part of this issue is covered by Agreement One above, but, if all the agreements are accepted, what is the field of ethics, and how is it to be distinguished from the sociological study of valuations? Some suggest that ethics has to do with

¹¹ von Wiese and Becker, *op. cit.*, 4-6; MacIver, *op. cit.*, 523; Cooley, Angell and Carr, *op. cit.*, 482; Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 103-105, 356; Bogardus, *op. cit.*, 355; Dow, *op. cit.*, 71. T. D. Eliot, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:182; H. C. Brearley, *ibid.*, 192; A. J. Todd, *ibid.*, 196; W. P. Meroney, *ibid.*, 198; H. P. Fairchild, *ibid.*, 178-180; Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 138-144.

¹² Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 2-4; M. T. Price, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:216; T. D. Eliot, *ibid.*, 182; A. E. Wood, *ibid.*, 186; H. Hart, *ibid.*, 209. von Wiese and Becker, *op. cit.*, 6, seem to take a different view. Cf. also Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 108.

¹³ von Wiese and Becker, *op. cit.*, 7; Cooley, Angell and Carr, *op. cit.*, 483; Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 104-107, 108. Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 37; Dow, *op. cit.*, 15; MacIver, *op. cit.*, 415. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 137, denies this proposition. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 2, holds that judgments of value are judgments as to consequences, and can be made as scientifically as judgments of existence.

¹⁴ von Wiese and Becker, *op. cit.*, 7; Cooley, Angell and Carr, *op. cit.*, 488; Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 26; M. T. Price, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:216. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 142, 148, agrees that metaphysics has its part to play as court of last resort. Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 139, suggests that the study of desires, as such, lies in the field of psychology rather than sociology.

ultimate values as distinguished from inquiry into what means are valuable in seeking given ends.¹⁵ But according to Agreement Two, ultimate valuations, considered as social data, do concern sociology. Another suggestion is that ethics has to do only with values considered subjectively.¹⁶ That rule, if strictly interpreted, would confine the subject to one's own valuations, as incommunicably perceived. Ethicists could not agree to that, for then ethical discussion would be impossible. Some regard ethics as hortatory or propagandistic, applying pressure upon others to get them to accept the valuations of which one happens to approve.¹⁷ If this is the case, which many ethicists would deny, sociological criticism is certain to prove destructive to dogmatic ethical systems. Some suggest that ethics proceeds critically, or dialectically, while science proceeds inductively.¹⁸ This would force us back into the dualism of assuming that observation and reason can be divorced from one another. One possible solution of these difficulties would be to regard social ethics as that part of sociology which investigates, scientifically, the characteristics, functions and interrelations of human valuations, with safeguards to prevent private value-judgments from introducing bias. Ethics would thus become a specialized natural science.¹⁹

2. What is the simplest and most useful analysis of underlying motives? Sociologists have in general abandoned the old lists of instincts on which human motivation once was supposed to be founded, but the frequent practice is to substitute lists of interests, wishes, values, attitudes, urges, dynamic factors, and goals.²⁰ Such lists leave open the question of why men find these goals desirable, and of how they are related to each other. Is any fundamental analysis of motivation possible?

Zeleny suggests that man continuously struggles to satisfy two basic needs—the need for security and the need for activity.²¹ Now, activity consists in the employment of structure, that is, functioning. Security consists in the conservation of structure. If Zeleny is right, therefore, we might develop from this clue a fundamental analysis of motivation based upon the familiar concepts of structure and function. At present, disagreement is widespread in this area.

3. Is there any practicable calculus for choosing between conflicting

¹⁵ Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 105, 355; Cooley, Angell and Carr, *op. cit.*, 482; MacIver, *op. cit.*, 414, 520; Bertrand Russell, *Religion and Science*, 240; von Wiese and Becker, *op. cit.*, 352, 370. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 3, and Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 147, hold that ultimate (absolute) values can be dealt with by science.

¹⁶ E.g., Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 27; Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, 249.

¹⁷ E.g., Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, 247.

¹⁸ Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 33; Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 104-106.

¹⁹ Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 1-8; Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 27. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 128-149, regards ethics as a science up to which all the positive sciences of human society lead.

²⁰ E.g., see Reinhardt and Davies, *op. cit.*, chap. 3, Sutherland and Woodward, *op. cit.*, 165 ff., 215; Hiller, *op. cit.*, 68; MacIver, *op. cit.*, 20-24.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, 6-7.

values, and for adjusting rationally the conflicts which arise between values?²² Agreement Six recognizes that the interactions between values form a proper subject for sociological study, but are there basic incommensurabilities between certain sets of values? How, for example, except by blind pressure, can it be decided to what extent the privileged few shall be given special advantages over the rank and file? Thorndike has offered what he believes to be a beginning of such a calculus.²³

4. The content of our sociology courses is determined by value-judgments. Should these judgments be based on: (1) tradition, blind except for crude trial and error selections; (2) propaganda by enthusiasts for one or another type or course; (3) dialectical metaphysics; (4) systematic study of social objectives; (5) some other criterion; or (6) some combination of these or other criteria?

5. Similarly, what criteria should determine our governmental, reform, religious, and other social objectives? Is a scientific statement of such criteria possible?

6. Should social opportunities and social rewards be based on heredity, friendships, political influence, need, service rendered, capacity, or some other principle or combination of principles?

7. What should be the relation between social value theory and social administration, statesmanship, and reform? Should sociology seek directly the stimulus and the correctives which come from practical experimentation, or should it, in an effort to escape bias, avoid all involvement in social issues?²⁴

It would help to clarify the subject further if teachers and writers who hold pronounced views about value-judgments would indicate the extent to which they can accept the tentative agreements suggested in this article, the changes which they would like to see made in the formulation of the agreements, and their views upon some of the unresolved issues.

²² For statements of the difficulty see Reinhardt and Davies, *op. cit.*, 127; Fairchild, *op. cit.*, 106; MacIver, *op. cit.*, 515.

²³ *Op. cit.*, 1-8.

²⁴ Some discussions of these issues will be found in L. L. Bernard, "Questions for Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1934, 13:165; A. E. Wood, *ibid.*, 188; E. T. Krueger, *ibid.*, 194-195; A. J. Todd, *ibid.*, 196-199; F. H. Hankins, *ibid.*, 202; M. T. Price, *ibid.*, 216.

THE EFFECT OF ORDER OF BIRTH AND AGE OF PARENTS UPON NEONATAL MORTALITY*

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THIS STUDY deals with neonatal mortality as it is affected by order of birth and age of parents. It is felt that variations in neonatal mortality is dependent upon *congenital* differences to a larger degree than are variations in adult or infant mortality. In New York state, exclusive of New York City, infant mortality was 51.3 per 1000 live births in 1915 and 17.2 in 1936, a reduction of 66 percent. The corresponding rates for neonatal mortality (deaths of infants under one month) were 49.3 and 31.6, a reduction of only 36 percent. If further significant reductions are to occur, they will have to be in neonatal mortality.

We studied 82,140 live births which occurred in New York state, exclusive of New York City, in 1936. (See cited paper for method.) Of these, 2566 infants died under one month of age. The neonatal mortality for this group was, therefore, 31.2 per 1000 live births.

I. *Order of Birth.* First births formed 28.8 percent of all births in 1917 and 36.0 percent in 1936, an increase of 25 percent. Similarly, the proportion of second births was 9.5 percent higher in 1936 than in 1917. The births of order three and higher were proportionately fewer in 1936. The largest reduction occurred among births of order six to nine. It is of interest to note that births of order ten and over were relatively as frequent in 1936 as they were in 1917. First and second births formed 60 percent of all births in 1936 and only 25 percent of all the births were of order higher than three.

The neonatal mortality was high for first births, dropped to a minimum for second births, increased slightly for third and fourth births and rose sharply beginning with fifth births. The rate for first births was 24 percent higher than for the minimum, while the rates for births of order ten and over was more than twice as high as that for second births.

The neonatal mortality for boys was 30 percent higher than that for girls for all orders of birth.

First births formed 39 percent of all births in urban and only 33 percent in rural areas. The neonatal mortality was slightly lower in the cities for practically all birth orders.

Births out of Wedlock and Plural Births. The rates by order of birth are

* Abstract of a paper presented Dec. 28, 1937 at Atlantic City which appears in full in the *Amer. J. Hyg.*, Sept. 1938.

affected by illegitimate¹ and plural births. Both have high neonatal mortality rates and their distribution is not uniform in all orders of birth.

Out of every 1000 live births, 23.0 were illegitimate and the neonatal mortality in this group was 62.5, which is more than twice the rate for the legitimate births. These births are heavily weighted in the first order which accounted for 78 percent of all illegitimate births.

The frequency of plural births was 21.4 (individuals) per 1000 live births and the neonatal mortality in this group was 125.3, more than four times as high as the rate for single births. These births are more frequent in the later orders of birth.

The elimination of either and both of these groups reduced the neonatal mortality rates but left the general trend of mortality by order of birth unchanged.

Premature Births. More than 4 percent of all infants in 1936 were prematurely born. Premature births were close to 5 percent of first births and of births higher than the sixth, while of births of order two to five, they formed only 3.7 percent.

The neonatal mortality of prematurely born infants was more than twenty-five times as high (39 percent) as the rate for infants who were carried to full term, and the rate rose continuously with order of birth. The rate for first births was lowest (329.4) and for the births of highest order, it was 644.4 per 1000 live births.

The neonatal mortality rate for all full term infants was only 15.2; the rate for the first born was 45 percent higher than the rate for second births.

The frequency of premature births in urban (44.3) was higher than in rural (41.5) areas. However, the mortality of premature infants was higher in the country (413.2) than in the cities (366.9). This is probably due to the inaccessibility of facilities for the care of premature infants in the rural communities.

The proportion and mortality of premature births was higher for boys than for girls.

Illegitimate births as well as plural births had very high frequencies of premature births. The excess of the mortality of these groups was present in both the premature and full term infants.

Stillbirths. Stillbirths are almost as numerous as neonatal deaths. In 1936 there were 2375 stillbirths and the rate was 28.0 per 1000 total births (including stillbirths). Thus, out of every 1000 total births, 28.0 were stillborn and 30.3 died under one month, a total loss of almost 6 percent.

The stillbirth rate by order of birth follows a similar course to that of

¹ Recent legislation in New York State forbids the mention of illegitimacy on the birth certificate. The year of the study was the last in which this information was available.

neonatal mortality with the minimum rate recorded for second births. In stillbirths, the excess mortality of first births over second births amounted to 63 percent as compared with 24 percent in neonatal mortality. The problem of premature births ranks very high also in the case of stillbirths. The stillbirth rate for premature infants was 249.0 as compared with the rate of 15.1 for full term infants.

The total loss sustained in the 84,515 births (including stillbirths) amounted to 4926. Of these, 2541 births or 52 percent were premature and the remaining 2385 (48 percent) were full term. Table 3 in the complete paper² presents the combined effect of stillbirths and neonatal mortality (late fetal and neonatal mortality rates) by order of birth for full term and premature infants as well as the frequency of premature births. It will be noted that the general trend of the total loss by order of births is very similar to that discussed for neonatal mortality.

II. *Age of Mother.* The decline of the birth rate has produced slight changes in the distribution of births by age of mother. The average age of all mothers bearing live infants in 1936 was 27.6 years compared with an average age of 28.0 years in 1917. Mothers under 25 years of age formed 28.9 percent of all mothers in 1936 and 35.6 percent in 1917 and the proportion of mothers aged 25 years and over was slightly lower in 1936 than in 1917. In 1936 almost one half of all the births occurred to mothers aged 21 to 28.

The neonatal mortality for infants born to very young mothers was very high. It decreased sharply to ages 27 to 28, which had the lowest rate and from then, rose gradually with age of mother. The neonatal mortality for the oldest mothers, as well as for the very young mothers, was more than twice the minimum rate. The rate for boys was higher than that for girls for practically all ages of mother.

The proportion of very young and very old mothers was considerably larger in rural than in urban areas, but there was practically no difference in the neonatal mortality by age of mother.

The variations in neonatal mortality of premature infants by age of mother were not as distinct as they were with order of birth. The general trend, however, was upward with age of mother.

The neonatal mortality of full term infants by age of mother presents a rather smooth U-shaped curve with high rates for very young mothers, minimum rates for mothers aged 24 to 27 and high rates for the higher ages of mother.

The stillbirth rates by age of mother were practically constant up to age 30, then increased gradually until the rate for infants of mothers over 40 was more than three times as high as that for mothers under 30.

² *Amer. J. Hyg.*, Sept. 1938.

Table 6 and Chart 7 in the complete paper³ show that both for premature and full term infants, stillbirths contributed an increasing proportion of the total loss with increasing age of mother. In the lowest age groups, stillbirths formed about 40 percent of the total loss while in the higher age group, the proportion rose to 60 percent.

Order of Birth and Age of Mother. There is, of course, a close association between order of birth and age of mother. Nearly two thirds of all the first births were to mothers under 25 years of age, while three fourths of the births of order ten and over were to mothers over 35 years of age. The average age of the mothers of births of various orders increased progressively from 24.1 years for first births to 38.8 years for births of order ten and over.

The association between the order of birth and age of mother presents the problem as to whether one or the other or both of these factors are responsible for the variation in neonatal mortality rates observed above.

Table 1 reveals that both the order of birth and the age of mother combine in producing the variations. If we follow the rates along any of the columns in the table, that is, if we keep the order of birth constant and note the variations with age of mother, we observe in practically every case that the rates start high for young mothers, decrease to a minimum at an optimum age and then rise with age of mother.

TABLE 1. NEONATAL MORTALITY RATES BY ORDER OF BIRTH AND AGE OF MOTHER FOR LEGITIMATE BIRTHS, NEW YORK STATE (EXCLUSIVE OF NEW YORK CITY), 1936

| Age of Mother | Order of Birth | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-----------|
| | Total | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 & 7 | 8 & 9 | 10 & over |
| Total | 30.5 | 30.7 | 25.5 | 26.6 | 29.1 | 37.7 | 40.4 | 39.5 | 54.3 |
| Under 20 | 33.5 | 32.7 | 33.1 | 50.6 | — | — | — | — | — |
| 20-24 | 28.2 | 28.8 | 26.2 | 27.2 | 26.5 | 46.8 | 75.3 | — | — |
| 25-29 | 26.2 | 27.7 | 21.5 | 25.4 | 28.1 | 26.6 | 38.3 | 31.5 | — |
| 30-34 | 32.4 | 42.6 | 25.5 | 25.2 | 27.9 | 33.1 | 43.4 | 38.7 | 45.3 |
| 35-39 | 36.4 | 34.5 | 34.2 | 27.9 | 32.1 | 53.3 | 35.1 | 44.0 | 37.8 |
| 40 & over | 48.1 | — | — | 28.1 | 42.8 | 50.0 | 40.3 | 37.0 | 74.9 |

Similarly, if we follow the table along any of the rows, that is, if we keep the age of mother constant and note the variations with order of birth only, we observe that the rate starts high for first births, drops to a minimum for either second or third births and then increases with order of birth. The rate for the highest order of birth to mothers of the oldest age group was more than three and one half times as high as the minimum rate which was recorded for second births to mothers aged 25 to 29.

³ *Loc. cit.*

A similar table to the above for stillbirth rates⁴ shows that there is a distinct difference in the effect of age of mother and order of birth between neonatal mortality and stillbirths. In the case of the stillbirths, the order of birth (with the exception of first births) has very little effect on the rates and almost the entire variation is due to age of mother.

We may conclude from Table 1 that the increased mortality associated with order of birth may be reduced considerably when the births of the various orders occur at favorable ages of the mother. There seems to be an optimum interval between successive births. The mortality rises when the spacing of the births is at very short or at very long intervals.

The problem presented by very young mothers suggests a possibly effective attack, viz., getting to the mother not only before delivery but also early in pregnancy. While this might not be possible for all expectant mothers, it probably could be done for very young mothers whose infants have such high neonatal mortality rates. All early marriages should be sent to the health officers so the future mother can be advised to seek medical care very soon after she is pregnant.

III. *Age of Father.* The average age of father for all legitimate births was 31.5 years or about 4 years above the average age of mother. There is, of course, a very high correlation between the ages of the two parents; this has been assumed to be responsible for whatever variations were observed in infant mortality with age of father. However, there is a definite relation between neonatal mortality and age of father when the effect of age of mother is eliminated.

A table similar to Table 1 which gives the neonatal mortality rates by age of mother and age of father,⁵ shows that when age of mother is kept constant, the variations of the rates with age of father are conspicuous. They start high for young fathers, drop to minimum rates at an optimum age, then rise with age of father. The minimum is for fathers, aged 25-29 when mothers are under 25 years of age, and at 30-34 when mothers are older than 25. It is noteworthy that the variations with age of father when age of mother is kept constant are of the same order of magnitude as those with age of mother when age of father is kept constant.

In order to determine what effect the relative ages of the parents have on neonatal mortality, first births were classified according to whether the father was younger than the mother, of the same age as the mother or older than the mother. The best rates were found in the case where the two parents were of the same age and the highest when the father was younger than the mother.

⁴ Table 8, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Table 9, *loc. cit.*

Official Reports *and* Proceedings

Press Relations Committee. To facilitate the *accurate* reporting of the papers presented at the Detroit meetings, the following committee has been appointed: Alfred McClung Lee, Chairman; Read Bain, ex-officio; Harold A. Phelps, ex-officio; Robert E. Park; and Malcolm M. Willey.

These sociologists are well acquainted with the purposes of the Society and with the technical problems of representatives of daily newspapers, news services, and news magazines. They have agreed to make available to reporters *accurate* and *newsworthy* summaries of the Society's papers and to cooperate with reporters in the development of "special stories."

This arrangement will afford those presenting papers a type of protection from hasty *résumés* that has not been attempted by this Society before. It should be a most welcome innovation. General assignment reporters, after all, do not pretend to have an adequate grasp of sociological thought. They, too, will welcome this aid.

Two copies of each paper, one for the Society's files and one for the Press Relations Committee, should be sent to the Society's office by December 1, addressed to

Harold A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Friday Morning Business Meeting. A program of unusual interest to the entire membership is being organized by the President for this special business meeting. At this time, in addition to complete reports of several special committees of the Society, a period will be devoted to the discussion of current organization problems. The question of the relations between the regional societies, the special interest organizations, and the American Sociological Society are in particular need of being threshed out.

Every member who can possibly be present should plan to attend.

Educational Sociology will publish in its December issue, all papers to be presented during the Christmas meetings in the sections on Educational Sociology. Copies of this number may be procured from Dr. F. J. Brown, School of Education, New York University, Washington Square, New York, New York, at 50 cents per copy.

Proposed Amendments. The following notice is probably illegal, but is presented for the information of the members. The only change from the legal notice which appeared in the April 1938 issue (page 238) of the *Review* seems to be the substitution of "one third" for "a majority." Since this will probably be presented as an amendment from the floor, it seems proper to call the attention of the members to the original amendments and the proposed amendment to the principal legally proposed amendment to the Constitution.—Editor.

The statement of the original signers of the proposed amendments follows:

"The proposed revision of Article 8, Sections 2 and 5, has been revised by the members who signed the original proposal to read as follows:

Article VIII, Section 2. A section of the Society shall be composed of members of the society interested in a common field of sociological specialization, or may consist of an independent society or association devoted to a special field of sociology, one third of whose members are members of the American Sociological Society. The constitution or by-laws of such an independent association must specify that it is a section of the American Sociological Society. Sections shall meet annually during the time of, and in the same city, as the annual meeting of the Society.

The amendment to this section is underlined.

Article VIII, Section 5. By inserting after the word "sections," "except as provided in Section 2 above."

C. E. Lively, Carl C. Taylor, J. H. Kolb, W. A. Anderson, Dwight Sanderson.

The International Sociological Federation will hold the fourteenth International Sociological Congress in Bucarest, August 29th to September 2, 1939, inclusive.

As a member-society of the Federation, the American Sociological Society is entitled to be officially represented by five delegates (at the Congress).

At its 1937 annual meeting, the American Sociological Society recommended that at the next session of the International Congress, appropriate steps be taken to make the *International Federation of Sociology* (which is composed of member-societies), independent of the *International Institute of Sociology* (which is composed of member-persons). Dr. Rene Maunier, President of the Federation, has written that he proposes to convene its special committee on By-laws sometime before summer, in order to consider this question, which he then expects to bring before the Congress at its Administration Session at Bucarest.

Two recent additions have been made to the membership of the Federation: The Polish Sociological Society, and the *Institut francais de Sociologie*.

The general topic of the Congress is "City and Village." Three full morning sessions will be devoted to this theme, under sub-topics as follows:

August 30th: Sociological conceptions of city and village; their genesis; types of structure, relations and interactions, activities, and trends.

August 31st: Sociological methods for the study of city and village. Methods of study, monographs, and statistics.

September 1st: Contributions of sociological research to the organization and improvement of conditions of city and village (from the standpoint of administration, social service, planning, etc.)

The three afternoons will be given to the following three topics: (1) the present state of sociological research; (2) the teaching of sociology and the social sciences; and (3) organization and function of societies for sociological research.

Members of the American Sociological Society who can be present at the Congress are invited to send suggested titles of papers not later than January 30, to Dr. Rene Maunier, 7 Avenue d'Orleans, Paris, 14, France. The complete papers are due in March.

Earle Eubank, International Federation Correspondent,
American Sociological Society.

EDITORIAL NOTES

Editorial Report. We have handled about 175 manuscripts since Jan. 1, 1938 and have printed 58. One member or more of the Editorial Board in addition to the editor has passed upon a large percentage of the papers printed. Members of the Board have also helped in the negative decision on a great many papers. This procedure is somewhat costly to the Society; therefore, contributors should be careful to observe the rule about inclosing return postage.

This method of handling papers also inevitably delays the final disposition of a paper,—just how much depends upon how many editors have to see it. If a decision is reached by the editor and one assistant editor, at least a month is required before the contributor can be notified. If he is not notified, the paper is still being sent to members of the Board, or to others. If our present method of handling manuscripts is continued (and the advantages seem to outweigh the disadvantages since the editor is obviously incompetent to pass upon all papers), contributors cannot expect immediate action. Needless to say, we will pass upon the papers as quickly as we can and still give them the careful consideration they deserve.

The assistant editors and others who have read papers by request have been of invaluable aid to the editor. He wishes to thank them for their cheerful and cooperative assistance. We also thank contributors for their generally favorable response to editorial suggestions. Our sole thought has been to help authors in every way possible. Doubtless, we have rejected some papers we should have printed, and vice versa, but in every case, we have sincerely and honestly used the best judgment we have. Our guiding principle has been that the *Review* should represent the various points of view in theory, method, and actual research which are now current in American sociology.

Contributors can help us considerably by observing the simple rules in the April 1938 *Review* for preparation of manuscripts, especially by preparing charts and tables properly and keeping manuscripts as short and concise as possible.

Members can help by suggestions and criticisms and by promptly sending in appropriate material for *Current Items*.

Internal Migration. Sociologists and statisticians studying internal migration are greatly handicapped by lack of census material on this impor-

tant subject. This could be remedied to some extent by getting two or three carefully chosen items into the 1940 Census schedule which is now being prepared. Those in charge of it are of course overwhelmed by proposed items. None relative to internal migration is likely to be included unless those interested take steps immediately.

§ Resolutions from the learned societies would carry considerable weight, but probably the most effective device would be several hundred letters from interested researchers. These should be sent to Leon C. Truesdell, Chief Statistician of the Census Bureau. Since space on the schedule is very limited, the letters should suggest what should be omitted in order to make room for the internal migration items which should be stated specifically and limited to the three or four questions regarded as most valuable by researchers.

A considerable number of such letters might aid the Committee materially in deciding both what should be eliminated as well as included in the 1940 Census schedule. It is quite evident that nothing will be done for internal migration data unless pressure from investigators and learned societies indicates that something should be done.

Book Reviewers. The book review editors are considerably embarrassed by the fact that many reviewers who have promised to furnish their reviews by a certain date have proved to be unduly dilatory. This not only delays the appearance of the reviews of current books, but also embarrasses the editors in the preparation of copy and is not fair to publishers who have generously offered books for review.

The book review editors would appreciate the names of members of the society who would like to review books in the field of their specialization. Under the circumstances, it would seem advisable that the corps of book reviewers should consist only of those who actually deliver their reviews to the book review editors at the time agreed upon.

CURRENT ITEMS

ANNOUNCEMENTS AND MEETINGS

Alpha Kappa Delta. The annual business meeting of the United Chapters of Alpha Kappa Delta will be held at 9:00 a.m., Thursday, December 29, in the Book-Cadillac Hotel, Detroit, following an informal breakfast meeting at 7:30 that same morning.

Alpha Kappa Delta, this year, is welcoming several new chapters into its fold, and there are problems of major importance to be discussed in conjunction with its developing policies. All national representatives should watch the Bulletin Board for the place of meeting. They should be present at the breakfast if possible and at the business meeting without fail.

American Council of Learned Societies continued its assistance toward the publication of works in the humanities in 1938. "Humanities" has been interpreted broadly enough to include many sociological works, "particularly those that verge on social philosophy." Since applications should have been received at 907 Fifteenth Street N. W., Washington, D. C., before November 1, 1938, this note is merely intended to bring these grants to aid publication to the attention of sociologists who may have manuscripts of the proper sort to submit in 1939. The proper forms and directions can be obtained by writing to the above address.

The American Institute of Cooperation held its Fourteenth Annual Session at the University of Idaho and the State College of Washington, July 11-15, 1938. Over 150 speakers and discussion group leaders participated. In addition, many movie demonstrations of co-operative production, processing, purchasing, and marketing procedures were given. The general sessions dealt with the larger social, economic, and philosophic aspects of the co-operative movement.

American Jewish Committee. Volume one, number one, of the *Contemporary Jewish Record* has appeared. It is a bimonthly digest of events and opinion concerning the problems of the Jewish people. It may be had at \$1.00 a year or 25 cents per copy from 461 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

The American Psychological Association held its Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting at Ohio State University September 7-10, 1938. Professor J. F. Dashiell, University of North Carolina, was president. G. W. Allport, of Harvard University, is the new president. About 1200 psychologists were present and about 200 scholars contributed to the program; 185 papers were given and 15 instructional and research films were shown.

The American Statistical Association held a special meeting at Ottawa, Canada, June 28-29, 1938.

Conceptual Integration Committee. A long-time and large-scale cooperative project is being organized to promote standardization of sociological terms and definitions and to promote systematization and agreement thereon. The first annual meeting of the group is to be held during the meetings of the American Sociological Society in Detroit. The aim is to organize the group and the project so that all who wish can participate. All sociologists are invited to attend this meeting whether or not they wish to participate in the work of the project. Watch the Bulletin Board for announcement of time and place of meeting.

The National Archives. Solon J. Buck, Director of Publications, was one of the two American official delegates to the Eighth International Congress of Historical Sciences which met at Zurich, Switzerland, from August 28 to September 4. He was also Chairman of the American Delegation to the Fourteenth International Conference on Documentation which met at Oxford, England, September 21 to 26. While he is abroad, Dr. Buck expects to visit and observe the methods of various archival establishments in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and England.

The National Conference on Family Relations held its first meeting in New York City on September 17th. The quality of the papers presented and the cross-sectional representation and enthusiasm of the members augur well for the continued success of the Conference in this growing field.

The following papers were read: Albert C. Jacobs, Columbia, "Marriage Laws"; Kingsley Roberts, New York, spoke on "Hospitalization for the Poor"; F. Lowell Bixby, Osborne Association, "The Results of a Reform School Investigation"; Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar, "A Plan for Successful Marriage"; Ernest M. Culligan, F.H.A., "Housing Plans: A National Outlook"; Frederick Osborne, American Eugenics Society, "Biological Basis of the Family"; Geoffrey May, Social Security Board, "Social Security: Policy and Practice."

At the luncheon meeting, Ellsworth Huntington, Yale, and Sidney E. Goldstein, New York Conference on Marriage and the Family, delivered the main addresses. President Paul Sayre, University of Iowa, presided. Plans for the continuance of the Conference were discussed. Huntington Bairns, Baltimore, is Vice-President, and Ernest W. Burgess, Chicago, is Secretary-Treasurer.

The Pacific Sociological Society, Northern Branch, met at Pullman, Washington, May 13-14. Over 15 papers were given. Some of the members traveled over 1100 miles to attend.

One of the most interesting aspects of the session was the spirited discussion of whether sociology should try to remain aloof from matters of public policy,—the "pure" science pose—or attempt to promote those values which seem to be indicated by its findings. Should science describe change or try to direct it? No conclusion was reached.

Pennsylvania Planning Board publishes *Pennsylvania Planning* with which all sociologists should be familiar. It also issues other publications, some of which may be obtained free by writing to the Board, 928 North Third Street, Harrisburg.

The regular *Bulletin* contains excellent charts, graphs, maps, and pictures as well as valuable textual matter and bibliography.

U. S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service should have been credited with participation in Items 137 and 138 of the Research Census in the August Review, page 559. Sorry for the error.

United States Public Health Service. Dr. C. T. Krassovsky has accepted an appointment as Associate Research Analyst in connection with the National Health Inventory. He received his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Michigan, 1937.

Wisconsin In-Service Training Apprenticeships. A year ago, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a plan for in-service training in the various state departments. The act makes use of the educational institutions of the state for personnel recruitment. Candidates for the apprenticeships must be recommended as students of exceptional ability by their educational institutions.

The apprentices devote three and a half working hours a week for ten months of their first year to a series of lectures and discussions on administration presented by experts from all the different state departments.

To date, thirty-one apprentices have been employed in thirteen different state departments. They are from three educational institutions, the large majority from the University. They represent fourteen different professions as indicated by their educational specialty.

Woods Schools, Child Research Clinic. The Fifth Institute on the Exceptional Child had "Modern Science and the Exceptional Child" for its central theme. It was held at Langhorne, Pennsylvania, Tuesday, October 18, 1938. Doctors Eugenia S. Cameron, Lawson G. Lowrey, Edgar A. Doll, Josephine Hemenway Kenyon, and May Ayres Burgess presented papers. The Woods Schools founded the Child Research Clinic in 1934 and has held institutes on the exceptional child annually since that date. Irene S. Seipt is the director. A number of valuable pamphlets, discussions, and research findings may be had by addressing the director.

The World Federation of Education Associations met at Rio de Janeiro in August. The Good Neighbor Policy and the opportunity for American teachers to familiarize themselves with South American conditions were the keynotes of the conference.

W.P.A. Division of Education has reduced illiteracy by about one-fourth during the last five years. The enrollment last year (1937-38) was 1,586,211. Over 1,000,000 illiterate adults have been taught reading, writing, and arithmetic. There are still 3,000,000 waiting to be taught. Homemaking, naturalization, nursery schools, correspondence courses, and other forms of education have been conducted. In 1938, there were 26,271 teachers of 101,612 classed with the total enrollment mentioned above.

NEWS FROM UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

Brown University. Dr. Harold A. Gibbard has been appointed to an instructorship for a two year term.

Clemson A. and M. College. Professor H. C. Brearley has returned from a session's study in London under a grant from the Julius Rosenwald Fund. His work was principally at the London School of Economics under Professors Malinowski, Ginsberg, Laski, and others. He was able to observe the work both of the Institute of Sociology, the English counterpart of the American Sociological Society, and also of Mass Observation, the new organization promoting social studies with the aid of voluntary observers.

Professor Brearley has been appointed chairman of the newly created Department of Social Science, which includes courses offered in economics, government, history, psychology, and sociology.

Colgate University. Wendell H. Bash, who did his doctoral work at Harvard, has been added to the staff as assistant professor.

Harvard University. P. A. Sorokin has been elected an Honorary Member of the Rumanian Royal Academy.

Harvard University Press is publishing in the Harvard Sociological Series, P. A. Sorokin's and Clarence Q. Berger's monograph, *Time Budgets of Human Behavior*.

University of Maryland. Dr. Theodore B. Manny, head of the department of sociology, died of acute infection September 26. The Society extends its sympathy to his family. Everyone who knew Dr. Manny agrees heartily with the sentiments expressed by Dr. Galpin's Obituary Notice in this issue. Sociology has lost a good man and many sociologists have lost a good friend.—Editor.

Nankai University. Since the complete destruction of Nankai University at Tientsin by the Japanese military last July the Nankai Institute of Economics has been forced to a temporary suspension of the publication of the *Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly*.

The Institute is re-orienting its program and will endeavor to carry on its training and research along lines originally planned for, though modified by such exigencies as the present national crisis has brought forth. Communications with the Institute may be directed to Shapingpa, Chungking, China.

South Dakota State College. The Department of Rural Sociology has recently released for distribution upon request a bulletin entitled "The Standard of Living of Farm and Village Families in Six South Dakota Counties, 1935." Please address requests for this bulletin to Professor W. F. Kumlien.

Syracuse University. Dr. William C. Lehmann, associate professor of sociology, has been granted a year's leave of absence to accept a visiting professorship in sociology at Tulane University for the year 1938-39.

Texas A. and M. College. With the cooperation of the W.P.A. and F.S.A., studies of recent changes in farm tenancy and farm labor are under way. Recent farm mechanization and crop control are being given special attention. W. C. Holley, Assistant State Supervisor of Rural Research, W.P.A., is in charge of the field work.

Another project, with the A.A.A., will study cropping systems and farm rental arrangements in relation to the A.A.A. program.

Reprints of "Texas Farm Tenure Activities," *Land and Pub. Util. Eco.*, August 1938, will be mailed on request.

University of Tulsa. Dr. Leo A. Haak, who has been at McMaster University, Hamilton Ontario, has been appointed assistant professor and head of the sociology department.

Wiley College. Dr. Oliver C. Cox has been appointed professor of sociology and economics, beginning this fall.

LATE NOTICE

The National Student Sociological Conference will hold its sixth annual meeting at Hotel Book Cadillac, Detroit, Dec. 29.

All students are requested to register at the registration desk of the American Sociological Society.

For details regarding rooms, program, etc., write to **Owen R. Davison**, Sociology Department, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

OBITUARY NOTICE

THEODORE B. MANNY

The untimely death of *Dr. Theodore B. Manny*, September 26, shocked and grieved his many professional friends over the United States. His was an intensely vital countenance and personality. The first reaction among his associates and co-workers was great sympathy for his wife and children; the next, personal grief and a realization of serious loss in the ranks of sociologists—especially of rural sociologists.

Theodore Manny's life was one of religious loyalty to human welfare. He was always ready to serve and support any institution which he believed would benefit human beings. Sociology was only one outlet for his abounding energy. He will be greatly missed in many other circles of endeavor as well.

To those of us who worked side by side with Manny in the general field of agriculture and rural life, remain the memories of intimate and comradely association in the effort to discover ways and means of understanding and advantaging rural society. These memories of Manny will long stand apart among our cherished possessions.

Some of the milestones in Dr. Manny's career follow. He was born in Chicago, Illinois, March 12, 1897; graduated from a Chicago high school, 1915; B.S. in general agriculture, majoring in farm management, University of Illinois, 1918; in the United States Army, 1918-1919; assistant manager of field work on a large farm at Wheaton, Illinois, December 1919, to February 1921; research assistant in rural sociology with Dr. J. H. Kolb, University of Wisconsin, February 1921, to July 1923; M.S., University of Wisconsin, 1922; graduate student in rural sociology with Dr. Dwight Sanderson, Cornell University, summer session, 1923; marriage to Miss Elsie B. Sherman, a former student at the University of Wisconsin, August 20, 1923; teaching and research, rural life, Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, September 1923, to September 1927; senior agricultural economist, research in the Division of Farm Population and Rural Life, U. S. Department of Agriculture from October 1927, to October 1935, and acting head of the Division from July 1934, to October 1935; Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, 1929; Century Rural Life Series, *Rural Municipalities*, 1930; professor of sociology, University of Maryland, from October 1935, to the date of his death.

Dr. Manny's training at the University of Wisconsin in sociology under Ross and Kolb, in psychology and political science, gave him the implements for research in the social aspects of rural problems. In the U. S. Department of Agriculture, his research product was notable. It gained the respect of the whole Department, as well as of the state universities and farm organizations of the states. His energy, social discernment and eminent fairness of temper, won him friends everywhere, even in the most trying social situations.

It was no surprise to his fellow workers that the University of Maryland selected Dr. Manny as their sociologist, responsible for teaching and research in general and for rural sociology in particular. His work at the University of Maryland has been marked by the same humane, scholarly qualities that he displayed in the special field of Government research. His short career has been one of true service—intelligent, always kindly, cheery, almost gay.

CHARLES JOSIAH GALPIN

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BOOK REVIEW EDITORS

HOWARD BECKER AND KIMBALL YOUNG
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

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The Role of Scientific Societies in the Seventeenth Century. By MARTHA ORNSTEIN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp xviii+308. \$3.00.

Science and Social Welfare in the Age of Newton. By G. N. CLARK. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937. Pp. 154.

Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England. By ROBERT K. MERTON. Bruges, Belgium: Saint Catherine Press, Ltd., 1938. (From *Osiris*, edited by George Sarton, IV, 2.) Pp. 360-632.

Of these three volumes, which have a common basis in their interest in the interrelations between science and the social background in the seventeenth century, the first may be dismissed with little discussion, since it is merely a new—and welcome—edition of a work already standard in the field. First privately printed in 1913, it was republished and made available at the suggestion of James Harvey Robinson in 1928, after the death of its author. Since that time it has remained an invaluable work for students interested in the growth of “academies” and “societies” in the period of the late Renaissance and seventeenth century. While later work on the subject has served to enlarge the field, and while Miss Ornstein’s work is no longer so exhaustive as it once seemed to be, it must continue to remain a pioneer in an important chapter in intellectual history.

Professor Clark’s little volume brings together four lectures delivered in the University of London in 1936, two of which have been published; a fifth essay has been added. The reader is not conscious, however, of any lack of organic unity, such as it often felt when essays are republished and brought together. Professor Clark, an economic historian, is naturally concerned with problems arising from the application of science to economic life; he is concerned with the influence of “technology” rather than “science,” as that term was understood in the age of Newton. Nevertheless he does not limit himself to a discussion of technology, and many of

the problems which he raises are of importance to students of intellectual and literary history, as well as to students of sociology and economics. To such students, the most significant sections of this work are those which analyze the social background of the scientific movement of the seventeenth century. Here Professor Clark criticizes the approach so common in histories of science, many of which tend to isolate major scientists, to consider them as if they had operated against a purely scientific background, as if scientific ideas passed full-grown from the brain of one scientist to another. With unusual force, considering the short space of his discussion, the author describes the five different groups of influence which worked upon science from the outside: "those from economic life, from war, from medicine, from the arts, and from religion." His approach is seen to be particularly valid when he analyzes Newton himself. Historians of science have stressed only the purely scientific interests of Newton, and have failed to realize the varied interests of the man, and the comparatively short period of his life which he devoted to the solution of the idea of gravitation. Most of the biographers have failed to understand either Newton's obsession with problems of religion and theology, and so fail to discover one of the most important clues not only to the man as a whole, but to the religious attitude of the period, and particularly to Newton's mystical ideas which lay behind the theory of gravitation. The Newton who appears in Professor Clark's essay is not only a more consistent thinker; he is more definitely a product of the diverse interests of his important century.

Professor Merton's much more extensive work offers the same valuable interpretation of the diverse background of the period. Many contrasts and comparisons between the points of view of the two writers might be developed if space permitted. Whatever the differences, the two works have in common an interpretation of the "new science" which did not operate in a vacuum, but which was both caused by and caused the changing "climate of opinion" of a highly complex age. Both show clearly the relation between religion and science in the seventeenth century; neither errs in considering that a Bacon or a Newton must have had his tongue in his cheek when he spoke of religion with reverence; neither distorts the past by reading into it ideas of the present.

To literary historians, such as the present reviewer, the most significant sections of Professor Merton's important work are those which deal with the shifts in cultural interest during the seventeenth century. The careful study of thousands of biographies listed in the *Dictionary of National Biography* affords Professor Merton his point of departure; while he himself is careful to say that even the large number of such biographies he studied give only a partial picture, it is nevertheless a convincing one. The charts and tables which he incorporates [pp. 391-396] are of great interest in showing graphically the shift of initial interest which took place between 1601-1700; the decline of the clergy, the rise of certain forms of the plastic arts, the fallow periods in drama, the gradual decline of poetry and the corresponding rise in prose. All these are matters about which literary historians have generalized, but it is interesting to see the extent to which

such a careful study as this bears out the generalizations. The growing scientific temper of the age shows in the charts which have to do with physicians and other scientists. Mr. Merton's conclusions in regard to the relation between Puritanism and the scientific spirit, while opposed to many of the older generalizations, are entirely in line with the conclusions drawn during the last few years by literary historians.

These two works form a welcome addition to a new field of research which has been steadily growing in importance in the last decade. The fact that these two volumes appear at a time when groups of the Modern Language Association are devoting themselves to a study of the interrelationship between science and literature, when various journals in the field of history are publishing articles on scientific subjects, when sociologists discuss the pros and cons of "the social determination of ideas," indicates that a new and important field of investigation has been opened for scholars in many fields. Only by a succession of such volumes, dealing with the interrelations of science, literature, economics, and politics can the true history of science be written. We seem to be emerging from a long period of departmentalization of thought and coming again to a period when, as in the seventeenth century, it is possible to take a synthetic view. If we may no longer hope with Francis Bacon to take all knowledge to be our province, we may, nevertheless, once again concern ourselves not only with the individual sciences, but with what the seventeenth century knew as *scientia*.

MARJORIE NICOLSON

Smith College

The Crisis of Democracy. By WILLIAM E. RAPPARD. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xiii+287. \$2.50.

In lucid and compelling style, Mr. Rappard, a convinced internationalist, confirmed democrat, and old-school liberal, outlines the difficulties confronting democracy. He chooses to identify it with its libertarian rather than its egalitarian ideal. Following a short history of the democratic idea, he plunges into the story of the older modern democracies. The sustaining force in their history is the love of liberty; economic and technical changes alter the form but not the spirit of democracies. He sympathizes with Wilson's audacious attempt to substitute, in the succession states, idealism backed by allied propaganda and threat of force for the historic processes from which the older democracies emerged and is amazed by Wilson's success rather than by his ultimate failure.

He pays tribute to the dictators for their material accomplishments though he weighs lightly the achievements of the Soviets, but he is convinced that in the long run the inherent weaknesses of dictatorships are bound to destroy them. He accepts the present compromises by democracy in the face of force as a demonstration of superior morality rather than a confession of weakness.

As to the older democracies, granted peace, they will survive if only they stop loading their budgets with debts contracted while pursuing the illusive

egalitarian ideal and return to the love of liberty which alone sustains democracy. Perhaps, in the light of the behavior of the older democracies in the recent Czech crisis, Rappard's optimism regarding democratic survival and Wilsonian "success" will meet with some scepticism on the part of his realistic critics.

W. F. COTTRELL

Miami University

The Lasting Elements of Individualism. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937. Pp. 187. \$2.00.

Liberalism is on the defense. The great challenge of modern dictatorships, their questioning and endangering of basic human values of freedom, liberty and individuality, may finally lead to a revival of true liberalism. Under the fire of its deadly enemy, it may not only recover its lost dynamic force, its fighting virility, and its moral courage, but also perceive its new functions in a profoundly changing world. Whatever the future may bring, so much is sure: post-dictatorial liberalism will be different from the nineteenth-century type. Chastened by the experiences of a period of its own failures (which are least partly responsible for the rise of an antiliberal reaction), it has to modify and reformulate its views and programs. For such a necessary discussion, Hocking's book offers a most salient contribution.

This study of the meaning and prospects of individualism centers around this pertinent question: How much of individualism is of lasting value? Is it perhaps a pioneer notion? Or is there something about the duty of being an individual which is permanently valid? The origin of modern European individualism was not laid in the industrial revolution, but received its impulse from the religious movement of the reformation period. This religious revolution, above all, with its appeal to private opinion or to "inner life," was a necessary prerequisite to the dissolution of medieval collectivism of conscience, and to the preparation of the individual for a cultural, economic, and political renaissance. The liberalism of the nineteenth century is only the final and not the most vigorous expression of this pattern of thought. In spite of its current loss of prestige, this European liberalism has been "the most successful conscious political hypothesis of human history." But it had definite shortcomings. Under the heading, "Is Liberalism Working Badly?," Hocking diagnoses as its three main defects (1) its failure to achieve social unity, (2) its false concept of rights without duties, and (3) its loss of an original emotional force. The task before present-day liberalism lies in the remedying of these defects.

This theme also resounds in the following chapter, "The Dialectic of Liberalism." Here the author shrewdly analyzes the contributions of John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, two outstanding exponents of nineteenth century thought markedly contradictory and yet strikingly complementary in their views. While he does not belittle the present pertinence of Mill's

plea for liberty, he rightly emphasizes the essentially illiberal nature of Mill's fight against intolerance, based as it was upon social utility and not on an inherent right of the individual. Marx, on the other hand, though fighting for a collectivistic society, showed a far more genuine sensitivity to the individual. The emotional basis of his fight against capitalism was above all moral, as evidenced by his early writings. The machine age and its division of labor destroyed many fundamentals of individual personality and freedom. Hocking rightly points to this sincere indignation evoked by the deformation of human nature and existence; it places Marx higher than Mill, indicating the "greater moral depth and the secret of his enduring power." Where he failed, according to Hocking, was in his purely economic interpretation (great as this contribution of a hitherto entirely neglected factor was to the philosophy of society) and in his vain hope for a socialized scheme to liberate the individual.

On the basis of such a critical survey, Hocking proceeds to outline "two necessities of future societies"; namely, the commotive function (the will to an active social unity) and the incompressible individual. Hocking, therefore, sees in the present-day trend toward a stronger social unity and centralized authority "not a temporary palliative for a passing disorder but a new stage which will remain." He is even prepared to recognize the appeal modern dictatorships possess because of their commotive impulse making for national unity and action. But because he recognizes the blind spot of the *laissez-faire* conception of a pre-dictatorial liberalism and thus the negative strength of the new dictatorial systems, he is able to point out the latter's fundamental blunders. His profound criticism, free from superficial "timeliness," weighs Bolshevism and Fascism in terms of human values and finds them wanting. Their perfect national and social unity is a unity of the drill squad, not of thinking beings. "A unity of individuals who do not think ceases to be a unity and tends to become a pure monologue and monodeed."

Opposed to this, Hocking pictures the "co-agent state" as his ideal. It must build up a strong social unity without mutilating the incompressible individual. It fulfils this function by acting as the citizens' "responsible agent" which in carrying out the instructions of its principal becomes an "extrapolation of his will." And since the only real guarantee for liberty lies in the reality of individual conscience, the first business of the co-agent state becomes to develop and equip that very conscience of its members. It provides an honest and competent opposition. True, it should not "avoid indoctrination in the sense of a positive recommendation of tradition (minds cannot grow in a vacuum), but the state that continues into maturity the process of indoctrination shows a fear of truth and begins to deprive itself of those individual resources of thought and conscience which are the life of the state." This maxim strikingly illustrates Hocking's way of steering between the old dilemma of authority and liberty into a disciplined democracy, a strong state of strong individuals. It conforms with his sharp attack on Mill's (and incidentally even most of today's liberals') plea for the absolute right of freedom of speech. What Hocking is asking instead

is "the right and duty to express whatever I have seriously and responsibly thought and to take the consequences of that statement, and to be prepared to face without complaint even ostracism . . . because a realm of costless toleration is a realm of devaluated truth." Moral courage becomes the backbone of every virile liberalism and the key to its rejuvenation. Hocking's added qualification that freedom of thought should be reserved "for thinkers" will be heartily agreed upon, although it raises the crucial question of how to recognize this competence and in whose hands to leave the discrimination.

In similar fashion, the book leaves unanswered many burning problems of our time on which one might have wished a more specific and clarifying interpretation by the author. But this undoubtedly would have led beyond the scope of his study. It is a statement of fundamentals. It clearly focuses on the vital social problems and lays the groundwork for their intelligent examination. Not quite two hundred pages in length, it is almost inexhaustible in its suggestions. Masterful in its style, poignant in its illustrations, and every line embodying the restraint, dignity and responsibility owed this life-and-death-question of human nature and existence, it deserves an outstanding place in discussions of political philosophy.

SIGMUND NEUMANN

Wesleyan University

Soviet Tempo. By VIOLET CONOLLY. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937. Pp. xii+189. \$2.50.

Observation in Russia. By SIDNEY I. LUCK. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xxxi+339. \$2.50.

Government of the Soviet Union. By SAMUEL N. HARPER. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company. Pp. xviii+204. \$1.25.

Of the making of books about Russia, there seems to be no end. Despite the fact that the Soviet regime has completed two decades of existence, the attitude of the world toward that grandiose experiment shows no tendency to crystallize. Charges and countercharges are bandied about as freely and with as much joyous invective as in the days of the early twenties. To most readers in the western world Russia remains as much of an enigma—inscrutable, self-contradictory and completely unpredictable—as ever.

These three authors offer some light on the problem but they, too, fail to provide any general illumination. Miss Conolly is an Irish economist who has recorded a log of her experiences and reflections while making a trip across Russia to the Black Sea and into the Caucasus. Knowing the language, she traveled alone, except for a strong anti-Communist bias—born in part, one suspects, of her strong religious convictions—which she brought from London. Mr. Luck is an Englishman who had lived for eighteen years in the old Russia and who, desiring to revisit the country, volunteered his services for an expedition to observe an eclipse from a remote point in Siberia. Professor Harper, of the University of Chicago, is one of the most competent American students of Russian affairs.

In a sense, all three of these books are complementary. The Harper volume is an attempt to provide American college students with a concise summary of the fundamental principles and the institutional organization of the system. The author has never for a moment allowed himself to forget that he is writing a textbook on a highly controversial subject. The result is a book which is informative for a beginning student but which is so scrupulous in its avoidance of praise or criticism that it is singularly flat and colorless. The dry bones of Russian institutions are there, neatly catalogued and arranged, but there is no hint of the spirit of the regime. Those who are familiar with Professor Harper's earlier studies will realize that this is a product of deliberate self-limitation, but, to this reviewer at least, it seems a limitation which has been carried out with destructive thoroughness.

Of the two travel books, Mr. Luck's record of his Siberian experiences is the more revealing and penetrating. He is a shrewd observer and he has no axe to grind. Consequently, his book is filled with those personal experiences, both pleasant and unpleasant, which when added together give one an admirable amount of local color with which to supplement the Harper study. Miss Conolly saw in Russia exactly what she had expected to see. From the Soviet standpoint her book will indeed give "aid and comfort to the enemy."

GRAYSON KIRK

Columbia University

My Life as a Rebel. By ANGELICA BALABANOFF. New York: Harper and Bros., 1938. Pp. 319. \$3.75.

If Emma Goldman is the most famous woman rebel alive, Dr. Angelica Balabanoff is the most significant. Where Miss Goldman has been a flaming comet across the revolutionary heavens, Dr. Balabanoff has been a fixed glowing star. Unlike the highly individualistic and temperamental anarchist woman, the author of this memoir has been, and remains today, a leader in the organized Socialist movement; a member of the Executive of the Second International and among the outstanding figures in the Italian Socialist Party before the war; one of the prime organizers and the secretary of the Zimmerwald Movement during the war; the first secretary of the Third or Communist International after the war.

Yet there is an amazing parallelism in the lives of these two women. Both were born in Russia and did their most important work as revolutionary agitators in other lands. Both returned to their native country after the Bolshevik triumph, worked with the Soviet régime for a period, and renounced it vehemently in broken-hearted disillusionment. Most important of all, neither of them has been snared by the fleshpots of revolutionary power and prestige; each has held steadfastly to her original ideals.

Soon after the nineteen-year old Angelica Balabanoff left her well-to-do home in Russia for the enlightenment of Western Europe, in 1898, she entered the Socialist movement. Her studies took her to Italy, which was

destined to become her real fatherland. When she returned to Russia just twenty years later it was as a celebrated revolutionary leader. To-day she lives in the United States, edits the *Avanti!* in exile, a refugee from both the countries with which she was most intimately associated and which now suffer under the heels of dictatorships.

My Life As a Rebel is her political autobiography. In recounting forty years of her exciting life, she summarizes, in effect, forty crowded years in the history of the labor and revolutionary movements of Europe. All the great personalities of those movements—Plekhanov, Liebknecht, Jaurès, Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Serrati, Luxemburg, etc.—move through the pages of this book. All the great crises of the period, particularly the collapse of internationalism under the impact of the war and the painful reconstruction after the Russian Revolution, were also climactic points in her own life, since she was always in the front trenches of the revolutionary struggles.

A certain popular notoriety attaches to her book because it of necessity includes a record of her ten years' association with a young Italian Socialist named Benito Mussolini. She had picked him practically out of the gutter, a "wretched-looking human being," dirty, sick, despondent, and for ten years he leaned on her strength. "No one could have foreseen in this bewildered and neurotic youth of twenty the man who rules Italy today," she apologizes. But the Mussolini episode is no more than a minor element in a rich life. The greatest values of this book are in its detailed story of the author's spirited fight for internationalism in the midst of war, and for human decencies in the midst of revolution. In both respects she failed, if success is measured in immediate results, but triumphed magnificently if success is measured in terms of personal integrity. Dr. Balabanoff is modest to the point of reticence, yet she emerges as a bigger person than the Zinovievs and Mussolinis and other "successful" leaders who played a role in her life.

At one point she tells of rushing to Lenin to protest against a particularly dirty piece of *provocateur* work by the Cheka. Lenin looked at her sadly. "Angelica," he said, "what use can life make of you?" "I left him," she records, "in a mood of deep depression. I was opposed to these methods, not only because I considered them unworthy of a Socialist regime, but because I knew that they would, in time, corrupt those who used them." There we have the stark confrontation of the practical man and the idealist. In the light of subsequent Russian history, who can say that Lenin was right and Dr. Balabanoff wrong?

EUGENE LYONS

New York City

The Invasion of China by the Western World. By E. R. HUGHES. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. 324. \$3.50.

Mr. Hughes is eminently qualified for the task set for him by the editors of the Pioneer Histories. He is an excellent Sinological scholar, with a long first-hand acquaintance with Chinese life and the Chinese people. He is now Reader in Chinese Religion and Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He

has a sympathetic understanding of the Chinese and their civilization, and at the same time a broad-minded liberal approach to world problems. The migration of Europeans and the accompanying penetration of European civilization into the vast continents of the Old and New World has created "the complex world of today, so nationalistic in its instincts, so internationalized in its relationships." The invasion of China by the Western world stands out as perhaps the most important part of this universal process, both on account of the tremendous population involved and the antiquity and intensity of Chinese civilization. The first chapter of the book gives a brief historical background of the relation between the West and China, necessarily very succinctly, sometimes even too sketchy. The second chapter deals with the missionary influence. The complex influence and consequences of Western political thought in China with which the third chapter deals have put the Chinese in a dilemma which Hu Shih has expressed very well: "It is easy for China to acquire the civilization of the West, but it is very difficult to master its barbarism. Yet I suppose we must first master this barbarism before we can feel at home in this new civilization." The Chinese were eager to receive democracy, but the present anarchic international relations have forced them into a nationalistic vehemence which is the negation of everything they prize in their own tradition. The last four chapters deal with the destruction of the old education, with Western science and medicine, with the new education, and finally with China today. The author correctly points out that for good or for evil, China is now part of the family of nations and that her problem is the same problem which presents itself to all other nations today, culturally, politically and economically. The book is very well written and will serve as the best short introduction to the intricate problems of China today. It is to be highly recommended for anybody interested in cultural sociology and the problems of civilization. A good bibliography and a very careful index supplement the book.

HANS KOHN

Smith College

The National Mind—English, French, German. By MICHAEL DEMIASHKEVICH. New York: The American Book Co., 1938. Pp. xii+508. \$3.50.

Here is another book added to a long list dealing with national characteristics that has been growing since the days of Herodotus. Literature abounds in such works. It is a perennial subject, and one immediately questions, Why this treatise? The author tells us it is to lay the foundations for a projected study of education for leadership. He thinks collective behavior represents a "liaison subject" of pedagogical value for a number of fields of knowledge.

That object justifies the study whether the methods and results do or not. It is written in excellent style from a wide reading and acquaintance with the peoples concerned. The reader will be fascinated with its fresh materials and scholarly gossip. He will be impressed with its learned chatter but not with its scientific value. About all it does is to illustrate anew the

character traits that are usually attributed to these peoples. Moreover it makes the erroneous assumption that the traits are unchanging without explaining how they originated or why they endure. The author is intent only on describing what he thinks is the basic pattern of conduct. This leads him briefly to formulate what amounts to a philosophy of history for each nation. This is conspicuously evident in case of the Germans. After the Spenglerian mood they are called a "Dionysian" or intuitive nation whose traits of "totalitarianism" and "infinetism" have alternated as ascendant qualities. This amounts to explaining one mythology by creating another. A subjective method is generally characteristic of the work.

NEWELL L. SIMS

Oberlin College

The Collapse of the Confederacy. By CHARLES H. WESLEY. Washington: Associated Publishers, 1937. Pp. xiii+225. Appendix. \$2.15.

Within recent years there have been a number of studies of the anatomy of revolution, with illustrative material drawn almost exclusively from successful revolts. The story of the Southern Confederacy furnishes an example of a revolution that failed. Historians have usually been content to assert that the superior financial, military, and industrial resources of the North finally defeated the rebellious Southern States. Dr. Wesley, however, challenges this assumption by pointing out that tremendous exertions had enabled the South to produce sufficient war material and foodstuffs to supply its needs. Although he admits that the whole system of distribution within the Confederacy collapsed, and there were many cases of individual hardships, he concludes that psychological factors lay at the base of the Southern failure. Contrary to legend, the South was not solid in 1861, and the vicissitudes of war produced disaffection among all but the dominant slave-holding class. In the end, the Confederate government lost the last vestiges of popular support. Finally, as a last desperate measure the Confederate rebels turned to the futile experiment of arming the slaves to fight the masters' battles. The experiment came too late to save the day and Lee met Grant at Appomattox.

Dr. Wesley's volume should enlighten students of revolutions. Implicit in his story is the lesson that a dominant group cannot wage a successful revolt without popular support. "The theoretical interest which the majority of the people had in slavery and independence was not of sufficient weight to balance the suffering they were called upon to make."

W. B. HESSELTINE

University of Wisconsin

Ukrainians in the United States. By WASYL HALICH. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937. Pp. xiii+174. \$2.50.

This is the first general treatise in English on the Ukrainian immigrant in the U.S.A. The author is an immigrant of the same nationality and an American Ph.D. in history. He describes, briefly, the background of the

Ukrainian immigrants, their movement to the U. S. A., adjustments in the economic sphere, organizations, the churches, the press, and activities called "social."

The treatment is largely historical; the conclusions based on fact; but there are suggestions of a naiveté which the sociologist avoids, as, for instance the reference to the Ukrainians as a "race" (p. 19), or, as having a "degree of intelligence" (p. 27), etc.

The sources comprise official immigration records, the newspapers and other publications of Ukrainian organizations, personal documents of old Ukranian leaders, and interviews.

The treatment of several important Ukrainian organizations, e.g. the O.D.W.U., is altogether too summary. The cardinal weakness of this study, however, is that the following organizations, which comprise at least a third of the Ukrainians, are omitted entirely, as are all the data from these sources: United Ukrainian Toilers, Inc., Ukrainian section of the I.W.O., the Ukrainian Labor Institutes, and the Ukrainian *Daily News*.

Easy to read, this book should be of help in gaining an impression of Ukrainians here. To the sociologist who is interested in intensive studies of Ukrainian immigrant adjustments, it is, at best, no more than an introduction.

STEPHEN W. MAMCHUR

College of St. Thomas

Ojibwa Sociology. By RUTH LANDES. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. Pp. 144. \$2.00.

The Ojibwa Woman. By RUTH LANDES. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. 247. \$3.00.

To the layman or the sociologist the Ojibwa are more familiar by name perhaps than many other Indian groups. Confined at the opening of the historic period to the neighborhood of Lake Superior, these natives later spread westward with the expansion of the fur trade and, in Canada, some bands reached what is now Saskatchewan and became acculturated to a prairie type of life. Yet despite their far-flung distribution, we have had very little ethnographic information about the Ojibwa, particularly information of a systematic sociological character. Consequently, these books by Landes fill a gap in the literature.

The material she presents is based chiefly upon contemporary observation of the Woodland Ojibwa of southwestern Ontario and related bands of Minnesota. In *Ojibwa Sociology* the formal aspects of their social structure are analyzed: kinship, gens (clan) organization and marriage. Their political organization into bands with chiefs is principally a reflection of modern conditions brought about through their relations with the Dominion Government.

One of the most important chapters in this volume is that on Property. Its unique feature is the attention devoted by the author to the economic aspects of religious, ceremonial and curative procedures, prime features of

native life. Heretofore this aspect of them has been almost systematically neglected, attention being paid only to such secular topics as land holding, etc. But as Landes points out, "Ojibwa religious institutions—like the Midewiwin, or exercise of vision powers—are inextricably interpenetrated with economic ideas. They cannot function outside of the economic system . . . together with their religious character, they have the character of 'economic goods.' There is no more difference in Ojibwa between religious and nonreligious items as economic goods than there is in our economic system between intangibles and tangibles" (p. 143).

The companion volume, *The Ojibwa Woman*, is distinguished by the richness of the case material, skilfully integrated throughout. The presentation is organized principally around the life cycle with chapters on Youth, Marriage, Occupations, Abnormalities and Life Histories. The chapter on Marriage in this volume (70 pp.) when read in connection with the shorter chapter of the same title in the *Sociology* gives as realistic a picture of the operation of both formal and personal aspects of marriage as could be desired. Since male ethnographers have given us most of our accounts of the life of native peoples, it is well to have a culture systematically studied and presented from the feminine point of view. Landes has been successful in carrying this out, as I can testify from my own investigation of a western branch of the Ojibwa.

The author was exceedingly fortunate in finding an informant who was not only willing but articulate enough and sufficiently literate to supply a considerable amount of biographical and anecdotal material about women's lives from her own recollections. Since the ethnographer usually is in residence only a short time, it is impossible to build up a sufficient body of such data through direct observation. While there is always the informant's personal bias to be considered, nevertheless, such material is of great value. The author has made effective use of such material in showing how the culture works in terms of the attitudes, motivations, etc., of the individual woman. Since, in Ojibwa society the role of the women, as culturally phrased, is very much more circumscribed than that of men, one might gain a totally false impression of the actual life of women without such data as Landes gives. She is able to show, and rightly I believe, that women not only have an immense amount of freedom in this very individualistic society, but that they are often successful in flaunting customs and vetoing traditional standards.

A. IRVING HALLOWELL

University of Pennsylvania

A History of the Business Man. By MIRIAM BEARD. New York: Macmillan, 1938. Pp. vi+779. \$5.00.

Business and Modern Society. By MALCOLM P. MCNAIR and HOWARD T. LEWIS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp.viii+411. \$5.00.

It is impossible to convey any adequate notion of the interest and significance of these books within the compass of a short review. Both books

will appeal to a wide range of readers, both books are rich in implications and suggestions. We must therefore direct our attention to the broad outline and purpose of the writers. Mrs. Miriam Beard Vagts is primarily concerned with the place of the business man in the social world; largely, but not exclusively, in respect to his participation in high politics. Little attention is given to the specific problems of business administration, though many features of the structure of business enterprise are essential to any understanding of the role of the business man in the life of the state. Only in the greater city states of the middle ages do we find the business man playing a dominant part in his society. In the great commercial towns the wealthiest business men assumed more or less complete control of the government, even if some recognition had to be given to king or emperor. In antiquity, the great commercial towns like Corinth and Carthage were conquered and dominated by the more militant aristocracies of Athens and Rome, and the general structure of society in antiquity was based upon a complete political and social subordination of the commercial classes. For a short period, in nineteenth century England, the business men was able entirely to shake off the domination of the state, but this was possible only under the special conditions presented under British imperialism.

The problem of the present day is to find some specific means of bringing business into close functional relationship with the state. In her final chapter, Mrs. Vagts discusses briefly the tendencies in Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. "Fascism is the elaboration of a 'Mythos,' woven of legend, history, and histrionics, to instil and uphold faith in the state . . . it saves [the business man] the trouble of rebuilding faith in himself, or examining his own creed and character. . . . This accordingly, is the laziest way out of the dilemma" (p. 741). Mrs. Vagts is led to the conclusion that the best solution must lie in a reformation of capitalism, and she clearly believes that powerful forces of reorganization are working towards such an end both in Great Britain and in the United States.

The papers brought together in the volume *Business and Modern Society* are designed to furnish an answer to the difficult problems confronting the great free societies. Dean Donham deals frankly with the social discontent of the present time. It is due he believes to disregard of the social consequences of industrial and economic change. This theme is presented in more detail in the paper by Professor Roethlisberger. "Industrial problems need to be redefined in terms of social structure," he says. In both the immediate problems of administration of the individual business unit, and in the broader aspects of general industrial policy careful consideration must be given to the effect upon the social life of the individual and the community.

The paper by Professor Slichter on "Adjustment to Instability" also emphasizes the necessity of studying all problems of business policy from the point of view of society as a whole. "The problem cannot be attacked solely from the point of view of business by deflation and wage cuts, nor from the point of view of labor by merely maintaining wages, nor by government intervention in support of the market . . . neither deflation in the form of cuts in production costs nor 'reflation' through unemployment benefits or

government spending is the remedy for depression. . . . *In fact each alone is dangerous.* Each needs to be supplemented by the other" (p. 253-4). The other papers are largely concerned with more technical problems of business policy, but they exhibit the progressiveness of contemporary thought and the wide range of possible reform in the structure of a free society.

ABBOTT PAYSON USHER

Harvard University

Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts, Vol. 23, 1936. Ed. by OTTO KOELLREUTTER. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1936. Pp. 383.

The year-book, a standard work of public law in Germany, publishes apart from most reliable reports and comments on German constitutional development, excellent and well-informed studies on foreign governments. This new volume is devoted exclusively to non-German governments. It lives up to the great tradition of the *Jahrbuch* in that it contains a mine of source material for a study of comparative government and for a serious discussion on contemporary affairs.

The first two contributions on the recent constitutional development in France are most suggestive, complementing each other felicitously. Professor René Capitant's study on the crisis and reform of French parliamentarism, a chronique written in French, plans to give a detailed report on French constitutional development from 1931-36. The section published in this volume covers the period up to 1932. Of special interest for the American reader will be the introductory part of the study dealing with the specific democratic and individualistic features of French parliamentarism. The second article on the crisis and reform in France which is by Karl Braunias, a well known Austrian professor of constitutional law, was completed on July 15, 1936. It does not include the Popular Front government, undoubtedly the most interesting experience in recent French internal development. The study centers around Doumergue's attempt at reform which still needs a more exhaustive treatment. The essay is enlarged into a general investigation of the basic causes of the French crisis. It gives a diagnosis, studies the attempts at reform, the radical experiments, the Doumergue government, and analyzes in a final chapter the "Two Frances." The article contains most valuable material, though, and like many of the investigations made by non-Frenchmen, it overstresses the multiple party system as a crisis element.

The study by N. Karadshe-Iskrow gives a very detailed and authoritative report on the development of administrative law in Soviet Russia since 1917, thus filling an often-felt gap in the study of the Soviet government. Of extraordinary interest, especially in these days, will be the contribution of Professor Fritz Sander of the German university in Prague on the constitutional development in Czechoslovakia from 1929-1935. Since there is almost no reliable material available on this crucial problem of European development a study of this last democracy in central Europe is important in showing, apart from the more spectacular international implications, the

young Republic's contribution to democratic government. Sander's essay reveals very well the great changes in the concrete structure of political government in Czechoslovakia during the last few years. Especially his discussion of the law on the defense of the state which (May 13, 1936) illustrates the most interesting attempts of Czechoslovakia to block the rise of Fascist movements within the nation. The hitherto unsolved problem of national minorities is also extensively discussed by Sander.

The study of Professor Carl Joachim Friedrich of Harvard in collaboration with Dr. Wolfgang Kraus "on the present status of federalism in the United States" will be especially appreciated. It needed this rare combination of splendid German background and training in addition to long American experience to present to a German audience the very intricate picture of the recent American constitutional development.

Though written for a very different audience, these contributions will be very useful for American readers, too. Incidentally, all of the authors realize the social implications of constitutional developments. For this reason the sociologist will use these regular publications of the *Jahrbuch* with great profit.

SIGMUND NEUMANN

Wesleyan University

Economics and Cultural Change. By RUSSELL A. DIXON and E. KINGMAN EBERHART. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938. Pp. xi+550. \$3.00.

The Preface of this treatise expresses its purpose and design very succinctly. "The book is primarily intended to serve as an introduction to the social sciences, particularly economics, sociology, and history. Its purpose is threefold: to trace the evolution of modern industrialism; to evaluate the contributions of each of the preceding cultures; and to study the forces promoting change in modern industrial society itself. . . . Its emphasis is economic. Its point of view is cultural." From this statement, as also from a reading of the text, it is clear that the title is a misnomer: there is little or no economic thought or theory in the book. A better title could be *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.

This little book promises to be useful to students in so far as it combines economic, social, and cultural development in a general way. Any very close correlation will have to be made by the teacher and student. The questions appended to each chapter will be helpful.

The book is based chiefly on textbooks and articles in Palgrave's *Dictionary*, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. It is very largely devoted to English history. Some errors are due solely to the sources used. The East India Company was never a regulated company and the Plymouth Company (if the Plymouth Bay Company is intended) was never chartered. That drapers and mercers were "specialized wholesale dealers" is incorrect.

When foreign names are used, they take on strange forms: Pierenne (p. 237) for Pirenne, Griefswald (p. 279) for Greifswald, Nuremburg (p. 283)

for Nuremberg, Lalberti (p. 377) for Alberti, and Puruzzi (p. 388) for Peruzzi.

The chief criticism of the book is its lack of maturity. Minor points might be mentioned, such as a failure to appreciate the importance of partnerships and commercial loans in the Middle Ages. The chapter on "Commercial Feudalism" should be called "Town Economy." In their effort to be original the authors have coined a term which embodies two elements never found in chemical mixture—feudalism and commerce. To end the book with industrial capitalism leaves out financial capitalism and the current national capitalism.

N. S. B. GRAS

Harvard University

Féminisme et Positivisme. By LOUISE-MARIE FERRÉ. Chez l'auteur, Saint-Léger-en-Yvelines (S.-et-O), 1938. 10 francs.

The Associated Country Women of the World. Proceedings of the Third Triennial Conference held at Washington, D. C., May 31-June 11, 1936. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937. \$.50.

Women in Two Worlds. By MARY L. ELY and EVE CHAPPELL. New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1938. \$1.25.

In her diminutive treatise of 124 pages, Louise-Marie Ferré, Doctor of Letters of the University of Paris, has achieved a marvel of condensation from her original work, dealing with the ideas of Auguste Comte on woman and her social role. With the clarity of which the French are so capable, she has traced the two careers of the great Positivist, discussed the influence of Clotilde de Vaux and the utopian conceptions of the mother-virgin, and drawn into her review the French, English, and Latin-American successors of the philosopher whose cult of humanity still exerts such an influence. Contemporary feminism encounters a mystic vision of woman even among staunch Protestants—if they are imbued with the Positivist credo.

Turning from mysticism to *The Associated Country Women of the World* is not equivalent to abandoning romanticism in favor of agriculture. The aim of friendship among the peoples of the earth is a leading aspiration of the Associated Country Women of the world. In this volume of Proceedings are the speeches and agenda covering the convention in Washington, attended by more than six thousand country women from 22 nations. The moving spirit in America in this organization is Miss Grace E. Frysinger of the Department of Agriculture, whose burning desire it is to see rural women exert a spiritual pressure in human affairs and who is ever seeking the ways and means. Mrs. Roosevelt opened the White House and grounds on this occasion as hostess to the multitude.

Women in Two Worlds is another report—a report on the leading women's organizations in the United States to the American Association for Adult Education. The Two Worlds in this case are viewed as the man's and the woman's. They are viewed sociologically and contemporaneously without the inhibitions of comparison with other times and purposes which a

time-depth of historical perspective might have brought to the appraisals. An obeisance is made to the past but not the tribute of knowledge. This too is a small book, consisting of only 169 pages, but it covers personal interviews as well as documents revealing programs, methods, and intentions. The conclusion is that out of a passive past American women of the bourgeois class have reached a distinguished and socially important level of intelligence and purpose.

MARY R. BEARD

New Milford, Conn.

Consumption and Standards of Living. By CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1936. Pp. xvi+602. \$2.75.

This work covers its field thrice: half of the volume consists of separate sections on the respective "roles" and "laws" of the major segments of the family budget—food, housing, clothing, "advancement," and savings. A second section reviews studies of family budgets and planes of living in each part of the world. A third group of chapters reviews the history of economic theories in their relation to consumption. In general this section is the best written in the book. The opening and concluding chapters present the author's own doctrines.

The book should be of some value as a reference work. Its contributions are: (1) Expansion of perspective through the comparison of findings and of methods in studies drawn from earlier centuries and remote areas. (2) Demonstration of the inadequacy of nearly all the "laws" or generalizations which have been laid down for consumption and budgetary behavior in localized periods, areas, cultures, or classes. (3) Application of a none-too-well-expounded "theory of limits" to most of the phenomena of consumption and culture, suggesting cyclical fluctuations, as against "linear" change and one-way "progress." (Zimmerman is of the Sorokin school, if any.) (4) A reappraisal of the contributions, actual and potential, of *Le Play*, in which appraisal, however, he was preceded (at points perhaps bettered) in the thesis by Dr. Ethel Wilson (1933) which he does not cite.

Zimmerman lumps all the "institutional" economists with the Marxians, and throws in the cultural-lag theory for good measure. His arguments against current governmental policies, while plausible, are oversimplified, confused, and poorly integrated with the body of the text. An inductive study of the effects of these policies upon actual family living would be a real contribution.

The author's selection of new terms for useful distinctions, such as "popular" rent (p. 180) or "institutional" clothing (p. 240) are not always happy. The author adds to the existing ambiguities of the phrase "standard of living" another definition of his own, which seems to the reviewer neither clear, particularly useful, nor close to common usage. He seems to use the term to describe a typological or hypothetical average plane of living (p. 6). The latter phrase, however, he reserves, for some reason, for character-

istic economic expenditures. For his ill-fitting phrase "manners of living" sociologists already have the word *ethos*.

It is to be hoped that the author's vast access to materials and his undoubted ability, when at his best, will bear fruit in more matured and constructive contributions in this important field.

THOMAS D. ELIOT

Northwestern University

Morphologie Sociale. By MAURICE HALBWACHS. Paris: Collection Armand Colin, 1938. Pp. 204. 17. 50 fr.

The thesis of this book is that every human group—family, church, state, business enterprise, club, etc.—has a definite spatial form and that this material body exercises a strong and continuous influence on the social life of the group in all its many aspects. M. Halbwachs is clearly an admirer of Ratzel and has been much influenced by the latter's *Anthropogeography*, but he also appreciates the roles of ideas, institutions, customs, folkways, etc. in determining social action. His strong belief in the fundamental role of the physical form of a group in giving direction to its development leads him to devote a large part of his discussion of social morphology to the size and the structure of populations.

The quantitative aspects of population are for him the core of social morphology in the narrower sense, and to them he devotes the larger part of this book. As illustrative of the importance of knowing the size and make-up of populations if one is to study social problems broadly, his work is quite satisfactory; however, as a complete description of the population of any particular group it is deficient at many points.

The author is to be congratulated on the simple style of his work and the power of expressing rather complicated ideas clearly and briefly. His work would contribute materially to a better understanding of population study for social science generally if only it were readily accessible to those who do not read French.

WARREN S. THOMPSON

Miami University

Die Grossstädte im Strome der Binnenwanderung. Wirtschafts- und bevölkerungswissenschaftliche Untersuchungen über Wanderung und Mobilität in deutschen Städten. By RUDOLF HEBERLE and FRITZ MEYER. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1937. Pp. xi+206. RM 12.00.

Heberle and Meyer's book on population mobility in large German cities is more in the tradition of Georg von Mayr than of Georg Hansen. It rests on a firm empirical basis; the problems of internal migration in relation to urbanization are stated realistically; an important source of data is examined critically and exploited systematically. The book will interest students of population chiefly in respect to this last feature: all available tabulations of *Meldestatistik*, i.e., routine data on change of residence available in the police registers, are analyzed to throw light on temporal

variations in mobility, particularly in relation to business cycles; on variations in mobility as associated with variations in the economic and social structure of large cities; on seasonal variations in mobility; and on variations in the mobility of various occupational groups in the population.

The authors deplore the fact that so few tabulations of police registration data have been published. Every migrant is required by law to register both upon leaving and upon entering a community, and the registration form includes such items as age, sex, civil status, family composition, occupation, birthplace, previous residence, etc. Yet age tabulations were available for only three cities, and even for these there was little consistency in age groupings. Tabulations of migrants by sex were available for 55 cities in 1910, and one of the most interesting findings in this book is the great variation among the 55 cities in sex-selective internal migration: cityward migration in Germany was, in the main, selective of males rather than of females, but the authors point out that such selection may not be characteristic of other German cities or even of these particular cities at other periods, because the range of selection was so wide. They interpret the observed variations in the strength of male selection in terms of variations in occupational opportunities for the two sexes, and further point out that if the number of females in the total migration volume represents year by year only slightly more than 40 percent of the total, and the higher representation of males persists over a long period of time, whereas females comprise more than half the total population [of these cities] . . . one must conclude that the migration of females is more *effective* than that of males . . . i.e., that the proportion of females who remain in the cities is greater than that of males (p. 32).

The superiority of analyses based on registration data to analyses based on net migration (gain or loss) alone is obvious from Heberle and Meyer's demonstration of the complete independence of migration volume (sum of in- and out-migrants) and net migration. Their analysis would have achieved greater significance from the point of view of migration differentials, however, if they had not limited themselves to migration volume but had separated total volume into its components of incoming streams and outgoing streams of migrants.

DOROTHY S. THOMAS

Yale University

Man the Slave and Master: A Biological Approach to the Potentialities of Modern Society. By MARK GRAUBARD. New York: Covici-Friede, 1938. Pp. 354. \$3.50.

Heredity and Politics. By J. B. S. HALDANE. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1938. Pp. 202. \$2.50.

Fifth Avenue to Farm: A Biological Approach to the Problem of the Survival of Our Civilization. By FRANK FRITTS and RALPH W. GWINN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937. Pp. viii+282. \$3.00.

Graubard's book should be widely read, especially by racialists, eugenicists, hereditarians, rampant mental testers, psychoanalysts, eminent sur-

geons, Aquinasians, and all such ilk, including Hitler and Goebbels. Competent sociologists have been saying these things for years, but competent biologists and others who need it most will probably read Graubard's book least. Such is the fate of most good books.

So much for praise. Space prevents extensive criticism, but we should note that while he rejects instincts (p. 102), he assumes certain "innate psychological reactions" (pp. 46 ff.) such as sympathy, social approval, esthetic pleasure, and so on, which are culturally conditioned. Such terms are relatively meaningless to me in the absence of the cultural factor. Even hunger, sex, smell, and pain, are capable of a great deal of cultural conditioning, both on the stimulus and response side of the reaction. Graubard tells us rather definitely just how things happened in cultural evolution in somewhat the same speculative and finalistic manner for which he roundly and rightly condemns Freud. He seems to accept the Fall of Rome myth, the genius theory of cultural development (with reservations), and to hold that the difference between animate and inanimate was unclear to "primitive man" (though he slays Lévy-Bruhl again), that religion and magic are the same, that Trobrianders do not know the "facts of life," and that social change is no longer a mystery since Marx. He finds the explanation of marriage and the incest taboo in economics and the origin of social classes in slavery, and of slavery, in conquest, with economic interest determinative. In general, much of his discussion of social phenomena is oversimplified and speculative, but he shows much greater familiarity than most biologists with the literature of sociology and anthropology.

He condemns "emotionalism," but there is marked emotion in much of his discussion, especially when Fascism, eugenism, and the virtues of science are in question. Men are always emotional when they are in earnest, whether they are saints or scientists. "Emotion" and its derivatives should be used for description, not derogation.

Haldane's book is also an effort at popularization but at a much higher level since it furnishes many data upon which Graubard's conclusions are based. Haldane destroys the race myth again, discusses differential fertility intelligently, exposes the fallacies of rampant eugenism, and is refreshingly conscious of his own possible biases. His opinions are modestly tentative, especially when they bear upon proposed political policies. He has invented some trenchant turns of phrase and logic which could be used with effect on those students and colleagues who attempt to supplement lack of knowledge by the intensity of their opinions.

Fifth Avenue to Farm is an example of what suburban farmer-lawyers ought not to try to write. Graubard and Haldane would be shocked by its "genetics," and serious students of rural and urban life will be shocked by its romantic idealization of the farm and its equally romantic damnation of the city. Differential fertility is the destructive demon of history; pioneers are the cream of the crop; "selective mating" has always been a beneficent principle, making for cultural and genetic stratification; our culture is probably doomed unless the "genetically superior" flee forthwith to the farm and raise a great many superior children. The authors think this is

beginning and will increase. To speed the happy day, they advocate that homesteads should be tax-free when operated by owners with their own hands. So everything will be all right, especially since these New Farmers will revive the moribund church.

READ BAIN

Miami University

Social Psychology. By DANIEL KATZ and RICHARD L. SCHANCK. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1938. Pp. xiv+700. \$3.75.

The authors admit that they sit at the feet of F. H. Allport. The text shows it, and so does the index. In influence and bulk of citations, Allport steals the show; E. B. Holt is runnerup; G. W. Allport comes in third. Others are not in the running. These three learned and scientific gentlemen are good men, but they are certainly not good enough to be the foundation of an entire social psychology.

Further support for the charge that the authors' scholarship is myopic can be found in their statement that the two classical texts in social psychology are McDougall's and Allport's, which is nothing short of travesty. The authors might also have consulted the *Child Development Abstracts*, to get acquainted with this gold mine of material for social psychology. After all, studies of the growth and social fashioning of children hold important secrets for a modern social-psychological text.

The first part of the K and S text deals with folkways, mores, institutions, and the forces producing uniform and variant behavior. Allport's J-curve hypothesis of conforming behavior is widely used and applied therein. Hertzler and Chapin are neglected in the discussion of institutions. The Park and Burgess processes of social interaction are used.

The second part of K and S attempts to describe the psychological foundations for social behavior and social processes—the nature of responses, of motivation, mechanisms of interaction and language. These matters are well and freshly covered.

The third part of the book contains the material on personality development and integration. It likewise is good and sufficient. Personality is viewed as the characteristic behavior of the individual. The self is conceived—and properly so—as one of the important integrating factors of personality, although the social psychology of self according to Cooley and George Mead is neglected. The factor of cultural variation is related to personality differences.

The fourth part of the text is merely a sugar-coated orientation to basic problems of sociology and public affairs. The material is thin; the bibliographical support, thinner. Nothing is said therein which is not said better and more thoroughly in current social science orientation and sociology texts.

The K and S social psychology is therefore a book of three parts (we will forgive and forget Part IV). All three of these parts stand well alone but not well together. Suppose an interested junior student were to ask Messrs. K and S to state the relation between conforming behavior and

personality, or between language, social interaction, mechanisms of interaction and self, what would the authors say? Whatever they might say, it has not been said in the book now under review.

If the first three parts could be properly interconnected, if Part IV could be dropped or really well done, if well-selected child development materials could be inserted, and if important contributors could more equally share the honors with the Allports and E. B. Holt, the text would be superfine. Even with these shortcomings noted, it is a good book. It appears to me to be the first social psychology written by psychologists which really takes sociological material and contributions into account, and gives a well-balanced perspective of both the psychological and sociological approaches.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

Vanderbilt University

Psychological Development. By NORMAN L. MUNN. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1938. Pp. xx+582. \$3.25.

An Introduction to Child Study. By RUTH STRANG. New York: The Macmillan Co., rev. ed., 1938. Pp. xv+618. \$3.00.

Social Psychology of Adolescence. By E. DE ALTON PARTRIDGE. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938. Pp. xiv+361. \$2.75.

The Adolescent. By ADA HART ARLITT. New York: *Whittlesey House*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938. Pp. ix+242. \$2.00.

Parents in Perplexity. By JEAN CARTER. New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1938. Pp. vii+143. \$1.00.

The titles of these five books suggest that they either bear upon or draw from social psychology. Only the first can, however, be considered of potential interest to the sociologist.

Very much the vogue ten years ago, that eclectic field which endeavors to bring the findings of the various biological sciences to bear upon the problem of human behavior and which has taken the name "genetic psychology" has of late been decidedly *passé*. Possibly it was the futile effort to interpret the whole of human behavior in terms of biological data which led to declining respect for the genetic approach. In his *Psychological Development*, Munn provides a sane, cautious, and thorough analysis of the field which may go far to revive interest in the subject. He seldom loses sight of the fact that the human organism develops in a social matrix, and he frequently points out that the direction and range of such development are to be understood only in terms of sociological and socio-psychological factors. The book is by far the best general treatment of the field to appear. The findings of research workers are covered meticulously, but they are integrated and interpreted to make a meaningful story. Munn writes both clearly and interestingly. Chapter summaries serve to resolve and give point to the necessarily complex analysis in the text proper. Suggestions for further reading, an extensive bibliography, and an excellent subject index make the book pedagogically effective. It should prove to be an excellent text for

advanced students of psychology and a valuable reference book for social psychologists. The sociologist who believes that behaviorism has been replaced in psychology by Gestaltism or some other "ism" will find Chapter V on the learning process a revelation. Chapters XI and XII on symbolic behaviors will prove of special interest to all social psychologists.

The effort to reduce the findings of the social sciences to practical precepts for the guidance of the layman still continues, but with no improvement in results. Strang's revision of *An Introduction to Child Study* is a nontechnical, practical treatment of many of the problems which adults might be expected to encounter in dealing with the child from birth through adolescence. It succeeds in being generally unsentimental, although the author could not resist the temptation to include an irrelevant picture of the Dionne quintuplets. The treatment suffers badly, however, in that the book is designed to serve both as a text for orientation courses in child study and as a manual for the practicing parent. The analytical materials are lost in a wealth of homely advice on such subjects as what to feed the five-year-old.

Intended presumably for educators, particularly those who serve as counselors, Partridge's *Social Psychology of Adolescence* is an effort to draw from socio-psychological sources all the findings which bear upon adolescent adjustment in modern society. His treatment, however, is sketchy; he hastens by the subject of adolescent maladjustments with eyes averted and cheeks flushed, and there is something Victorian in his repeated reference to adolescent girls as "young ladies." In general, his presentation is such that it suggests he is writing for, rather than about, the immature.

Arlitt's *The Adolescent* is another of her paper pellets for perturbed parents. In earlier books, she has covered the infant and the preadolescent. She will next, one may fear, turn to advising the postadolescent how to take care of parents. The book is written in an easy-going manner and spiced with some common-sense advice. It might well distract the perturbed parent for an hour or two. The reviewer put down the book pleased to know that two adolescents can live together as cheaply as one (see table p. 235) but puzzled by the fact that their combined income is \$325.00 per month. Parents with such prosperous children should have few problems to worry them.

Carter's *Parents in Perplexity* is a report of a brief survey of parent-education activities throughout the country. This is the eleventh in a series of studies in adult education being made and published through funds provided by the Carnegie Corporation. The movement is an interesting and significant one and well worth serious study. This report, however, contains nothing of the slightest import. The general tone of the book can be judged from the fact that the author sees in the organization of parent education a battle-ground of the forces of democracy and authoritarianism! The book is, however, written in such evident enthusiasm and with such winning naïveté that it makes amusing reading.

RICHARD T. LAPIERE

University of Michigan

The Exploration of the Inner World. By ANTON T. BOISEN. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1936. Pp. xi+322. \$3.50.

In 1921, Dr. Boisen found himself a patient in a mental hospital where he was classified as a case of "catatonic dementia praecox." Of this experience he says in part: "It came over me like a flash that if inner conflicts like that which Paul describes in the famous passage in the seventh chapter of Romans can have happy solutions, as the church has always believed, there must also be unhappy solutions which thus far the church has ignored. It came to me that what I was being faced with in the hospital were the unhappy solutions. Most of the patients whom I saw around me would then be in the hospital because of spiritual or religious difficulties" (p. 5). Since his discharge from the hospital, Dr. Boisen has been continually engaged in developing his hunch concerning the relation of functional mental disorder to religious experience. His hypothesis is that mental disorder of the dementia praecox variety represents a problem-solving experience for the person involved, and as such, is an attempt to meet the sense of personal failure and isolation from one's fellows by casting out old beliefs and attitudes and thereby making possible a newer organization of the personality on a higher level than had previously been the case.

This hypothesis, Dr. Boisen attempts to check by two methods. His data consisted of the 173 research cases studied intensively by the staff at Worcester State Hospital. Dr. Boisen first analyzed these cases for the etiological factors presented and came to the conclusion that "the primary evil lies in realm of social relationships, particularly in a life situation involving the sense of personal failure" (p. 28). His second method is to compare the personal and social experience of a patient, used as a base line case, with the life histories of men of "unquestioned religious genius." Such men include, Saul of Tarsus, George Fox, John Bunyan, Emmanuel Swedenborg, and Jesus Christ. These men, unlike the mine-run of patients with functional mental disorders, passed through a period of acute mental disturbance, came out of it, organized their lives on a higher level, and passed on the insights obtained from their experiences to others.

These, briefly, are the facts which Dr. Boisen presents. His interpretation of these facts presents several difficulties. If, as Dr. Boisen insists, dementia praecox represents a variety of religious experience, the question might be raised as to whether or not all forms of personal maladjustment, in which the person has failed (in terms of our cultural values) in some aspect of his life, are not also examples of religious experience. In fact, Dr. Boisen somewhat implies this by his comparison of criminals with schizophrenic personalities. However, he finds that the criminals escape mental breakdowns because of their identification with groups which support their rebellious attitudes while the psychotic continues to accept the standards and judgments of his early guides. Is this lack of emotional development to be considered as the forerunner of religious experience?

The unusual significance assigned to the content of the patient's thought and the religious concern manifested by the patient can be questioned in the light of the definitions. If religion is conceived of as socialization on the level

which is universal and abiding (p. 305), then Dr. Boisen fails to take account of this definition in handling the problem of religious concern when he prefers to define religious concern in terms of orthodox theological principles and activities (p. 49). Then, the seventy-four cases which he found as showing no religious concern might well be classified as "religious" in the light of the broader definition. A patient might be faced with profound personal problems without manifesting any of the ideas or activities, such as attending church and participating in prayer, which Dr. Boisen defines as religious concern. In fact it is apparent from this book that Dr. Boisen finds difficulty in reconciling a dynamic humanistic view of religion with an older and static theological conception.

It would be impossible to conclude this review without a tribute to Dr. Boisen for the manner in which he has made a practical application of his ideas. He does not intend that ministers should supplant psychiatrists in the field of psychotherapy, but he does contend that ministers should have some training and experience with the mentally ill in order that they will be wiser both in the varieties of human nature and in the detection of mental difficulties in their own church members. Toward this end, Dr. Boisen founded the *Council for the Clinical Training of Theological Students*, for the purpose of providing for the future ministers an experience with the mentally ill. For this contribution to the life of the mental hospital, Dr. Boisen should long be remembered. As one who has been in contact with this program on occasion, I can only say, in all sincerity, that Dr. Boisen and his students have made a real contribution to the mental hospital by providing a valuable socialization program for those persons who are caught in the maze of mental illness. The book contains a glossary, a bibliography, and an index.

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Chicago

The Christian Understanding of Man. By T. E. JESSOP, R. L. CALHOUN, N. ALEXEIEV, EMIL BRUNNER, AUSTIN FARRER, WALTER M. HORTON, and PIERRE MAURY. Chicago, New York: Willett, Clark, 1938. Pp. xii+268. \$2.00.

Psychology and Religion. By CARL GUSTAV JUNG. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. Pp. 131. \$2.00.

The Future of Freedom: Notes on Christianity and Politics. By DOUGLAS JERROLD. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1938. Pp. x+306. \$2.50.

Science has achieved some degree of mastery in the empirical realm, but it has made very little progress in the realm of subjective consciousness, in dealing with ethical value-judgments, and with the relation of man's spirit to whatever may be found to be supreme in the universe. The question of how to deal with these inner and ultimate problems has been central in the centuries-long controversy between science and religion. The issue has been raised vigorously in recent sociological discussions.

The Christian Understanding of Man is Volume II of the official books

put out by the world-wide conference at Oxford in 1937. As such it presents the nearest available approach to an authoritative statement of Protestant views on this issue. Some scientists have held that knowledge is possible only in the empirical realm. Jessop takes clear-cut issue with that position. He holds that ethics should have the fundamental marks of science—clarity, system, and evidence, even though the evidence of value is non-perceptual and hence (he asserts) lacks public demonstrability. Contributors to this volume agree that the findings of empirical science are to be adopted by Christians, but they insist upon the validity of wider interpretations in fields beyond the scope of empiricism. The reviewer is of the opinion that they have in general failed to face the full bearings of the findings of psychology, anthropology, history, textual criticism, and sociology upon the Christian records, traditions, and theology.

Psychology and Religion consists of three lectures delivered by Jung at Yale. He says: "I am an empiricist . . . [My standpoint] is concerned with occurrences, events, experiences, in a word, with facts." His facts belong quite largely to the inner world of dreams reported by his patients. Inner, "subjective" experiences may be objective and verifiable, if his reported data are reliable. This approach, if explored in its full implications, promises to destroy the barrier which both scientists and religionists have set up against applying scientific methods to extra-sensory experience.

The Future of Freedom is a compilation of sweeping and unsupported statements by a British publicist.

HORNELL HART

Duke University

Manual of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene. By AARON J. ROSANOFF. 7th edition, rewritten and enlarged. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1938. Pp. xviii+1091. \$7.50.

This edition of a long-standing classic in psychiatry is almost entirely rewritten and greatly enlarged, this time by the author himself. (Previous editions were of joint authorship.) The title, in fact, including as it does the term "mental hygiene," indicates something of the changes in emphasis taking place in the past ten or eleven years since the sixth edition. Yet in spite of the addition to the title, and although the author does give considerable recognition to the social factors in etiology, his fundamental acceptance of heredity as the basic "causal" factor in psychopathy remains unchanged. Since psychiatry follows the medical emphasis upon constitutional causation, and especially since so much of the work in this field deals with cases where organic lesion and toxic or infectious conditions do play a large role, it is only natural that there should be an underestimation of the place of social-cultural conditioning in the induction of mental disorders. But in the light of recent recognition of the play of environmental factors, it is surprising that the traditional bias should remain so completely unqualified. And when the discussion involves such items as so-called "anti-social personality"—considered here to be a definite tempera-

mental type—the author is on uncertain ground indeed. For instance, in discussing criminality he makes much of the factors of biological inheritance, basing his conclusions on such unsatisfactory data as those of Johannes Lange and of the Gluecks. There is nowhere in his discussion of crime and delinquency any mention of the work of Healy, Shaw, Burgess, and others who have studied misconduct in terms of the social and cultural setting in which it occurs. No one doubts that temperamental and emotional factors may play a part in misconduct, but to link it so definitely to innate and constitutional foundations is a gratuitous assumption.

In his treatment of the classification of symptoms, the author is cautious and critical. He avoids many of the oversimplifications of traditional Kraepelinian psychiatry. But even in his discussion of organic factors, there are some notable omissions. The section on the relation of the endocrines to psychopathology is brief, and there is no reference to the recent work of Hoskins and his colleagues in trying to get at the combination of constitutional and social-cultural "causes" in schizophrenia.

While the author refers to Terman and Miles' recent work on masculinity and femininity, he does not include Terman and Merrill's recent revision of the Stanford-Binet intelligence test, which will prove a handicap for those who wish to make use of that part of his section on "special diagnostic procedures."

KIMBALL YOUNG

University of Wisconsin

Emotion and the Educative Process. A Report to the American Council on Education. By DANIEL A. PRESCOTT. Washington: American Council on Education, 1938. Pp. 293. \$1.50.

Mental Conflicts and Personality. By MANDEL SHERMAN. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938. Pp. 319. \$2.25.

Personality in Formation and Action. By WILLIAM HEALY. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1938. Pp. 200. \$2.00.

The "report to the American Council on Education by its Committee on the Relation of Emotion to the Educative Process (under the chairmanship of Dr. Prescott) is the outcome of about four years work, and yet it professes to be only an 'exploratory study'." As such it is a highly commendable document which should be read by all educators (including parents).

It will no doubt be criticized for apparent sins of omission, especially, perhaps, by the psychoanalysts, although much of the discussion is predicated on a fundamental understanding of the contributions of this group. Its obvious merits, however, overshadow such criticism.

Perhaps one of the greatest contributions of the report is the disagreement which it may be expected to promote. ("Certainly, no member of the committee agrees with everything that appears in the report.") Throughout, emphasis is placed on the role of the school in the shaping of affective life, and it is to be hoped that the suggestions for needed research (noted especially, but not exclusively, in the chapter on "Aspects of Education Need-

ing Study") will stimulate a good deal of worth-while investigation. Certainly the committee has done a laudable job in indicating the paucity of significant data on most phases of affective life. It approaches the subject without bias and with every effort to provide a well-rounded picture including the physiological, social, cultural, and "individual" factors, each in its manifold aspects. It presents the best available experimental data, in the opinion of the committee, on each of the areas discussed, emphasizes the inadequacy of those data, and provides a measuring stick for use in planning further research. As an additional stimulus to constructive thought the study is studded throughout with cautions against uncritical acceptance of the experimental results quoted and the views expressed. It is impossible in a short review to give credit to other merits and the well-tempered point of view of this report. It is worthy of high recommendation.

Anyone reading *Mental Conflicts and Personality* will come away with the feeling that somehow he has a better understanding of the "how" and the "why" of human behavior. The approach is, of course, through the role of conflict in daily life. The point is well made that conflict may be either beneficial or detrimental depending, in general, on "the way in which a person responds to his conflicts." Following an introduction on "The Genesis and Nature of Conflicts," there is presented a section on "Attitudes and Conflicts" which emphasizes, for the later discussion, the attitudinal aspects of behavior. Specifically, the author concerns himself with conflicts in the spheres of culture, inferiority and insecurity, sex, neuroses, and antisocial behavior.

In each case he has presented useful case material to illustrate the dynamic, cumulative, and interactive nature of conflict development—always with emphasis on the importance of the ideational content as the directive force. His constant emphasis on the role of conflict in normal adjustment will receive hearty approval, and makes it a book which should be on all reading lists not only for students of personality, but also for the lay reader who may be temporarily disturbed by his own apparent troubles. It can be recommended with the assurance that the result will be a more normal and balanced point of view.

Dr. Healy's book is an easy series of associations, from a decidedly eclectic point of view, based on his "thirty years of experience in dealing with the problems which developing personalities present." He had drawn on a wide variety of anecdotal and life history material to illustrate the categories which he considers important in personality development.

The reader may be troubled by his rather natural overemphasis on the organic bases of behavior and by his apparent oversimplification of cases in spite of his occasional cautions that other fundamental motivations may have been operative. The impression is given that a personality is a persistent entity which is buffeted about by a series of isolated forces in directions which are determined in good part by constitutional characteristics. True, this entity is endowed with purposive behavior (even in the foetal stage), but it is only in the discussion of cultural factors and ideational content of stimuli that an approach is made to the concept that an individual

is a series of selves which are ever changing as a result not only of environmental stimuli, but also as a result of the individual's response or tendency to respond to these stimuli.

In general it is a book which is useful collateral reading for persons interested in broadening their association with case material or in acquainting themselves with the associated observations of a long-time supporter of mental hygiene.

NEAL DROUGHT

University of Chicago

Studies in Group Behavior. By GRACE LONGWELL COYLE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937. Pp. x+258. \$2.75.

This book is composed of records of the composition, activities, and reactions of "natural" club groups. The records were kept by group leaders for a two-year period.

The limitations in the study, admitted by the author, are the inadequacy of concepts for the analysis of social interaction with the group, lack of adequate training of the leaders in sociological analysis, the fact that the groups are "natural" groups only, and the fact that the groups are one-sex groups.

Of interest to the sociologist are the social processes leading to the leader-follower relationship, group ethnocentrism, and the impact of the larger community on the group. The study is of greater interest to the group leader, both for its concrete typical examples of social group activities and its potential value in furthering the discussion of common problems faced by leaders.

DONALD C. MARSH

Wayne University

Group Adjustment: A Study in Experimental Sociology. By WILBER I. NEWSTETTER, MARC J. FELDSTEIN, AND THEODORE M. NEWCOMB. Cleveland: Western Reserve Univ. 1938. Pp. xv+154. \$2.00.

After the theoretical pioneering into the interhuman problem, the actual study of groups and communities has come into the sociological orbit. It is in this category that the present work belongs.

Newstetter, the director of the project, points out in an introductory chapter: "No real evaluation of group work technique, methods and principles can be forthcoming until reliable and valid tools are developed, by means of which it is possible to estimate what is actually taking place in the group."

The experimental situation is a camp of boys. The boy to boy relationship is made the objective of a sociometric research. The two main phases of the study are "The Personal Preference Technique" and "Objective Observations of Groups and their Reliability."

The preferences the boys express for one another are tabulated and analyzed. Observations and recordings are made of every contact one boy

has with the other in reference to specific activity and for how long each contact lasts. These observations and recordings are made by several observers independently. The study demonstrates that the position of the individual in a group is not determined by his individual traits but by what the group partners think of him.

The main conclusions of the brilliant monograph are summarized by Newcomb: "Evidently an individual's group status is largely revealed in cordial behavior received from others but not very largely by his cordiality shown to others. . . . Interactions can apparently be measured. They are not the results of any measurable 'traits.' They are evidences of a pragmatic summing up of all pertinent traits by those in a position to know more about them than social investigators, the co-participants in the social situation."

If the study had emphasized no more than this, its publication would have been eminently justified.

J. L. MORENO

Beacon, N. Y.

Behaviorism at Twenty-five. By A. A. ROBACK. Cambridge: Sci-Art Publishers, 1937. Pp. 256. \$1.75.

This caustic book purports to be an investigation into the present status of behaviorism. In reality, however, Dr. Roback seems to have had three ideas in mind in its writing: (1) to argue his thesis that behaviorism is not psychology (he has proved elsewhere "that a behavioristic conception is fatal to all the arts and sciences which deal with human relations" pp. 114-5); (2) to reprint and amplify, after 13 years, his reply to an unfavorable review of his *Behaviorism and Psychology* (this requires 41 pages); and (3) to enumerate the miracles promised by behaviorism and inquire reproachfully why behaviorism has not fulfilled its pledges. "At any rate it cannot be said that in the 25 years of behaviorism we have had greater results [from psychological investigation] than in the quarter of a century preceding its birth" (p. 89).

His lists of "representative behaviorists" and "allies and sympathizers" of behaviorism lend an atmosphere of *Red Network* to the book.

There is a valuable bibliography on the subject of behaviorism containing 336 items, and indexes of names and subjects.

J. E. HULETT, JR.

University of Illinois

Fundamentals of Sociology. By LOUIS A. BOETTIGER. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1938. Pp. xiii+752. \$4.00.

Mr. Boettiger writes that his book was "undertaken as a systematic text in sociology with a definite historical perspective." The systematization was achieved, in part, by the use of the Wiese-Becker terminology (*Systematic Sociology*), but there is little to indicate that the ideas supporting the latter were seriously considered. The effort to achieve "a definite histori-

cal perspective" was more successful, however; leaning heavily on Oswald Spengler's erudite organicism, the author has developed a complete, consistent, and unashamed fascist sociology. The book covers a tremendous stretch of territory, from enzymes to the Tennessee Valley Authority, but virtually every branch of the discussion—be it religion, race relations, the family, population, the status of women, war, crime, politics, or labor problems—is bent towards the Rome-Berlin axis.

This is not to suggest that a fascist bias is any more reprehensible than any other brand. Rather, this reviewer feels that when the writer of a textbook affirms his belief in the necessity for an objective, nonevaluative approach to sociological problems (Mr. Boettiger not only does this, but also devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of the various biases which the sociologist must avoid), one may legitimately object to his injection of a politico-economic prejudice into the main divisions of his work. Particularly is this true when the book is intended for the use of beginning students, who are consciously searching for a "scientific" political philosophy and whose ears are not sensitive to the sound of grinding axes.

The volume offers little grist for the mill of those who incline towards the psycho-sociological approach. Cooley is mentioned briefly, Dewey gets a wave of the hand, and George Herbert Mead is ignored. This is particularly surprising at the present time, when sociology and socio-psychology show a growing amalgamative tendency. Moreover, this reviewer found somewhat annoying the author's habit of frequently interrupting the discussion to dash into the wings, returning with either a large red herring or a copy of *The Decline of the West*, from which selected passages are reverently rendered.

Courses in sociology, however, are steadily becoming both more numerous and more heterogeneous, and the book will undoubtedly find favor somewhere. It certainly will be an indispensable tool for those instructors and students who believe with Mr. Boettiger that "Fascism is . . . the fulfillment of the conception of the capitalistic state which emphasizes its social responsibility to the entire population" (p. 603).

ROBERT SCHMID

University of Wisconsin

A Student's Dictionary of Sociological Terms. By CONSTANTINE PANUNZIO. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937. Pp. 49. \$1.00.

All fields of human activity, especially fields of learning, are marked in their development by an expanding body of concepts and terms distinctive of the field, and certainly one of the evidences that sociology is growing up is to be found in its rapidly growing vocabulary. Whereas Dr. Albion W. Small compiled in 1905 a catalogue of sociological concepts as chapter 29 of his *General Sociology*, involving only 80 major terms, there are now not less than 1200 having more or less general currency as part of the sociological vocabulary. The time is already here when its nomenclature definitely needs a distinctive dictionary of its own.

In the preface to this modest booklet, the first separate undertaking of its kind, Dr. Panunzio indicates that it is a part of a larger projected work. The present forerunner selects only 131 terms. Because of its brevity there may be a question as to its practical serviceability in the present form; more questionable is the choice of even these 131 items. While no two persons would make identical lists, the reviewer must be critical of one which includes terms so obviously marginal as *deathrate*, *divorce*, *hypothesis*, and *state*, and such unusual terms as *raciation* and *physiconatural*, while omitting such vital terms as *interest*, *person*, and *social force*, which have such a large place in our usage. The definitions themselves, some of them excellent, are supplemented by other definitions quoted from sociological literature. In a number of cases better quotations could have been found; but a more serious criticism is that the author omits to indicate that certain terms have two or more equally valid but different meanings. By giving only the one definition in such cases, he is automatically ignoring others equally valid which a dictionary should indicate. Since a major criterion of such a work should be consistency of treatment, one wonders what was the basis of selection that included *sociation* and *association* but not *dissociation*; *biological* factors, but not *social* factors; *paleolithic* and *neolithic* but not *colithic*; and *custom*, but not *taboo*. It is to be hoped that the contemplated larger work will correct these objections, in order that its usefulness may be equal to the need.

EARLE EUBANK

University of Cincinnati

Sacrifices in Ancient Israel: Their Origins, Purposes and Development. By W. O. E. OESTERLEY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. Pp. 320. \$4.00.

Never to Die: The Egyptians in Their Own Words Selected and Arranged with Commentary. By JOSEPHINE MAYER and TOM PRIDEUX. New York. The Viking Press, 1938. Pp. 224. \$3.50.

The work by Oesterley is a very competent treatment of the subject of sacrifice as practiced by the Israelites. The first quarter of the volume consists of a concise but illuminating compilation of ideas on the various theories of the world-wide practice of sacrifice in both anthropological and Biblical literature, of sacrifices among the various early Semitic peoples, and the relationship of ritual and the offering of sacrifices. Here the idea is elaborated that all types of sacrifice were originally based on one or the other of three fundamental ideas and purposes, namely, to offer gifts, to effect communion, and to liberate and give life.

The body of the book is devoted to the evolution of Israelite sacrificial acts from these three angles in the successive periods of their life: the nomadic, the agricultural, the pre-exilic prophetic, the exilic and post-exilic, the post-Biblical and pre-Christian, and the period of Jesus. The general development of sacrifice as analyzed is from the purely utilitarian procedure of giving in order to receive to sacrifice for atonement, expiation, and

propitiation. The work has some value for anthropologists and sociologists, but the emphasis in the latter portion gives it primarily theological importance.

The second book is a well-selected collection of gems of ancient Egyptian literature, in the best translations. The format is excellent, and the illustrations are pertinent and well placed. Most of the material can be very appropriately used in conjunction with recent studies on the social thought of ancient Egypt. Some indication of the sources of the text in the main body of the work would have enhanced its scholarly usefulness.

University of Nebraska

J. O. HERTZLER

A History of Social Philosophy. By CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938. Pp. xiv+581. \$2.60.

Professor Ellwood's book invites comparison with several others in the field of history of theory. It differs from the recent two-volume work of Barnes and Becker in that it deals with social thinkers of Europe and the United States only, with no sociologist later than Sumner and Ward, and in that it is nowhere so searching in analysis nor so generous in documentation. It covers about the same ground as Lichtenberger's earlier volume, is more readable than that but less well provided with excerpts from source materials. Since Ellwood deals so frequently with theories of evolution and progress his book may be compared with J. B. Bury's *Idea of Progress*; the latter has the advantage of setting forth briefly but cogently the mode of thought characteristic of a period, before dealing with individual thinkers, so that a reader starts with some real reminders of the prevailing "climate of opinion."

Some will quarrel with the unqualified definition of social philosophy as "all that man has thought regarding human relations, their origin and destiny." In line with it, the author's plan, after giving biographical data for each thinker, is to note the kind or lack of scientific method in his theory, his doctrines of social origins, development, organization and functioning, order and progress, and, finally, Ellwood's criticism. The story is carried from Plato to the precursors of Comte, from Comte through Ward and Sumner, with one section devoted to various brands of one-sided determinists.

One may be enthusiastic about the general tenor of this book—for the writing of it was undoubtedly a labor of love and an act of devotion on the part of a man long valiant for sociology—but there are a number of shortcomings which this reviewer feels strongly. The chief faults are a kind of inaccuracy which roots in lack of conciseness in use of terms and lack of comprehensive presentation of currents of thought. For example, take several references to the eighteenth century: Hume is lauded for his experimental method, but every close student of the century knows that though Hume spoke fondly of the method, he performed no experiments; his method resolved itself into taking account of what he found. Again, surprise and regret are registered that Adam Smith seemed to have considered his

political economy a part of his moral philosophy and that Adam Ferguson blended his moral and political theories. Of course they did, since moral philosophy was the rubric under which much social theory was written until such time as the nineteenth-century emergence of the social sciences as independent disciplines. Other characterizations of authors as if they were more or less unique suggest that Ellwood would have done well to preface his analysis of individuals with some account of the general thought complexes of the century; thus he would have avoided this type of error. To skip to his treatment of a modern sociologist as exemplifying somewhat the same lack of conciseness and setting: his failure to reckon with various doctrines of evolution allows him to speak of Sumner's sociology as being mainly concerned with an evolutionary theory; the fact is that Sumner would have none of it, and it was Keller who superimposed the Darwinian formula on Sumner's unpublished materials and rationalized the procedure. He regrets, too, that Sumner did not emphasize social tradition; yet what are the folkways and mores but that? It is this kind of tightening up and fuller reckoning that the book needs.

These criticisms are not to say that there is not good and solid material in the volume, for there is. As one reads, one can almost hear and see Ellwood talking, smilingly persuasive, stating his trust in man's intelligence and his hope that sociology may yet see the error of its ways and become the reformer's science.

GLADYS BRYSON

Smith College

Priests and Prophets. By JACOB HOSCHANDER. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1938. Pp. xviii+362. \$3.00.

In the preface Dr. Adler states that the author "felt it almost a sacred duty to engage in polemics against the modern Biblical criticism." Such being the case, the book hardly deserves notice in a scientific journal. The average constituent of the *American Sociological Review* would not be served by a lengthy analysis going into the dry technical details of the subject.

But there is a point of view from which the book has general significance for the sociologist. The Jewish people have been made increasingly "group conscious" by two forces, one of which is Biblical higher criticism, while the other is "anti-Semitism."

The older "orthodoxy" of Christians and Jews alike regarded the ancient Hebrew nation as a mere channel, or passive instrument, through which a theological revelation was projected into human history from a transcendental source. Thus, the ancient Hebrews were believed by their descendants and also by Christians to have been isolated from the social processes of antiquity. And accordingly, scholarship at one time divided history into the "sacred" and the "profane."

But modern Biblical criticism, in the non-Jewish universities, has discredited orthodoxy without replacing it by an intelligible version of ancient Hebrew history as the starting point of monotheism. This new movement

of scholarship was initiated, not by Gentiles, but by the acumen of such Jewish thinkers as Ibn Ezra in the twelfth century and Spinoza in the seventeenth. The higher criticism, then, while destroying a crude supernaturalism, has thus far merely shifted the basis of Hebrew isolation by failing to offer a positive substitute for orthodoxy. In other words, having been thrust out of the field of realistic history by an artificial distinction between the "sacred" and "profane," the Hebrew people were now apparently deprived of their credentials as a divinely chosen group at the very time when anti-Semitism was taking violent forms.

Dr. Hoschander's treatise will have significance for the sociologists as an example of the many attempts made by Jewish and Christian scholars to reinterpret the Hebrew people as a social group functioning in world history. The author's opposition to Biblical criticism, however, puts the volume under a heavy disadvantage; at the same time, his exploitation of orthodoxy will fail to satisfy the orthodox. The book will not contribute anything toward the problem of Israel as the bearer of monotheism.

LOUIS WALLIS

Kew Gardens, Long Island, N. Y.

Co-operation or Coercion? By L. P. JACKS. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1938. Pp. xvii + 153.

This small volume from the pen of one long famous as the editor of the *Hibbert Journal* should receive the attention of the world, and will probably claim a goodly share of it. Aside from its appeal to common human nature and its aspirations, the essay has special significance for historians, political scientists, economists, and sociologists.

The style is lucid in both logic and expression, and the reasoning weighted with a generous supply of factual material and plain common sense. But since it is the argument that makes its high significance for the present hour, we proceed at once to summarize it in briefest possible form. The League of Nations rests on the exploded Contract Theory of Rousseau, and adds some further defects: namely, possesses no taxing power; no recognized adjudication over its members (the states); does not, as do national governments, provide for change in the possessions and status of its members, but tries to maintain their *status quo*. Security rests in the last resort on the good faith of those who plight their word. But the parties to the League Covenant are "sovereign" states which never have submitted and never will submit to coercion from other states, or join forces to coerce other states. The hope that bloodshed can be avoided by a "brandishing of irresistible arms in the aggressor's face" has been shown to be vain. Yet the League itself is "the most promising institution in the world" if it will renounce violent coercion, or the threat of it, adopt the "indirect" method, and become a "grand Training School for the nations in the art and practice of international co-operation." In the midst of international political perfidy, international business relations go quietly along, thus showing the way out for the League. On this line Josiah Royce pioneered

in his *War and Insurance*, published in 1914. Mr. Jacks proposes a very definite plan of international mutual insurance against war disasters, especially favorable to the nonaggressor in every instance. He applies the plan of Royce in such a way as to divert say ten percent of all armament budgets to an International Fund, to be used "for promoting and financing economic co-operation on definite lines."

Of interest to social scientists are the contentions that the American Constitution does not, as often argued, supply an analogy for coercive world organization, in view of the fact that coercion of the states was rejected explicitly by Hamilton, Madison, and Ellsworth, as being sure to plunge the states into civil war and separation. Instructive also is the chapter showing that England and France developed their present close friendship through their commercial treaty of 1859.

Sociologists in particular will notice that Jacks' argument supersedes that of Ward's *Pure Sociology*, Sumner's essay on "War," and Giddings' *Democracy and Empire*. All these writers held the process of enlargement of peace areas through conflict to be an essential aspect of the order of things in the world, whereas Jacks thinks "This line of evolution has now reached its term." On the other hand Ward's "method of indirection" (in *Dynamic Sociology*) and Novicow's mutual service through "exchange" (in his "Foundations of a Sociology of Peace," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 23, pp. 289-349) are both given new significance as basic social processes.

CLARENCE MARSH CASE

University of Southern California

Experience and Education. By JOHN DEWEY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. Pp. xii+116. \$1.25.

Teaching and Scholarship and the Res publica. By FRANZ SCHNEIDER. Berkeley: the Pestalozzi Press, 1938. Pp. ii+86. \$1.25.

Outposts of the Public School. By WATSON DICKERMAN. New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1938. Pp. vii+76. \$0.75.

Learning in Leisure (The What and Why of Adult Education), Social Science Series No. 4. By A. STEPHEN STEPHAN. Saint Paul: Department of Education, State of Minnesota, 1938. Pp. 85. \$0.25.

Adult Abilities. By HERBERT SORENSON. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938. Pp. xiii+190. \$2.00.

Mind in Transition. By JOSEPH K. HART. New York: Covici-Friede, 1938. Pp. xii+413. \$3.50.

There is much too little tough-minded realism in democratic educational theory. Our liberal educators have bandied back and forth pet stereotypes such as "free intelligence," "creative mind," "the democratic way of life," "scientific method," until these terms have become clichés of a coterie, nobly intentioned though it may be. They shy in horror at the mention of indoctrination and propaganda; and any alert social psychologist knows

that the latter, at least, is indispensable in the modern world of mass communication and mass movement. How to implement the grand and vague programs of liberal educators is a problem that even the Deweyans, their problem-solving approach notwithstanding, hardly consider.

The books under review, with the exception of that by Herbert Sorenson, suffer to a greater or lesser degree from the loves and hates of the democratic educators.

As usual John Dewey is heuristic rather than positive, formulative rather than definitive. He repeats in condensed form his well known message of experience, scientific method, and democracy and the implications of these in raising the quality of living to the highest possible level. All this is old stuff to readers of Dewey, but the repetition of it is keenly executed and there is much good reformulation throughout. New readers will find here an excellent summary, brought up to date, of Dewey's educational thought.

The discussion centers around a contrasting of progressive with traditional education. The new education, Dewey says, should not merely reject the old and set up dogmas of its own, but should critically examine its principles and problems and rebuild upon the basis of this examination. In this rebuilding it should take over the solid materials of the old education and use them in the construction of a philosophy of education based upon a theory of experience. This means a utilization of the past, an ordering and guiding of activities, and an organization of materials, methods, and ideas so as to make for intelligent and purposeful, not aimless endeavor.

Dewey's profound and inspiring exposition, as ever, lacks definiteness. What purposes does he have in mind, for instance, when he says that the freedom of enduring importance is intellectual freedom "in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while"? (p. 69). His social psychology, usually sound, goes astray when he assigns equal weights to the objective and internal conditions of interaction. It seems to us that the comparative strengths of outer and inner factors vary as to circumstances, as to time and place, and as to changes occurring in the factors themselves. For example, at one time the individual may dominate the environmental situation, at another time the converse may hold.

Franz Schneider, a sage of many years' experience in university teaching, calls upon education, particularly liberal arts education in the colleges, to save the world. His language is beautiful and eloquent, a delight and an inspiration, but his optimism verges on the naïve. While the world is appraised intelligently for what it is, the thesis put forward that improvement in the curricula and the teaching of the liberal arts will bring quick improvement to society is nothing short of Pollyannish.

We wish that Watson Dickerman's report had given a more extended treatment of failures in adult education instead of a passing mention. Far too much of adult education literature has been soaked with sentimental success stories and this book is no exception, as the opening chapter shows. Dickerman describes examples of the new, informal type of adult school. This type is found in well-to-do suburban communities and is composed of

already well educated students. The author refuses to admit that it is essentially a middle class institution.

The pamphlet by Dr. A. Stephen Stephan attempts to outline what adult education is and why it should be promoted. It is handicapped by a pedestrian style and by careless typography. Like the majority of such works, it is overly inspirational and fails to link up adult education with social and political movements of the times.

Herbert Sorenson has given us an excellent descriptive summary of studies of extension students at seven universities. This little book is a real contribution to the literature on adult education. Instead of offering the usual stodgy sentimentality, it tells us who adult students are and what they do. The author wisely recommends that adults keep on learning, diversify their experience, and tackle new problems in order to keep their mental powers at par.

Not until late in his rather large volume does Joseph K. Hart really get under way. Before that time his book consists of hortatory historical review that drags along; after that it warms up and we are treated to keen observations on the plight of modern society and an intelligently eloquent plea for humanitarian science as the instrument of social reconstruction. To be sure, the exhortation continues until the very end, but it grows inspired, alive, and revealing.

The theme of the book is the conflict between the old and the new mentality, between what the author variously calls primitive, patterned, traditional mind and scientific, free, creative mind. The evolution of mind is traced from primitive stages to the high promise given by modern, scientific thought. In his account Hart commits the egregious though common blunder of labelling Marx's theories as "economic determinism," which, as scholars now know, is but a caricature of Marxism. Among his keener comments are such statements as: The common people (workers) have carried on civilization despite philosophers, despots, and generals; the American pioneer farmer was not a democrat but an incipient capitalist; the social sciences, despite an increasing prolificity, are not at all taken seriously, their voluminous literature being ignored or discarded.

ARTHUR KATUNA

Bacone College

Honesty. By RICHARD C. CABOT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. Pp. ix+326. \$2.50.

Towards an Objective Ethics. By GEORGE RAYMOND GEIGER. Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1938. Pp. 87. \$1.00.

Cabot's book is offered as the first elaborate analysis of the effects of lying and truth-telling upon the self, upon other individuals, and upon "society at large." A lie is defined as an attempt to deceive without consent. The central hypothesis of the volume is that a lie is never justified—not even in dealing with the dying and the insane. The author sets out to test this hypothesis by an analysis of short-run and long-run effects of honesty

and lying in international relations, internal politics, labor relations, science, education, medicine, social work, art, religion, and the so-called polite relations. He concludes that the long-run consequences of lying and truth-telling are exceedingly difficult to predict in any particular case, but that truth-telling is far more likely to have beneficial effects and that, therefore, it is safer always to tell the truth. At one juncture he concedes that lying might justifiably be done to certain persons intent on crime and violence, but in the rest of the book he contradicts that concession. Sociologists have been interested in Healy's work on pathological lying. They may find in this volume by a physician-professor some hypotheses for the study of the social implications of other types of lying. It would be interesting to have the author's central hypothesis tested by far more evidence than he has submitted—particularly statistical evidence. Perhaps most of us are predisposed to doubt that lying necessarily weakens social organization by destroying our faith in each other, that it necessarily acts as a boomerang by destroying our self-respect, and that those who advocate beneficent lies are necessarily preoccupied with short-run implications and underestimate the untrained, the sick, and the insane man's thirst for and ability to endure facts when these are presented with obvious kindness. But the author at least leaves us with a profound sense of the need for and the practicability of elaborate research in order that decisions as to when to lie and when not to lie may be taken more out of the realm of guesswork than they are now. He of course carefully differentiates the socially beneficial from the socially detrimental types of frankness and evasion.

Geiger shows that the notion that ethics cannot be a science is based upon the assumption that ethics must be absolutistic. He then proposes Dewey's relativistic ethics and ably shows how the scientific method can be used as truly in ethics as in any of the recognized social sciences. This book is a useful corrective for those sociologists who assume that the method of ethics is different from the method of the recognized social sciences.

ALBERT BLUMENTHAL

Marietta College

Play and Mental Health. By JOHN EISELE DAVIS. New York: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1938. Pp. xvi+202. \$2.50.

A Conservative Generation's Amusements. By ESTHER ALICE PECK. Bangor: University of Maine Studies, Second Series, No. 44, 1938. Pp. xi+119. \$0.50.

Recreation in Church and Community. Ed. by WARREN T. POWELL. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1938. Pp. 136. \$0.75.

In *Play and Mental Health*, an attempt is made to develop a psychology of play in line with recent advances in psychiatry. The author, who is a lay worker in a veteran's hospital, has written out of his experience with recreational therapy for the mentally ill. The book is addressed primarily to

school teachers and is designed to acquaint them with fundamental psychiatric concepts and mechanisms of conduct that will facilitate the more effective use of play in the education of children. Among the topics discussed are the recreational aptitudes and interests of adolescence, guidance of the competitive spirit in recreation, discipline through play, improvement of emotional life through play, play and adjustment to the outside world, psychoanalysis of play activities, and socialization of play. The volume is clearly written with a minimum of technical language and an abundant use of illustrative materials.

A Conservative Generation's Amusements is the title of a master's thesis dealing with recreational customs and attitudes in Connecticut during the first half of the nineteenth century. The materials gathered from original sources provide an interesting chapter in the early history of American recreation in a state where Puritan traditions were dominant. Historical studies of this kind are needed for an understanding of the backgrounds of the modern recreation movement.

Powell's small volume is a recreational handbook for church leaders interested in building up recreational programs under religious auspices. Introductory chapters discuss recreational trends and objectives but the main body of the book describes methods of organization and administration, principles of program construction, and types of recreational programs that have been found successful by church leaders. Two of the three contributors to the volume are teachers of physical education while the third is a director of musical activities.

J. F. STEINER

University of Washington

Youth Tell Their Story. By HOWARD M. BELL. Washington: The American Council on Education, 1938. Pp. 273. \$1.50.

A New Deal for Youth. By BETTY and ERNEST K. LINDLEY. New York: The Viking Press, 1938. Pp. xvi+315. \$3.00.

American Youth: An Annotated Bibliography. By LOUISE ARNOLD MENEFFEE and M. M. CHAMBERS. Washington: American Council on Education. Pp. xi+492. \$3.00.

The first of these books is a sober and disquieting survey of the manner in which young people are weathering the depression in the state of Maryland, with important implications for the country as a whole. The second volume is an enthusiastic exposition of the part the Federal government has had in easing the impact of the lean years, through the National Youth Administration. The last is a general source of information on a wide variety of topics concerning American youth. These books are reviewed in the order given.

Youth Tell their Story is precisely what the title implies—a sample of 13,000 youth, from 16 to 24 years old, responding to the carefully selected questions of 35 trained interviewers in the cities, towns, and rural areas of Maryland. The book consists simply of the tabulated results of these inter-

views, burdened with a minimum of editorial garnish, and brightened by the pictorial graphs of an artist with a sense of humor.

The larger part of the study is devoted to an attempt to define the actual conditions under which youth are living, and the picture presented is not a pretty one. The viciousness of the downward economic spiral (low wages of parent plus large family plus limited education = new generation with low wages, etc.) is readily apparent, and the need for deep-striking revisions of national economic, social, and educational policies lurks behind each table and graph.

As might be expected, the second and much smaller section devoted to attitudes is inferior to the more concrete "conditions" emphasis of the early chapters. So-called attitudes, where they are not checked in the light of actual behavior in the situations studied, are frequently little more than transitory opinions. Thus it is doubtful that much reliance can be put on the tables purporting to represent youth's attitudes toward war, drinking, child labor, or relief. These opinions may point to attitudes, but until a check-up with actual behavior has confirmed the hypothesis they had better not be dignified by the term "attitude" which, it is assumed, refers to relatively stable tendencies to act. Nevertheless, this is a good book.

The Lindleys' frankly partisan, somewhat defensive, but nevertheless enlightening story of the National Youth Administration contains many pages of material pertinent to an understanding of the psycho-sociological processes involved in the adjustment of youth to the demands of a malfunctioning economic and social order. A large part of the book—too much, perhaps—is devoted to the actual accomplishments of the program, in terms of the number of school houses rebuilt, recreational centers refurnished, and buildings erected. But there are many pearls among the oysters; for example, this homely illustration of psychic income from the NYA in terms of ego-rewards, given by a young recipient of NYA help:

"Maybe you don't know what it's like to come home and have everyone looking at you, and you know they're thinking, even if they don't say it, 'He didn't find a job.' It gets terrible. You just don't want to come home . . . But a guy's gotta eat some place and you gotta sleep some place. . . . I tell you, the first time I walked in the front door with my paycheck, I was somebody."

The book is enhanced by the authors' lucid style and by frequent illustrations, in the form of photographs of NYA youth at work and direct quotations from supervisors, national leaders of the program, and the youth themselves. An appendix of nearly 100 pages provides factual information for those with special interests in this field.

Probably not every sociologist is catholic enough in his interests to warrant his owning the American Youth Association's bibliography, but this volume should certainly find its way into every general library. The work explores the field thoroughly, and is based on a comprehensive survey of a wide range of books and periodicals.

The annotations following each of the 2000 items are in most cases sufficient to give at least a general idea of the content of the article or book re-

ferred to, and the division of subject matter is generally good, although there is perhaps an undue emphasis on *child* problems which are not ordinarily considered under the youth rubric. The directory of publishers and the lengthy cross-referenced index is a welcome accessory.

ROBERT SCHMID

University of Wisconsin

The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation. By WILLARD WALLER. New York: Cordon Co., 1938. Pp. 621. \$3.25.

New Horizons for the Family. By UNA BERNARD SALT. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xiii+772. \$4.00.

Mr. Waller has given us a book which is novel in more ways than one. In style and arrangement the work departs markedly from the conventional textbook form. In organizing the material around the chronological family experience from life in the parental family through courtship, the first year of marriage, parenthood, to the "stage of the empty nest" the author has further departed from the academic rut. Added new features are the best discussion in sociological literature of courtship as a process, and an excellent analysis of bereavement and its effect on family relationships.

By far the most important innovation is the attempt to write a systematic social psychology of the family. The usual historical, ethnological, statistical, and social trend cargo is jettisoned in order to hold to the social-psychological course mapped out in the first section of the book. In the opinion of the reviewer this latter feature makes the book a genuine contribution.

Three years ago Harriet Mowrer published her *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*. That work has stood until the present as the most systematic attempt to apply social-psychological theory to the analysis of family relations. Waller, with his excellent grasp of the theories of Dewey, Mead, and Freud has pushed the application to new levels. The organization of social-psychological theory is around the core concept of habit (as Dewey uses the term). It must be said that the systematizing attempt is not entirely successful. What appears to be a fairly stable framework of concepts in the first section of the book tends to crumble into a somewhat confusing eclecticism in the later discussions of concrete family relations. In all fairness, one must hasten to add that this defect cannot be laid at the author's door, but rather charged to the chaotic condition of social psychology.

Certain minor criticisms may be listed: (1) The author seems needlessly to lapse into subtle but bitter cynicisms about the "realities" of marriage as opposed to the illusions of courtship. To be sure there is ample justification for such emphasis in a day of "happy-ever-after" Hollywood banalities; but such coloring detracts from rather than adds to the value of the book. (2) There is a tendency to draw too sharply the line between the blue haze experience of courtship and the dull gray experience of marriage. In the

histories of relatively mature personalities, the disparities between courtship and marriage are rarely so marked. Again, however, there is justification for the overemphasis. (3) There is need in the book for a more explicit statement of the limitations imposed by the context and point of view within which and from which the author does his analysis of family dynamics.

Notwithstanding these and other possible criticisms, this book stands as the best and most systematic work on the social psychology of the family to date.

New Horizons for the Family is philosophic, historical, and descriptive rather than analytic. It offers no new orientation in the approach to the family, nor does it present novel lines of research. The organization of the work is a combination of Goodsell's *History of the Family and Problems of the Family*.

The first 225 pages are devoted to a summary of the anthropological and historical materials. The next section is on "the modern family," in which the author discusses education in the school and home, child welfare, changes in the status of women, population and birth control, family instability, and the "emergence of the co-operative family." Another section is devoted to practical problems of housekeeping, homemaking, family recreation, etc., along the line of recent developments in the general field of home economics. A final section is devoted to a projection into the future of hopes and aspirations for a finer and more satisfying family life.

The treatment of the material does not add greatly to our insight into the nature of family life as a form of social experience. However, at various points in the discussion rather stimulating insights and leads occur. For example in discussing education, the author makes a number of highly relevant and pointed statements regarding the unsatisfactory character of education and points to the relevance for both family and school of some of the ideas of progressive education. Again in discussing the changing status of woman, the contradictory values and roles facing the modern woman are well brought out.

While it does not contribute any new departures, this work will be useful as a reference of summaries of much recent factual data on problems of the family.

LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR.

Cornell University

The Art and Science of Marriage. By ESTHER B. TIETZ and CHARLES K. WEICHERT. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938. Pp. xii+279. \$2.50.

Sex Satisfaction and Happy Marriage. By the REVEREND ALFRED HENRY TYRER. New York: Emerson Books, 1938. Pp. 158. \$2.00.

Both of these books are reasonably good, viewed from the standpoint of what the authors are trying to do. The first devotes 15 of its 22 chapters to the structure and functions of the human body, but it is not a "comprehen-

sive analysis" of marriage problems as Dr. Morris Fishbein, M.D., editor of the series, alleges in his introduction. Dr. Fishbein declares that all previous books have been one-sided, reflecting the previous experiences of the authors. He implies that the present volume is an exception. It certainly is not. It is two-thirds biology and one-third psychiatry. Dr. Weichert is a biologist, Dr. Tietz a psychiatrist. The first three and the last four chapters on such subjects as courtship, marriage, adolescence, and parenthood are more likely to interest the general reader than detailed descriptions of the bones and muscles, of the circulatory, digestive and respiratory systems. Some of the statements on birth control and sterilization are factually doubtful and the tone is altogether too conservative.

Reverend Tyrer is a Canadian clergyman who has counselled on marriage for some years. His book is, on the whole, sound medical popularization, and he shows a progressive and enlightened viewpoint. His short book, written in simple language, will be especially helpful for those of the general public whose orthodox religious sentiments are a barrier to needed adjustments. The treatment is elementary throughout but withal sensitive to the needs of the public. The book answers common questions. The authors of the first book under review evidently never stopped to ask themselves what these common questions were.

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